I'm always excited to see the newest issue of Tennessee Historical Quarterly appear in my mailbox. There tends to always be at least one Civil War article, sometimes the whole issue is Civil War themed. Also it seems that the past few years have seen quite a few Shiloh articles. This past Wednesday I received the latest issue and there were two Civil War articles and one of them was Shiloh themed.
Donald A. Clark wrote a pretty good piece on the Army of the Ohio's advance from
Nashville to Savannah, arriving in time to see combat on April 7th, with advance units reaching the Shiloh battlefield as the first day's fight was winding down. The article nearly gives a day by day account of the march across middle Tennessee with highlights from soldiers' diaries and letters. I especially liked this as it now seems like I could retrace Buell's route pretty closely.
There are things I wish the author had expanded on. He says that its now clear that Grant's army would have prevailed in the battle even without the assistance from Buell. I'm not 100% in agreement. I think the second day would have gone for the Union and that the Confederates would have retreated back to Corinth. But I think that it would have taken longer for the Union to reclaim its old camps and while in reality Grant did not use April 8th to make it a horrible disaster for the Confederacy that opportunity likely would not have even been possible if Buell had never arrived.
William "Bull" Nelson comes off quite well in the article, a conclusion I too agree with. If he had lived through the war I think he would have made some nice contributions to the Union cause. Clark has written a biography of Nelson that will be coming out this winter from Southern Illinois University.
I do think though that some of Clark's article was clumsy. When he talked about battle sequences he jumbled them up a bit. The article makes it sound like once the Peach Orchard line collapsed Grant started to bring up the siege guns to anchor a line of artillery near the landing. In reality those siege guns had started moving into position earlier in the morning, they are just too heavy for rapid movement. This might just be an editing oversight, if that paragraph had been moved up a few paragraphs it would be in the right order and make perfect sense.
Clark also revealed more about how much Grant and Buell were communicating with each other, something I had not really given much thought. But Grant sent two officers (presumably with some sort of escort) to find Buell as he marched across the state. Clark refers to one as Grant's best scout, which made me wonder how things might have been different if this scout had been available on the morning of April 6 to lead Lew Wallace into position. That is just one of the little things that perhaps changed part of the battle.
Friday, July 30, 2010
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga and the Organizations Engaged
The Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga and the Organizations Engaged. By Henry V. Boynton. Edited by Tim Smith.
Henry V. Boynton should be much more well known than he is. It is due to his efforts that the battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga were preserved by the federal government, the first battlefields to be preserved by the federal government. This lead to the creation of other battlefield parks in the 1890s and has continued to the present day. When the battlefields were preserved one of the first tasks was to create troop movement maps with accompanying text, which then became the basis for the iron interpretive markers on the battlefields.
In his role as the first park historian Boynton wrote quite a bit on Chickamauga and Chattanooga. He wrote an extensive tour of the battlefields with a history of the preservation efforts. He also wrote a book covering the formation of the park for the grand dedication in 1895. These books can still be found in libraries and appear for sale online quite regularly. Boynton also wrote three small books that are much less readily available in libraries or for sale. Timothy B. Smith has collected these three short volumes into one book. He also provides an introduction that places Boynton and these three volumes in their proper historical context. The three volumes are presented as originally published, Smith confined his notes about the books to the introduction.
This is a very useful addition to the study of these battles. These rare volumes can now be owned by anyone. Then being able to pair the text with the maps, available online, makes it an even more worthwhile book.
If you wish to learn more about Boynton’s role in the formation of Chickamauga check out A Chickamauga Memorial: The Establishment of America’s First Civil War National Military Park by Timothy B. Smith
The full review will appear here after its publication in Civil War News.
Henry V. Boynton should be much more well known than he is. It is due to his efforts that the battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga were preserved by the federal government, the first battlefields to be preserved by the federal government. This lead to the creation of other battlefield parks in the 1890s and has continued to the present day. When the battlefields were preserved one of the first tasks was to create troop movement maps with accompanying text, which then became the basis for the iron interpretive markers on the battlefields.
In his role as the first park historian Boynton wrote quite a bit on Chickamauga and Chattanooga. He wrote an extensive tour of the battlefields with a history of the preservation efforts. He also wrote a book covering the formation of the park for the grand dedication in 1895. These books can still be found in libraries and appear for sale online quite regularly. Boynton also wrote three small books that are much less readily available in libraries or for sale. Timothy B. Smith has collected these three short volumes into one book. He also provides an introduction that places Boynton and these three volumes in their proper historical context. The three volumes are presented as originally published, Smith confined his notes about the books to the introduction.
This is a very useful addition to the study of these battles. These rare volumes can now be owned by anyone. Then being able to pair the text with the maps, available online, makes it an even more worthwhile book.
If you wish to learn more about Boynton’s role in the formation of Chickamauga check out A Chickamauga Memorial: The Establishment of America’s First Civil War National Military Park by Timothy B. Smith
The full review will appear here after its publication in Civil War News.
Monday, July 26, 2010
The Chickamauga Campaign
The Chickamauga Campaign. Edited by Steven E. Woodworth.
Western theater battles often lack the coverage that Eastern theater battles do. This discrepancy will never be erased but lately there has been a surge of Western Theater material. Partially trying to fill this void is the Civil War Campaigns in Heartland series from Southern Illinois University Press. The second volume, covering the Chickamauga campaign, follows on the heels of the wonderful Shiloh volume published last year.
Editor Steven E. Woodworth has assembled eight essays that explore some aspects of the campaign and provoke some critical thinking. The collection of essays focuses more on the Confederate side than the Union side. There are essays on D. H. Hill, Alexander Stewart, James Longstreet, Patrick Cleburne’s night assault, James Negley’s actions on Horseshoe Ridge, the performances of Thomas Crittenden and Alexander McCook, the near battle of McLemore’s Cove and Henry Van Ness Boynton’s shaping of Chickamauga as a national park. Although the collection focuses more on the Confederates it is not a distracting decision especially since the essay on Crittenden and McCook is nearly three times the length of the other essays, so the page count is probably pretty closely divided.
All the essays were good, there did not seem to be a weak one in the collection. There are four maps at the front of the book. Although it is nice to have maps these are not the best maps as all troop locations are shown as a horizontal box. On a theater map this is fine but on a battlefield map this makes it appear as if all troops were facing north or south. Some maps from contributor David Powell’s recent “Maps of Chickamauga” would have been better.
The problems with the maps though are easily overlooked though because of what a wonderful collection of essays this is. With two volumes in the Campaigns in Heartland series completed this series is now established as one to pay attention to for all future installments.
Contributors were John R. Lundberg, Alexander Mendoza, David Powell, Ethan S. Rafuse, William G. Robertson, Timothy B. Smith, Lee White, and Steven E. Woodworth.
The full review will be posted after its publication in Civil War News.
Western theater battles often lack the coverage that Eastern theater battles do. This discrepancy will never be erased but lately there has been a surge of Western Theater material. Partially trying to fill this void is the Civil War Campaigns in Heartland series from Southern Illinois University Press. The second volume, covering the Chickamauga campaign, follows on the heels of the wonderful Shiloh volume published last year.
Editor Steven E. Woodworth has assembled eight essays that explore some aspects of the campaign and provoke some critical thinking. The collection of essays focuses more on the Confederate side than the Union side. There are essays on D. H. Hill, Alexander Stewart, James Longstreet, Patrick Cleburne’s night assault, James Negley’s actions on Horseshoe Ridge, the performances of Thomas Crittenden and Alexander McCook, the near battle of McLemore’s Cove and Henry Van Ness Boynton’s shaping of Chickamauga as a national park. Although the collection focuses more on the Confederates it is not a distracting decision especially since the essay on Crittenden and McCook is nearly three times the length of the other essays, so the page count is probably pretty closely divided.
All the essays were good, there did not seem to be a weak one in the collection. There are four maps at the front of the book. Although it is nice to have maps these are not the best maps as all troop locations are shown as a horizontal box. On a theater map this is fine but on a battlefield map this makes it appear as if all troops were facing north or south. Some maps from contributor David Powell’s recent “Maps of Chickamauga” would have been better.
The problems with the maps though are easily overlooked though because of what a wonderful collection of essays this is. With two volumes in the Campaigns in Heartland series completed this series is now established as one to pay attention to for all future installments.
Contributors were John R. Lundberg, Alexander Mendoza, David Powell, Ethan S. Rafuse, William G. Robertson, Timothy B. Smith, Lee White, and Steven E. Woodworth.
The full review will be posted after its publication in Civil War News.
Friday, July 23, 2010
The Ever-Changing Leaders and Organization of the Army of the Potomac
The Ever-Changing Leaders and Organization of the Army of the Potomac by George S. Maharay
I made a previous post about this book, the author had emailed me trying to sell a copy and made the claim that there were 6 changes in army command and the 8 changes in general-in-chief. He made a big point in the email (and on the back of the book) about saying how many changes there were among the leaders and the organization of the army. The back of the book proclaims 149 changes in leadership and 94 changes in organization.
I thought he was overreaching on both points. Even if we consider McDowell a commander of the Army of the Potomac (he technically wasn't because it wasn't the Army of the Potomac yet but many authors will credit him as the first commander because his army is the basis for the Army of the Potomac) that leaves us with five; McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade. And those are truthfully only four changes. But Maharay claims Pope as a commander of the Army of the Potomac, giving him a tenure of "six days or less" as commander. This is obviously wrong. Not to belabor a point but McClellan was not relieved of command in late August 1862, he had many of his men temporarily transferred to Pope's command. And if Pope had won the battle of Second Manassas I'm sure those transfers would have become permanent and McClellan would have been sent home. But he retained command of the army until November 1862. And Pope was never given command of the Army of the Potomac, just over many of its men. There is also the possibility that if the two armies were combined under a victorious Pope that the new army would be called the Army of Virginia (the name of Pope's army, who would the victors choose the name of the army that had been defeated in all of its major battles?)
His logic for the general in chief post is even more convoluted, he claims times when Lincoln was general in chief and times when Lincoln and Halleck held the post jointly. Both are false. There definitely were times when Lincoln did Halleck's job but he was never officially general in chief. I thought his email might have been mostly exaggerated to sell books but he actually says in the text that Lincoln was general in chief.
I think this book had the chance to be great, and some of it is worthwhile. Partly it is his interpretations of things that weaken the book. In the chapter discussing Grant becoming general in chief and electing to keep his headquarters near the Army of the Potomac instead of at a desk in Washington Maharay does a good job of explaining the situation and the decision. Then near the end of the book when recapping all the commanders of the army he writes this one sentence paragraph to close the chapter, "US Grant took to the field with the Army of the Potomac and from March 1864 until the end of the war, the army had two commanders." There were times Meade felt that he wasn't really commanding the army but on paper he was still the commander, his commanding officer just happened to always be very close by. Maharay did a good job explaining that setup the first time it appeared and then made an error the second time around.
The author is really devoted to numbering the changes, closing each chapter with a list of the changes and numbering them. I'm not so sure that his figures of 149 changes in leadership and 94 changes in organization are correct. For example when Burnside replaces McClellan as commander of the army this is counted as two changes, McClellan being relieved and Burnside replacing him. Same thing when McClellan replaces Scott as general in chief, Maharay counts it as two, Scott retiring and McClellan replacing him. This would make me believe that the number of changes is more likely half or two-thirds of the 149 and 94 Maharay claims. The actual number is not something I care about but when the author makes a big deal about numbering them then I feel he should be accurate.
I would have liked to see Maharay expand the book down to the divisional level. The book only focuses on the changes at the corps level and beyond. That's another reason the 149 and 94 changes claim seems way too high. That is a ton of changes for the corps and beyond level. At the most there were eight corps in the army at one moment. I made a chart from Maharay's info and it has 38 men making 49 command changes. This ignores the times that wings were used but those would not add more than a dozen command changes.
The book is self published. I've seen more of these in recent years and being self published doesn't necessarily make it a bad book. What seems to be lacking in them is the extensive review process many other presses put their books through. I know the University of Tennessee Press uses two peer reviewers who only worry about content and not grammar. A self published book could plenty of peer review as well as copy editing, instead though they seem to lack this. This book is a prime example.
A peer reviewer would have seen the issues I listed above and while they might not have been fixed they most likely would have been addressed more. Instead of a one sentence paragraph claiming Grant and Meade were both army commanders, 50 pages after a well reasoned section on the structure, the peer reviewer would have likely pressed Maharay to change that sentence or to enlarge the paragraph and explain why in his opinion Grant can be classified an army commander. I doubt that this book as is would have been published by a university press or one of the other good presses around the country. They might have eventually published the book but it would have looked different than it does now.
I'm glad I got this book through the library and did not spend my own $28 on it. I would not recommend anyone using their own money on this book.
I made a previous post about this book, the author had emailed me trying to sell a copy and made the claim that there were 6 changes in army command and the 8 changes in general-in-chief. He made a big point in the email (and on the back of the book) about saying how many changes there were among the leaders and the organization of the army. The back of the book proclaims 149 changes in leadership and 94 changes in organization.
I thought he was overreaching on both points. Even if we consider McDowell a commander of the Army of the Potomac (he technically wasn't because it wasn't the Army of the Potomac yet but many authors will credit him as the first commander because his army is the basis for the Army of the Potomac) that leaves us with five; McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade. And those are truthfully only four changes. But Maharay claims Pope as a commander of the Army of the Potomac, giving him a tenure of "six days or less" as commander. This is obviously wrong. Not to belabor a point but McClellan was not relieved of command in late August 1862, he had many of his men temporarily transferred to Pope's command. And if Pope had won the battle of Second Manassas I'm sure those transfers would have become permanent and McClellan would have been sent home. But he retained command of the army until November 1862. And Pope was never given command of the Army of the Potomac, just over many of its men. There is also the possibility that if the two armies were combined under a victorious Pope that the new army would be called the Army of Virginia (the name of Pope's army, who would the victors choose the name of the army that had been defeated in all of its major battles?)
His logic for the general in chief post is even more convoluted, he claims times when Lincoln was general in chief and times when Lincoln and Halleck held the post jointly. Both are false. There definitely were times when Lincoln did Halleck's job but he was never officially general in chief. I thought his email might have been mostly exaggerated to sell books but he actually says in the text that Lincoln was general in chief.
I think this book had the chance to be great, and some of it is worthwhile. Partly it is his interpretations of things that weaken the book. In the chapter discussing Grant becoming general in chief and electing to keep his headquarters near the Army of the Potomac instead of at a desk in Washington Maharay does a good job of explaining the situation and the decision. Then near the end of the book when recapping all the commanders of the army he writes this one sentence paragraph to close the chapter, "US Grant took to the field with the Army of the Potomac and from March 1864 until the end of the war, the army had two commanders." There were times Meade felt that he wasn't really commanding the army but on paper he was still the commander, his commanding officer just happened to always be very close by. Maharay did a good job explaining that setup the first time it appeared and then made an error the second time around.
The author is really devoted to numbering the changes, closing each chapter with a list of the changes and numbering them. I'm not so sure that his figures of 149 changes in leadership and 94 changes in organization are correct. For example when Burnside replaces McClellan as commander of the army this is counted as two changes, McClellan being relieved and Burnside replacing him. Same thing when McClellan replaces Scott as general in chief, Maharay counts it as two, Scott retiring and McClellan replacing him. This would make me believe that the number of changes is more likely half or two-thirds of the 149 and 94 Maharay claims. The actual number is not something I care about but when the author makes a big deal about numbering them then I feel he should be accurate.
I would have liked to see Maharay expand the book down to the divisional level. The book only focuses on the changes at the corps level and beyond. That's another reason the 149 and 94 changes claim seems way too high. That is a ton of changes for the corps and beyond level. At the most there were eight corps in the army at one moment. I made a chart from Maharay's info and it has 38 men making 49 command changes. This ignores the times that wings were used but those would not add more than a dozen command changes.
The book is self published. I've seen more of these in recent years and being self published doesn't necessarily make it a bad book. What seems to be lacking in them is the extensive review process many other presses put their books through. I know the University of Tennessee Press uses two peer reviewers who only worry about content and not grammar. A self published book could plenty of peer review as well as copy editing, instead though they seem to lack this. This book is a prime example.
A peer reviewer would have seen the issues I listed above and while they might not have been fixed they most likely would have been addressed more. Instead of a one sentence paragraph claiming Grant and Meade were both army commanders, 50 pages after a well reasoned section on the structure, the peer reviewer would have likely pressed Maharay to change that sentence or to enlarge the paragraph and explain why in his opinion Grant can be classified an army commander. I doubt that this book as is would have been published by a university press or one of the other good presses around the country. They might have eventually published the book but it would have looked different than it does now.
I'm glad I got this book through the library and did not spend my own $28 on it. I would not recommend anyone using their own money on this book.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Louisianians in the Western Confederacy: The Adams-Gibson Brigade in the Civil War
Louisianians in the Western Confederacy: The Adams-Gibson Brigade in the Civil War. By Stuart Salling.
Stuart Salling’s book on the Adams-Gibson Brigade of Louisianians follows the brigade as it fought in the Army of Tennessee, participating in all the battles of that army until after Nashville when it was transferred to Mobile Bay rather than being sent to North Carolina. The brigade also served as part of Joe Johnston’s army in Mississippi during the summer of 1863.
The brigade went through many reorganizations but its main elements were banded together in August 1862. The ravages of war reduced the Louisiana regiments to the point that they had to be consolidated together, and sometimes they were able to gain enough recruits to regain their individual status again. Salling does a good job of explaining the plentiful confusing command and structure changes with the regiments of the brigade.
Salling also does a good job of explaining the political infighting between Bragg and his generals. Brigade commander Daniel Adams was a Bragg supporter, in fact he received this brigade to prevent Randall Gibson, a Bragg opponent, from commanding a brigade. Adams and Gibson though appear to have gotten along quite nicely. After Bragg resigned following the battle of Missionary Ridge Adams was one of the many officers who recommended Gibson for a promotion to brigadier general, which he got. Gibson commanded the brigade in all its future actions
Besides being an interesting story the book is laid out well visually. There are quite a few pictures of the men and officers who served in the brigade. The maps are nice as they show the layout of the regiments within the brigade and also show the entire battlefield as well. Sometimes these sorts of books get so focused on the activities of their small part that they ignore the larger operations, this book tends to do a good job of not getting too focused.
The full review will appear after its publication in Civil War News.
Stuart Salling’s book on the Adams-Gibson Brigade of Louisianians follows the brigade as it fought in the Army of Tennessee, participating in all the battles of that army until after Nashville when it was transferred to Mobile Bay rather than being sent to North Carolina. The brigade also served as part of Joe Johnston’s army in Mississippi during the summer of 1863.
The brigade went through many reorganizations but its main elements were banded together in August 1862. The ravages of war reduced the Louisiana regiments to the point that they had to be consolidated together, and sometimes they were able to gain enough recruits to regain their individual status again. Salling does a good job of explaining the plentiful confusing command and structure changes with the regiments of the brigade.
Salling also does a good job of explaining the political infighting between Bragg and his generals. Brigade commander Daniel Adams was a Bragg supporter, in fact he received this brigade to prevent Randall Gibson, a Bragg opponent, from commanding a brigade. Adams and Gibson though appear to have gotten along quite nicely. After Bragg resigned following the battle of Missionary Ridge Adams was one of the many officers who recommended Gibson for a promotion to brigadier general, which he got. Gibson commanded the brigade in all its future actions
Besides being an interesting story the book is laid out well visually. There are quite a few pictures of the men and officers who served in the brigade. The maps are nice as they show the layout of the regiments within the brigade and also show the entire battlefield as well. Sometimes these sorts of books get so focused on the activities of their small part that they ignore the larger operations, this book tends to do a good job of not getting too focused.
The full review will appear after its publication in Civil War News.
Monday, July 12, 2010
Matthew Archer
Its taken me awhile to get the time to make this post but nearly two weeks ago my son was born. Matthew Archer joined this world at 2:01 PM on June 30th. He weighed 6 pounds and 7 ounces, and was 18.5 inches long. Things were not 100% normal or easy but when my wife was released three days later we were able to bring Matthew home at the same time so it worked out fine in the end. I took the last week off of work so I could have some bonding time, plus help my wife while she recovered. This week I'm back to work and already missing the little guy. I'm looking forward to this evening when I'll be back home with my two sons and wife.
I could share a ton of pictures but I'll only bother you with three. The first is Matthew when he was just 30 minutes old.
And here is Matthew during his first evening home.
I could share a ton of pictures but I'll only bother you with three. The first is Matthew when he was just 30 minutes old.
Finally after three days in the NICU our other son was able to hold his brother for the first time. He wasn't allowed in the NICU so the best he got was seeing him once for a minute through a window. He really wanted to see and hold his little brother so once we were cleared to leave the hospital we took a few minutes in the room so big brother could hold little brother. In the last 12 days I think he has worn his big brother shirt on 4-5 of them. He is a protective of his little brother and is going to be a great big brother.
And here is Matthew during his first evening home.
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
Sorry for the absence of late
This past month (or two) I have been buckling down on my manuscript. So while I focused on that this blog ended up getting little of my attention. Its amazing how long some of the little things added up time wise on the manuscript. But now its done. All I need to do is print and send.
So hopefully I'll be able to give the blog the time it deserves again. One thing I want to do right off the bat is do some short book reviews. You can see to the right that there is quite a few books that I've read for Civil War News. All of those reviews have been written, I'm just waiting for them to be published in the newspaper and then I'll post the whole review here. In the meantime though I wanted to give a short review of those books on here so that you would not have to wait months to find out if the book is worthwhile. Those short reviews will be the next thing I start putting on here.
And we're in the home stretch for the baby's arrival. They will definitely induce on July 1st if the baby has not arrived by then. At the beginning of June I thought for sure the baby would come before July 1st but now I'm thinking that he is going to be an ornery child and will arrive on July 1st. And long ago we decided on Matthew Archer. We liked Matthew and then my wife decided she would be open to a Civil War connected middle name. So one night I pulled Coddington's Gettysburg off the shelf and read her the order of battle. She liked Archer, for Confederate General James Archer. I wanted Braxton for Braxton Bragg, who I think was not nearly as bad as everyone makes him out. But Archer sounds good and as it turns out Archer is probably best remembered for being the first Confederate general in Lee's army to be captured and it happened on July 1st by the 2nd Wisconsin. So besides having a Civil War connection we will also have a connection to Wisconsin (where all my family is from) might also have a connection to July 1st.
So hopefully I'll be able to give the blog the time it deserves again. One thing I want to do right off the bat is do some short book reviews. You can see to the right that there is quite a few books that I've read for Civil War News. All of those reviews have been written, I'm just waiting for them to be published in the newspaper and then I'll post the whole review here. In the meantime though I wanted to give a short review of those books on here so that you would not have to wait months to find out if the book is worthwhile. Those short reviews will be the next thing I start putting on here.
And we're in the home stretch for the baby's arrival. They will definitely induce on July 1st if the baby has not arrived by then. At the beginning of June I thought for sure the baby would come before July 1st but now I'm thinking that he is going to be an ornery child and will arrive on July 1st. And long ago we decided on Matthew Archer. We liked Matthew and then my wife decided she would be open to a Civil War connected middle name. So one night I pulled Coddington's Gettysburg off the shelf and read her the order of battle. She liked Archer, for Confederate General James Archer. I wanted Braxton for Braxton Bragg, who I think was not nearly as bad as everyone makes him out. But Archer sounds good and as it turns out Archer is probably best remembered for being the first Confederate general in Lee's army to be captured and it happened on July 1st by the 2nd Wisconsin. So besides having a Civil War connection we will also have a connection to Wisconsin (where all my family is from) might also have a connection to July 1st.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
symposium ticket sales
Tickets for the 2010 Rocky Mountain Civil War symposium are now available for sale on the website. The event is October 2nd at the Community College of Aurora. It promises to be another great event. This year our theme will be Ulysses S. Grant.
Brooks Simpson, author of “Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865,” will provide an overview of Grant the general.
Peter Cozzens, author of many books on Western Theater battles (among others), will talk about the relationship between Grant and Rawlins.
Although Grant led men in battle before Shiloh that battle is his first real test of army command in big battle. Wiley Sword, author of “Shiloh: Bloody April,” will discuss Grant's performance in this battle.
Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign is what really separates him from the rest of the prominent generals. John Marszalek, Executive Director and Managing Editor of the Ulysses S. Grant Association, will cover this complicated campaign. Grant's papers are also now available online.
Gordon Rhea, author “Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26–June 3, 1864,” rounds out the panel with a presentation on Grant as General-in-Chief.
The day will end with a panel discussion and time for books to be signed. As always there will be a book room with a ton of good books and deals.
Tickets will be $50 again, which also includes a continental breakfast and lunch. Last year we also gave away "The New Civil War Handbook" by Mark Hughes free to all attendees.
If you have any questions please contact us at RockyMtnCWRT at aol dot com.
Brooks Simpson, author of “Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865,” will provide an overview of Grant the general.
Peter Cozzens, author of many books on Western Theater battles (among others), will talk about the relationship between Grant and Rawlins.
Although Grant led men in battle before Shiloh that battle is his first real test of army command in big battle. Wiley Sword, author of “Shiloh: Bloody April,” will discuss Grant's performance in this battle.
Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign is what really separates him from the rest of the prominent generals. John Marszalek, Executive Director and Managing Editor of the Ulysses S. Grant Association, will cover this complicated campaign. Grant's papers are also now available online.
Gordon Rhea, author “Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26–June 3, 1864,” rounds out the panel with a presentation on Grant as General-in-Chief.
The day will end with a panel discussion and time for books to be signed. As always there will be a book room with a ton of good books and deals.
Tickets will be $50 again, which also includes a continental breakfast and lunch. Last year we also gave away "The New Civil War Handbook" by Mark Hughes free to all attendees.
If you have any questions please contact us at RockyMtnCWRT at aol dot com.
Friday, May 21, 2010
Army of the Potomac
This week I've had an interesting exchange of emails with an author. He has published a book on the Army of the Potomac and in his email touting his work he talks about the 6 changes in army command and the 8 changes in general-in-chief (as well as the many changes in brigade, division and corps leaders as well as the structure changes).
For whatever reason I decided to respond to him instead of ignoring him and asked him what those changes were. He claimed the army command commanders as McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade. I pointed out that Pope was never in command of the Army of the Potomac and McClellan never was removed from command. His response was citing a letter from McClellan that he felt he was a man without an army. I don't doubt he felt that way but he was never officially removed from command. Of course the author should discuss this incident in the book but he should also make clear that the Army of the Potomac troops serving under Pope were a temporary attachment, although if Pope had won the Battle of Second Manassas it might have been made permanent.
A secondary point if one wanted to quibble is that the changes of McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade is only five changes. The author stated six changes. When I first heard six changes I was pretty sure he was going to include Pope as an army commander. I wondered though if he would call McDowell the first army commander (while technically incorrect most historians have listed him as such) or if he would claim that Grant was really the army commander in 1864-65 as Meade's influence on army movements was severely curtailed.
The changes the author claims for general-in-chief are even more bizarre. I could think of Scott, McClellan, Halleck and Grant. The author claims it as Scott, McClellan, Lincoln, Halleck, Lincoln and Halleck, Lincoln, Lincoln and Halleck, Grant. General-in-chief refers to the senior army officer, Lincoln was not a general and President, he was commander-in-chief. Lincoln was very hands on, Halleck complained that he was really a military advisor implementing the wishes of Lincoln and Stanton. There was a period between McClellan and Halleck that there was no general-in-chief, but to call Lincoln that is an error. The author would need to explain in the text that Lincoln operated without a general-in-chief for awhile. Also I do not remember a time when Halleck was suspended from command as general-in-chief or that Lincoln said "we're now co-general-in-chief."
Was the marketing email simply over stating facts to make the number of changes more impressive? Maybe. I'm worried though that when given a chance to back pedal and explain that he really knew that Pope was not a commander of the Army of the Potomac and that Lincoln was not general-in-chief the author refused and doggedly stuck to his guns that he was right on all counts. It makes me worry that there are similar errors in the other command and structure changes enumerated in the book.
I confirmed through amazon that it is a self-published book, which by itself doesn't set off red flags but one of the benefits of using a publishers is that many others read the book before its published. In this case I think peer review was missing.
Needless to say I will not be buying this book. If my local library happens to get a copy I'll probably look at it but I definitely would not use it as a source until I made an extended effort to confirm anything he said.
***UPDATE 5-25-10***
Enough people have emailed asking for the title, so I'll add it here as well. The book in question is "The Ever-Changing Leaders and Organization of the Army of the Potomac" by George S. Maharay. I have also since requested the book thru ILL, only one copy was listed on worldcat which is probably not a good sign.
For whatever reason I decided to respond to him instead of ignoring him and asked him what those changes were. He claimed the army command commanders as McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade. I pointed out that Pope was never in command of the Army of the Potomac and McClellan never was removed from command. His response was citing a letter from McClellan that he felt he was a man without an army. I don't doubt he felt that way but he was never officially removed from command. Of course the author should discuss this incident in the book but he should also make clear that the Army of the Potomac troops serving under Pope were a temporary attachment, although if Pope had won the Battle of Second Manassas it might have been made permanent.
A secondary point if one wanted to quibble is that the changes of McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade is only five changes. The author stated six changes. When I first heard six changes I was pretty sure he was going to include Pope as an army commander. I wondered though if he would call McDowell the first army commander (while technically incorrect most historians have listed him as such) or if he would claim that Grant was really the army commander in 1864-65 as Meade's influence on army movements was severely curtailed.
The changes the author claims for general-in-chief are even more bizarre. I could think of Scott, McClellan, Halleck and Grant. The author claims it as Scott, McClellan, Lincoln, Halleck, Lincoln and Halleck, Lincoln, Lincoln and Halleck, Grant. General-in-chief refers to the senior army officer, Lincoln was not a general and President, he was commander-in-chief. Lincoln was very hands on, Halleck complained that he was really a military advisor implementing the wishes of Lincoln and Stanton. There was a period between McClellan and Halleck that there was no general-in-chief, but to call Lincoln that is an error. The author would need to explain in the text that Lincoln operated without a general-in-chief for awhile. Also I do not remember a time when Halleck was suspended from command as general-in-chief or that Lincoln said "we're now co-general-in-chief."
Was the marketing email simply over stating facts to make the number of changes more impressive? Maybe. I'm worried though that when given a chance to back pedal and explain that he really knew that Pope was not a commander of the Army of the Potomac and that Lincoln was not general-in-chief the author refused and doggedly stuck to his guns that he was right on all counts. It makes me worry that there are similar errors in the other command and structure changes enumerated in the book.
I confirmed through amazon that it is a self-published book, which by itself doesn't set off red flags but one of the benefits of using a publishers is that many others read the book before its published. In this case I think peer review was missing.
Needless to say I will not be buying this book. If my local library happens to get a copy I'll probably look at it but I definitely would not use it as a source until I made an extended effort to confirm anything he said.
***UPDATE 5-25-10***
Enough people have emailed asking for the title, so I'll add it here as well. The book in question is "The Ever-Changing Leaders and Organization of the Army of the Potomac" by George S. Maharay. I have also since requested the book thru ILL, only one copy was listed on worldcat which is probably not a good sign.
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Grant's Papers
The other day while doing research on John Marszalek for the upcoming Rocky Mountain Civil War Symposium I saw a link that the Papers of Ulysses S. Grant are now available online. Marszalek is the head of the Papers after the passing of John Simon a could years ago.
Having the papers online is a fantastic resource. It helped me solve two riddles almost immediately. One was that at Shiloh the first staff member to give Lew Wallace an order was A.S. Baxter. All sources only use his initials, its a small riddle but I wanted to use his full name in a project if possible, and I found it (Algernon). The second riddle was that I had a source that claimed Grant wrote a letter to Alfred Mathews, but I did not know when. The letter appeared in a footnote in the Papers which I would not have had the patience to search for manually but now that the Papers are digitized online it took only a few minutes to solve that riddle.
I'll use it a lot on future research projects. In the past the only copy I knew of locally was a half hour drive downtown. I hardly ever have the time anymore to get there so this is a really helpful resource for me.
To search the collection yourself click here
Having the papers online is a fantastic resource. It helped me solve two riddles almost immediately. One was that at Shiloh the first staff member to give Lew Wallace an order was A.S. Baxter. All sources only use his initials, its a small riddle but I wanted to use his full name in a project if possible, and I found it (Algernon). The second riddle was that I had a source that claimed Grant wrote a letter to Alfred Mathews, but I did not know when. The letter appeared in a footnote in the Papers which I would not have had the patience to search for manually but now that the Papers are digitized online it took only a few minutes to solve that riddle.
I'll use it a lot on future research projects. In the past the only copy I knew of locally was a half hour drive downtown. I hardly ever have the time anymore to get there so this is a really helpful resource for me.
To search the collection yourself click here
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Sickles at Gettysburg
Sickles at Gettysburg by James A. Hessler
This is a wonderful book, I thoroughly enjoyed it. Daniel Sickles is someone I've always been fascinated by but had never read a biography about because they all seemed to be too pro-Sickles or too anti-Sickles, there did not seem to be a good even handed biography of him out there. I think Hessler has solved this.
The book focuses on Sickles actions at Gettysburg and how he spent the rest of his life defending those actions. There is of course some discussion of his life before the Civil War, probably most well known for murdering Philip Barton Key, and his military record in the Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg. But the bulk of the book concerns all aspects of Sickles' Gettysburg performance. Hessler does side with Meade's side in most of the Sickles-Meade arguments over Sickles' Gettysburg record.
The one area I thought the author could have devoted more attention to was explaining how the battle might have been fought if Sickles had stayed put like Meade wanted. Show exactly where his lines would have been and try to guess how Longstreet would have attacked the Union lines. My thinking has always been that Sickles forced Longstreet to use his men taking a position that did not imperil the main Union lines. Sickles was helped out by other Union units taking Little Round Top so that he was not flanked from that position but if Sickles had not been able to secure Little Round Top if he stayed put then it seems to me his position would have been flanked and a greater calamity fallen on the Union lines than actually did. And my own recollection (and Hessler confirms this) is that Hancock's lines ended well north of Little Round Top (near the present location of Pennsylvania state monument), so did Sickles have enough men to connect to Hancock's left and hold Little Round Top?
I think it would have been about a mile long line if it was straight and since the ground was not level, especially to cover Little Round Top, and the left should be refused at least a bit. Sickles had 10,675 men in the ranks. The men would form in two ranks, and if each man is allotted 18 inches of line (somewhere I remember reading that is about how much front a man occupies) then those men would cover a front of roughly 1.5 miles. Measuring on a park map it looks like the line is roughly 1.3 miles long so allowing for some refusal of the flank and some reserves it appears that Sickles could have covered Little Round Top.
Maybe someone has done a study that breaks down exactly how much front Sickles could have filled on the Meade line and also how Longstreet might have reacted, he certainly would not have assaulted straight up the Emmittsburg Pike. I have not read the study if it has been done, but I'm not a voracious Gettysburg reader so it is quite possible that I have missed such a study.
In any respect this is a great book. I only wish Sickles life was made into a movie. He is a fascinating character and Hessler has provided a pretty fair treatment of him. Buy this book.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Shiloh Maps
Trailhead Graphics has made a new Shiloh map set. Basically it is the Reed map placed onto the modern topo map that serves as the base for the monument map that Trailhead already makes (and is a valuable tool for wandering a battlefield). There are two maps, one for each day. I saw samples last week at the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table meeting and it looks fabulous. The map is supposed to go on sale at the park this week. It does not appear yet on the Trailhead Graphics website and I also did not find it on the Eastern National website. I guess you need to call the park bookshop to order a copy. The visitor's center phone number is (731) 689-5696. You can also contact Trailhead Graphics at trailhead@dim.com or 800 390-5117. I can't wait to own this set.
Monday, May 17, 2010
Chickamauga Maps
I fear this post might be well behind the times but in case its not, I recently found out that that the University of Tennessee Press has put pdfs copies of the Betts' Chickamauga maps online. These maps were created when the battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga were preserved. Henry Boynton was the first park historian and wrote the official battle history, placed the iron markers you see on the field today and also had troop movement maps created to accompany the text. You can buy these maps in an altered state today at the park, basically one map now has info that originally appeared on 3-4 maps. But now UT Press has put the original 13 maps online here.
They did this in conjunction with the publication of "The Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga and the Organizations Engaged" by Henry Boynton, edited by Timothy B. Smith. Smith has basically combined three Boytnon books into one volume and provided some other notes on Boynton. I have not held a copy of Smith's version yet, I knew he was working on it but did not realize it was out already. I actually do have Boynton's other books but I would like a modern reprint so I don't have to worry about ruining my 100 year old versions.
They did this in conjunction with the publication of "The Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga and the Organizations Engaged" by Henry Boynton, edited by Timothy B. Smith. Smith has basically combined three Boytnon books into one volume and provided some other notes on Boynton. I have not held a copy of Smith's version yet, I knew he was working on it but did not realize it was out already. I actually do have Boynton's other books but I would like a modern reprint so I don't have to worry about ruining my 100 year old versions.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Life
Sorry for the dearth of posts lately. I've been kept busy working on a manuscript that I hope to have finished soon. Plus I've been fine tuning a presentation I'm giving to the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table next week.
And of course there is the more important things like trying to get ready for the baby. The doctor intends to induce labor at the end of June so a July 1st birth is quite likely. The nursery is nearly ready. We've been waiting for the crib to arrive, apparently we selected the slowest company in the world, this Saturday it'll be 17 weeks since we ordered it. Then I can hang some pictures and shelves on the walls and get things finished. Last weekend was the baby shower so now most things we need are here. I think all we're really missing is a high chair and we can wait on that for a little while.
Things should clear up next week after the round table presentation. And then hopefully by the end of the month the manuscript will be complete. So once I start to free up times for better posts the baby will come and the blog will be the furthest thing from my mind. I'll try to build up a supply of posts so that there won't be a precipitate drop off here in July.
Thanks for your understanding.
And of course there is the more important things like trying to get ready for the baby. The doctor intends to induce labor at the end of June so a July 1st birth is quite likely. The nursery is nearly ready. We've been waiting for the crib to arrive, apparently we selected the slowest company in the world, this Saturday it'll be 17 weeks since we ordered it. Then I can hang some pictures and shelves on the walls and get things finished. Last weekend was the baby shower so now most things we need are here. I think all we're really missing is a high chair and we can wait on that for a little while.
Things should clear up next week after the round table presentation. And then hopefully by the end of the month the manuscript will be complete. So once I start to free up times for better posts the baby will come and the blog will be the furthest thing from my mind. I'll try to build up a supply of posts so that there won't be a precipitate drop off here in July.
Thanks for your understanding.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Cleburne: Franklin
September 1864 was a rough month for Cleburne, professionally and personally. Hood blamed Hardee, and by association Cleburne, for the fall of Atlanta. Govan's loss was hard on Cleburne as those were Arkansas boys he had been with since the beginning of the war. Captain Buck of his staff had been wounded at Jonesboro and was now at a hospital. Chief of staff Major Benham resigned in despair and left for Mexico. His fiancé Sue was suffering from "neuralgia" and was unable to write.
On September 27 Hardee was finally transferred out of the army. Cleburne contemplated asking for a transfer as well and told his staff that he'd rather be an aide to Hardee than command a division in Hood's army. Cheatham was given Hardee's corps. The next day Cleburne went to Hood's headquarters to ask for a two week furlough so that he could go to Mobile and marry Sue. Hood denied the request saying that the campaign season was not yet over.
There was a bright spot that month though as Govan's men returned to the army after a particularly quick prisoner exchange. When President Davis visited the army that month he made a visit to every brigade. As Hood and Davis passed by Govan's brigade they chanted "Johnston! Johnston!"
The army now moved north towards Dalton. During the second week of October Cleburne's men wrecked the railroad with their bare hands. They lacked the proper tools so they just lined up on one side and lifted the whole rail up and were then able to remove the ties. From Dalton they went to Rocky Face Ridge, Lafayette, Alpine, Decatur and reached Tuscumbia on October 31. A pontoon bridge was built to cross the nearly one mile of river and Cleburne's division finally crossed on November 13 and camped at Florence. Cheatham's corps went north through Waynesboro and Cleburne left Mercer's brigade behind to guard the river crossings. On November 20 he set out with the brigades of Govan, Lowrey and Granbury.
On November 22 they passed through Waynesboro. South of Columbia on November 24 Cleburne met Lucius Polk again. Polk's house was across the road from Hood's headquarters. At Polk's chapel Cleburne idly remarked, "It is almost worth dying to rest in so sweet a spot." The next day they occupied Columbia on the Duck River. Across the river Schofield had two corps but Hood had no intention of a direct assault.
On November 29 Hood started his flank movement with Cleburne's division in the lead. By 3 PM Cleburne was near Spring Hill. There was a Union force south of town but Hood was more concerned with blocking Schofield's retreat. Schofield was still near Columbia apparently believing that Hood would assault him directly. Cheatham believed that Hood wanted him to assault Spring Hill and that the turnpike south of town was not his objective. Between 3:30 and 4 PM Cleburne deployed his division in echelon facing west, Lowrey on the right, then Govan and Granbury. Forrest deployed one brigade on Cleburne's right.
At 4 PM the division moved forward and then swung to the right. They quickly drove Bradley's brigade but came under fire from 18 cannon near Spring Hill. Lane's brigade then redeployed from Bradley's left and then came due south at Cleburne but nothing much came of this attack. It was now 5 PM (sunset was at 4:26) and Cheatham began to work at creating a solid line against Spring Hill. Bate's division was currently executing exactly the movement Hood desired, on the turnpike and moving south but at about 6 PM Cheatham ordered Bate to a different position. At 6:17 PM the field was completely dark and a hoped for second attack to be led by Brown was now impossible. The troops went to sleep a quarter mile from the turnpike. That night Schofield's army snuck past the Confederates.
When Hood woke in the morning and found out that the Union had slipped past he was furious. At a meeting of his generals he ranted and blamed them for the mistake. He had good reason to be upset but he also should accept some of the blame himself. From 4-6 the night before his headquarters were close to the front and yet he never ventured out or sent out aides to find out what was happening. There is also evidence that he went to sleep that night knowing that his troops were not in the right position but he did nothing to correct it. When Cleburne found out that Hood held him partly responsible he said to Brown that he would seek an investigation at the first opportunity. At a command conference at Harrison House Hood said that the Confederates should "go over the main works at all hazards." Cleburne replied "I will take the enemy's works or fall in the attempt." Later that day near Winstead Hill Govan noticed that Cleburne seemed more despondent than normal. He tried to engage him in conversation and said, "Well General there will not be many of us that get back to Arkansas." Unsmiling Cleburne responded, "Well Govan if we are to die let us die like men."
Cleburne arranged his brigades in column to the right of the Franklin Turnpike. They waited for about an hour when Cheatham gave the signal to advance at 4 PM. When the division hit the Union salient it turned into a race for the main Union line. Govan and Granbury's brigades pierced the line and Cleburne was soon with them. He was on foot now as two horses had previously been shot from under him. Fifty yards from the Carter cotton gin he was killed instantly when a single bullet entered his heart. Granbury and four other Confederate generals were also killed that day. Late that night the Union left Franklin.
Once Cleburne's body was identified he was taken to Carnton. He was later buried in Rose Hill cemetery in Columbia. Rose Hill though had former slaves, paupers and Yankees buried there too and so it was decided to rebury him at St. John's Chapel. This is the chapel that he had remarked upon the beauty of a week earlier in the presence of Lucius Polk. Finally in April 1870 his body was moved for a final time to Helena, Arkansas.
During Reconstruction he became a larger hero than he was in his lifetime. Veterans recalled with increased clarity his sterling character and devotion to duty. His martyrdom came to represent the martyrdom of the Army of Tennessee.
On September 27 Hardee was finally transferred out of the army. Cleburne contemplated asking for a transfer as well and told his staff that he'd rather be an aide to Hardee than command a division in Hood's army. Cheatham was given Hardee's corps. The next day Cleburne went to Hood's headquarters to ask for a two week furlough so that he could go to Mobile and marry Sue. Hood denied the request saying that the campaign season was not yet over.
There was a bright spot that month though as Govan's men returned to the army after a particularly quick prisoner exchange. When President Davis visited the army that month he made a visit to every brigade. As Hood and Davis passed by Govan's brigade they chanted "Johnston! Johnston!"
The army now moved north towards Dalton. During the second week of October Cleburne's men wrecked the railroad with their bare hands. They lacked the proper tools so they just lined up on one side and lifted the whole rail up and were then able to remove the ties. From Dalton they went to Rocky Face Ridge, Lafayette, Alpine, Decatur and reached Tuscumbia on October 31. A pontoon bridge was built to cross the nearly one mile of river and Cleburne's division finally crossed on November 13 and camped at Florence. Cheatham's corps went north through Waynesboro and Cleburne left Mercer's brigade behind to guard the river crossings. On November 20 he set out with the brigades of Govan, Lowrey and Granbury.
On November 22 they passed through Waynesboro. South of Columbia on November 24 Cleburne met Lucius Polk again. Polk's house was across the road from Hood's headquarters. At Polk's chapel Cleburne idly remarked, "It is almost worth dying to rest in so sweet a spot." The next day they occupied Columbia on the Duck River. Across the river Schofield had two corps but Hood had no intention of a direct assault.
On November 29 Hood started his flank movement with Cleburne's division in the lead. By 3 PM Cleburne was near Spring Hill. There was a Union force south of town but Hood was more concerned with blocking Schofield's retreat. Schofield was still near Columbia apparently believing that Hood would assault him directly. Cheatham believed that Hood wanted him to assault Spring Hill and that the turnpike south of town was not his objective. Between 3:30 and 4 PM Cleburne deployed his division in echelon facing west, Lowrey on the right, then Govan and Granbury. Forrest deployed one brigade on Cleburne's right.
At 4 PM the division moved forward and then swung to the right. They quickly drove Bradley's brigade but came under fire from 18 cannon near Spring Hill. Lane's brigade then redeployed from Bradley's left and then came due south at Cleburne but nothing much came of this attack. It was now 5 PM (sunset was at 4:26) and Cheatham began to work at creating a solid line against Spring Hill. Bate's division was currently executing exactly the movement Hood desired, on the turnpike and moving south but at about 6 PM Cheatham ordered Bate to a different position. At 6:17 PM the field was completely dark and a hoped for second attack to be led by Brown was now impossible. The troops went to sleep a quarter mile from the turnpike. That night Schofield's army snuck past the Confederates.
When Hood woke in the morning and found out that the Union had slipped past he was furious. At a meeting of his generals he ranted and blamed them for the mistake. He had good reason to be upset but he also should accept some of the blame himself. From 4-6 the night before his headquarters were close to the front and yet he never ventured out or sent out aides to find out what was happening. There is also evidence that he went to sleep that night knowing that his troops were not in the right position but he did nothing to correct it. When Cleburne found out that Hood held him partly responsible he said to Brown that he would seek an investigation at the first opportunity. At a command conference at Harrison House Hood said that the Confederates should "go over the main works at all hazards." Cleburne replied "I will take the enemy's works or fall in the attempt." Later that day near Winstead Hill Govan noticed that Cleburne seemed more despondent than normal. He tried to engage him in conversation and said, "Well General there will not be many of us that get back to Arkansas." Unsmiling Cleburne responded, "Well Govan if we are to die let us die like men."
Cleburne arranged his brigades in column to the right of the Franklin Turnpike. They waited for about an hour when Cheatham gave the signal to advance at 4 PM. When the division hit the Union salient it turned into a race for the main Union line. Govan and Granbury's brigades pierced the line and Cleburne was soon with them. He was on foot now as two horses had previously been shot from under him. Fifty yards from the Carter cotton gin he was killed instantly when a single bullet entered his heart. Granbury and four other Confederate generals were also killed that day. Late that night the Union left Franklin.
Once Cleburne's body was identified he was taken to Carnton. He was later buried in Rose Hill cemetery in Columbia. Rose Hill though had former slaves, paupers and Yankees buried there too and so it was decided to rebury him at St. John's Chapel. This is the chapel that he had remarked upon the beauty of a week earlier in the presence of Lucius Polk. Finally in April 1870 his body was moved for a final time to Helena, Arkansas.
During Reconstruction he became a larger hero than he was in his lifetime. Veterans recalled with increased clarity his sterling character and devotion to duty. His martyrdom came to represent the martyrdom of the Army of Tennessee.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Cleburne: command squables and Chickamauga
Due to some foulup with blogger this post did not get published at its appointed time, so it is now a bit out of order, sorry about that.
During the retreat after Stones River the criticisms of Bragg bubbled back up. On January 11th Bragg, after reading the criticisms in newspapers, sent a letter to all division and corps commanders asking their opinion of the retreat and their opinion of him in general. He told them to consult their subordinates and implied that he would resign if he had lost their good opinion. Hardee's corps came down unanimously against Bragg and thought that a change would be in the best interests of the army. Only Jones Withers supported Bragg. Instead of resigning Bragg told Davis that he was a victim of a cabal. While this was going on Polk was in Richmond complaining to Davis about Bragg and so Davis might have easily believed the cabal charge.
In order to get a second opinion on the army, and also perhaps to rid himself of a disgruntled general, Davis sent Joe E Johnston to Tullahoma. On January 27 Johnston met with Polk, Hardee and Bragg. He reported to Davis that there was unrest in the army but Bragg had performed well at Stones River and it would be unfair to remove him now. After Johnston left Bragg wrote his report on Stones River. He gave praise to Polk, Hardee and Cleburne while criticizing Cheatham, Breckinridge and McCown. Hardee thought Bragg's assessment of Cheatham, Breckinridge and McCown was correct but loved the fact that Bragg continued to make the army unrest even worse. Bragg had McCown arrested and Cleburne would serve on that court martial. Cleburne was the judge on the panel and also was one of the chief witnesses. McCown received a six month suspension and afterwards only served in minor posts.
On March 19th Johnston returned to Tullahoma, this time with orders from Davis to take command of the army from Bragg and send Bragg back to Richmond. At first Johnston kept Bragg in Tullahoma as Mrs. Bragg was sick. Then Johnston became ill and needed Bragg around in case Rosecrans' attacked. Eventually Johnston left Bragg's army to serve as theater commander.
In April Polk's report of Stones River came out and commended Cheatham. Bragg was convinced that they were in cahoots and sent a letter to Polk's subordinates asking about an event in the Perryville campaign. Cleburne also received this letter because he had serve with Polk during the Perryville campaign. Cleburne asked Hardee for advice. Hardee told Cleburne not to responded as it seemed that Bragg was just fishing for a court martial which is what Bragg was doing.
Cleburne's division underwent a minor overhaul in May. Johnston was now in Mississippi halfheartedly trying to save Vicksburg. To respond to one of his calls for men Bragg sent Breckinridge with 2 of his 3 brigades. Then Bragg took Bushrod Johnson's brigade from Cleburne and combined it with Breckinridge's remaining brigade into a new division under Stewart. As compensation Cleburne received Churchill's brigade of recently exchanged prisoners, these men had surrendered at Arkansas Post without firing a shot. No other division in the army wanted these men but Cleburne welcomed them to the division. He told them that they would be judged on what they do and not on what happened previously.
Cleburne's division was in the Liberty Gap area but Bragg was not really prepared for a Union advance. On June 24 Liddell's two regiments were unable to hold Liberty Gap against the Union assault. Bragg now had to retreat as Rosecrans conducted a pretty impressive campaign of maneuver. Cleburne's men acted as the army's rear guard for most of this retreat. On July 5th his division crossed the Tennessee River and Hardee turned command of the corps over to Cleburne while Hardee went to Chattanooga to discuss strategy with Bragg. Cleburne's corps went east of Chattanooga and took up a defensive position upriver of the town. This is the area where Bragg thought Rosecrans would cross the river. A week later Hardee was sent west to help Johnston. Cleburne thought he might get corps command on a permanent basis but DH Hill soon arrived to take the position. In late August Rosecrans crossed west of Chattanooga and on September 7 Cleburne led his division south.
Chickamauga
As his division marched south from Chattanooga more changes were being made to its structure. Churchill was transferred to the trans-Mississippi and his brigade was now commanded by Deshler. Liddell's brigade was removed from the division and Liddell soon had his own division. Despite the changes and the retreat esprit de corps was high in the division.
During the retreat Bragg found an opportunity to strike at Rosecrans' scattered army at McLemore's Cove. Hindman was to attack first and Cleburne would support the attack . The morning of the attack went by with no sound from Hindman's area. Bragg and Hill were with Cleburne but waited until noon to order him to attack. Bragg hoped that Hindman would attack if he heard Cleburne's attack. Just as Cleburne's skirmishers were becoming engaged Bragg changed his mind and called off the attack. At 4:30 PM firing was finally heard from Hindman but when Cleburne went forward they found that the Union had escaped from the trap.
On September 19th Cleburne marched north to take part in a new battle. Around sunset his division crossed Chickamauga Creek at Thedford's Ford and marched two miles to the extreme right of the army. In the dark they went into position behind Liddell's division and Liddell urged Cleburne to attack. Cleburne was hesitant to attack because of the late hour, thick woods and unknown terrain. DH Hill arrived and Liddell urged him to order Cleburne to attack, which he then did. Cleburne began his advance at 6 PM with Deshler on the left, then Wood and Polk. The attack was a success at first but Wood, in the center, gave way. Cleburne brought up artillery to within 60 yards of the Union line and Wood was able to resume the advance. Finally at 9 PM the attack was halted.
On September 20 Cleburne was awake at sunrise (about quarter to 6 AM). Hill and Breckinridge joined him for breakfast. At 6:30 AM a courier from Polk arrived with orders for Breckinridge and Cleburne. The orders were for a dawn attack, which time had already passed. Hill was upset that Polk was ignoring the change of command, but actually Bragg had reorganized the army the night before, in part to limit Hill's role. Hill wrote a reply for Polk and the courier left. Polk though soon arrived to find out why there was no dawn attack. Cleburne said that once his men had eaten they would attack. Polk was fine with this explanation and left. He wasn't gone long when Bragg arrived. Bragg was upset that there had been no dawn attack, said the attack should begin as soon as possible and then he too left. It was now 8 AM.
Cleburne got his men ready and made a reconnaissance of the ground. At 9:30 AM Breckinridge could be heard attacking so Cleburne went forward. They attacked the Kelly Field salient and it was pretty much a disaster. Thomas' men had been preparing breastworks most of the night and were able to shuffle fresh men in and out of the front line. Wood and Polk got separated in the attack. Deshler became entangled with Stewart on his left. Cleburne helped sort this mess out and got Stewart to join in the attacks with Deshler. At 11 AM Cleburne ordered Wood and Polk to retreat and had Deshler cover the retreat. Deshler was among the Confederate brigade commanders killed in the battle. At 2 PM Deshler's brigade was finally ordered out, the division had lost about 50%. At 3:30 PM a staff officer told Cleburne to move to the right to attack again. Cleburne had the officer lead him to the spot to attack from. At 5 PM they attacked just as Thomas was pulling out, the evacuation turned into a stampede. The pursuit didn't really get going until the next afternoon and reached Missionary Ridge on the afternoon of the 22nd. On September 24 Bragg made a reconnaissance in force at Chattanooga. Cleburne's division was within 200 yards of the Union trenches when he saw the divisions on either side of him retreat. He wanted to make the attack but without support had no choice but retreat. Cleburne had brought 5115 men into battle at Chickamauga, they lost 1743 killed and wounded. Despite fighting at night they only had 6 missing.
Bragg vs the generals
For the third straight time after a campaign Bragg and his generals turned to infighting rather than preparing to fight the Union. Bragg felt that with a victory he had more leeway to get rid of those he disliked. The first to go was Hindman, who was suspended from command. He also suspended Polk, but Davis said that he'd need to file official charges or let it go. Davis thought this would make Bragg give up on Polk but instead Bragg had Polk arrested. A petition was passed around asking for Bragg's removal from command. Cleburne mainly kept his opinions to himself but he did sign the petition. Davis had to come visit the army to see what all the trouble was and in essence gave Bragg carte blanche to fix the dissent. DH Hill was made the scapegoat. Hill asked for and received Cleburne's support.
In Cleburne's report he praised Polk, Deshler and RQ Mills (Deshler's successor). He made no mention of Wood, positive or negative. The day before Cleburne submitted his report Wood submitted his resignation. It is not known if Cleburne showed Wood the report first or why else Wood might have resigned. Neither ever talked about it.
During the retreat after Stones River the criticisms of Bragg bubbled back up. On January 11th Bragg, after reading the criticisms in newspapers, sent a letter to all division and corps commanders asking their opinion of the retreat and their opinion of him in general. He told them to consult their subordinates and implied that he would resign if he had lost their good opinion. Hardee's corps came down unanimously against Bragg and thought that a change would be in the best interests of the army. Only Jones Withers supported Bragg. Instead of resigning Bragg told Davis that he was a victim of a cabal. While this was going on Polk was in Richmond complaining to Davis about Bragg and so Davis might have easily believed the cabal charge.
In order to get a second opinion on the army, and also perhaps to rid himself of a disgruntled general, Davis sent Joe E Johnston to Tullahoma. On January 27 Johnston met with Polk, Hardee and Bragg. He reported to Davis that there was unrest in the army but Bragg had performed well at Stones River and it would be unfair to remove him now. After Johnston left Bragg wrote his report on Stones River. He gave praise to Polk, Hardee and Cleburne while criticizing Cheatham, Breckinridge and McCown. Hardee thought Bragg's assessment of Cheatham, Breckinridge and McCown was correct but loved the fact that Bragg continued to make the army unrest even worse. Bragg had McCown arrested and Cleburne would serve on that court martial. Cleburne was the judge on the panel and also was one of the chief witnesses. McCown received a six month suspension and afterwards only served in minor posts.
On March 19th Johnston returned to Tullahoma, this time with orders from Davis to take command of the army from Bragg and send Bragg back to Richmond. At first Johnston kept Bragg in Tullahoma as Mrs. Bragg was sick. Then Johnston became ill and needed Bragg around in case Rosecrans' attacked. Eventually Johnston left Bragg's army to serve as theater commander.
In April Polk's report of Stones River came out and commended Cheatham. Bragg was convinced that they were in cahoots and sent a letter to Polk's subordinates asking about an event in the Perryville campaign. Cleburne also received this letter because he had serve with Polk during the Perryville campaign. Cleburne asked Hardee for advice. Hardee told Cleburne not to responded as it seemed that Bragg was just fishing for a court martial which is what Bragg was doing.
Cleburne's division underwent a minor overhaul in May. Johnston was now in Mississippi halfheartedly trying to save Vicksburg. To respond to one of his calls for men Bragg sent Breckinridge with 2 of his 3 brigades. Then Bragg took Bushrod Johnson's brigade from Cleburne and combined it with Breckinridge's remaining brigade into a new division under Stewart. As compensation Cleburne received Churchill's brigade of recently exchanged prisoners, these men had surrendered at Arkansas Post without firing a shot. No other division in the army wanted these men but Cleburne welcomed them to the division. He told them that they would be judged on what they do and not on what happened previously.
Cleburne's division was in the Liberty Gap area but Bragg was not really prepared for a Union advance. On June 24 Liddell's two regiments were unable to hold Liberty Gap against the Union assault. Bragg now had to retreat as Rosecrans conducted a pretty impressive campaign of maneuver. Cleburne's men acted as the army's rear guard for most of this retreat. On July 5th his division crossed the Tennessee River and Hardee turned command of the corps over to Cleburne while Hardee went to Chattanooga to discuss strategy with Bragg. Cleburne's corps went east of Chattanooga and took up a defensive position upriver of the town. This is the area where Bragg thought Rosecrans would cross the river. A week later Hardee was sent west to help Johnston. Cleburne thought he might get corps command on a permanent basis but DH Hill soon arrived to take the position. In late August Rosecrans crossed west of Chattanooga and on September 7 Cleburne led his division south.
Chickamauga
As his division marched south from Chattanooga more changes were being made to its structure. Churchill was transferred to the trans-Mississippi and his brigade was now commanded by Deshler. Liddell's brigade was removed from the division and Liddell soon had his own division. Despite the changes and the retreat esprit de corps was high in the division.
During the retreat Bragg found an opportunity to strike at Rosecrans' scattered army at McLemore's Cove. Hindman was to attack first and Cleburne would support the attack . The morning of the attack went by with no sound from Hindman's area. Bragg and Hill were with Cleburne but waited until noon to order him to attack. Bragg hoped that Hindman would attack if he heard Cleburne's attack. Just as Cleburne's skirmishers were becoming engaged Bragg changed his mind and called off the attack. At 4:30 PM firing was finally heard from Hindman but when Cleburne went forward they found that the Union had escaped from the trap.
On September 19th Cleburne marched north to take part in a new battle. Around sunset his division crossed Chickamauga Creek at Thedford's Ford and marched two miles to the extreme right of the army. In the dark they went into position behind Liddell's division and Liddell urged Cleburne to attack. Cleburne was hesitant to attack because of the late hour, thick woods and unknown terrain. DH Hill arrived and Liddell urged him to order Cleburne to attack, which he then did. Cleburne began his advance at 6 PM with Deshler on the left, then Wood and Polk. The attack was a success at first but Wood, in the center, gave way. Cleburne brought up artillery to within 60 yards of the Union line and Wood was able to resume the advance. Finally at 9 PM the attack was halted.
On September 20 Cleburne was awake at sunrise (about quarter to 6 AM). Hill and Breckinridge joined him for breakfast. At 6:30 AM a courier from Polk arrived with orders for Breckinridge and Cleburne. The orders were for a dawn attack, which time had already passed. Hill was upset that Polk was ignoring the change of command, but actually Bragg had reorganized the army the night before, in part to limit Hill's role. Hill wrote a reply for Polk and the courier left. Polk though soon arrived to find out why there was no dawn attack. Cleburne said that once his men had eaten they would attack. Polk was fine with this explanation and left. He wasn't gone long when Bragg arrived. Bragg was upset that there had been no dawn attack, said the attack should begin as soon as possible and then he too left. It was now 8 AM.
Cleburne got his men ready and made a reconnaissance of the ground. At 9:30 AM Breckinridge could be heard attacking so Cleburne went forward. They attacked the Kelly Field salient and it was pretty much a disaster. Thomas' men had been preparing breastworks most of the night and were able to shuffle fresh men in and out of the front line. Wood and Polk got separated in the attack. Deshler became entangled with Stewart on his left. Cleburne helped sort this mess out and got Stewart to join in the attacks with Deshler. At 11 AM Cleburne ordered Wood and Polk to retreat and had Deshler cover the retreat. Deshler was among the Confederate brigade commanders killed in the battle. At 2 PM Deshler's brigade was finally ordered out, the division had lost about 50%. At 3:30 PM a staff officer told Cleburne to move to the right to attack again. Cleburne had the officer lead him to the spot to attack from. At 5 PM they attacked just as Thomas was pulling out, the evacuation turned into a stampede. The pursuit didn't really get going until the next afternoon and reached Missionary Ridge on the afternoon of the 22nd. On September 24 Bragg made a reconnaissance in force at Chattanooga. Cleburne's division was within 200 yards of the Union trenches when he saw the divisions on either side of him retreat. He wanted to make the attack but without support had no choice but retreat. Cleburne had brought 5115 men into battle at Chickamauga, they lost 1743 killed and wounded. Despite fighting at night they only had 6 missing.
Bragg vs the generals
For the third straight time after a campaign Bragg and his generals turned to infighting rather than preparing to fight the Union. Bragg felt that with a victory he had more leeway to get rid of those he disliked. The first to go was Hindman, who was suspended from command. He also suspended Polk, but Davis said that he'd need to file official charges or let it go. Davis thought this would make Bragg give up on Polk but instead Bragg had Polk arrested. A petition was passed around asking for Bragg's removal from command. Cleburne mainly kept his opinions to himself but he did sign the petition. Davis had to come visit the army to see what all the trouble was and in essence gave Bragg carte blanche to fix the dissent. DH Hill was made the scapegoat. Hill asked for and received Cleburne's support.
In Cleburne's report he praised Polk, Deshler and RQ Mills (Deshler's successor). He made no mention of Wood, positive or negative. The day before Cleburne submitted his report Wood submitted his resignation. It is not known if Cleburne showed Wood the report first or why else Wood might have resigned. Neither ever talked about it.
Cleburne: Atlanta
The spring campaign in the west began May 8. Cleburne's first action was to reinforce Dug Gap. The situation appeared bleak but Granbury's brigade arrived in time to claim the gap and actually faced very little skirmishing. The next dawn Cleburne sent out pickets to see if the Federals were still there and found out they were gone. It appeared the Dug Gap attack had been a feint but Johnston wasn't sure. The movements of Cleburne's division over the next few days illustrate the difficulty Johnston was having determining Sherman's intentions. The night of May 9 Johnston pulled Cleburne's division out of the gap and sent them to Resaca. After a few hours there Hardee sent Cleburne back to Dug Gap, arriving there at sunset on May 10. The next day at 7 AM he was again on the move towards Resaca.
During the initial part of the Georgia campaign Cleburne's division saw little combat. During the May 14-15 battle of Resaca Cleburne's division was in the center of the lines and saw very little action. Their next movements took them to Adairsville, Kingston and Allatoona. While at Allatoona (May 20-23) Cleburne likely learned of the death of Kit, his youngest half brother. Kit was a lieutenant in the 5th Kentucky and was killed in a skirmish at Dublin, Kentucky on May 10. Twice during the campaign Cleburne was in combat; at Pickett's Mill and Kennesaw Mountain. Both times he turned in sterling efforts.
May 27 found Cleburne at Pickett's Mill. Early in the morning he moved his men to the right, extending the army's flank, by his own initiative. He had been in reserve but now was in the front. Luckily for him this is exactly the spot the Union army would attack. If Cleburne had not moved his division the Union would have struck an open flank but now they ran into one of the better divisions of the army. The fighting centered around a sinkhole while the Union kept probing in the dense woods for the right flank, Cleburne held this line for several hours. At dusk two of Lowrey's regiments, the 33rd Alabama and 8/19th Arkansas, pulled back a few dozen yards to straighten the line. When Cleburne's staff saw this they though it was the beginning of a rout and sent two regiments to bolster the line. This confusion almost lead to a real rout but Cleburne was at the spot and soon straightened everything out.
That night Union soldiers could be heard rustling in the brush. Cleburne's men were not sure what was going on and Cleburne ordered Granbury to send out some pickets to figure it out. Granbury suggested using the whole brigade instead. At 10 PM they fixed bayonets and charged into the woods. There were some Federals there but they ran away after firing a volley and Granbury gathered about 200 prisoners. For the third time (Missionary Ridge and Ringgold Gap) Cleburne had repulsed a numerically superior enemy. Partly this was due to Howard committing his men piecemeal but Cleburne had prepared his position well with good trenches and interior lines to shift men. His brigade commanders also worked well as a team and would reinforce each other without waiting for the orders to be routed through Cleburne.
On June 14 Leonidas Polk was killed by an artillery shell. Johnston appointed Loring, Polk's senior division commander, the new corps commander, apparently Johnston never considered Cleburne. Loring was 10 months Cleburne's senior in rank and was from the same corps. A week later Stewart took permanent command of the corps. He was junior to Cleburne by four months and from Hoods' corps, but he was a West Pointer, had not been anti-Bragg and had not supported Cleburne's emancipation proposal. If Cleburne objected to these command decisions he never said anything about it. That's one of Cleburne's characteristics, he never complained openly about decisions concerning rank.
Sadness again hit Cleburne when his good friend Lucius Polk was wounded on June 15. He was severely wounded in the legs by an artillery shell, the second Polk to be hit by artillery in two days. Polk would resign from the army in July and return to his home near Columbia, Tennessee.
While Cleburne performed well at Kennesaw Mountain on June 27 it was not the sort of battle that needed the incredible to turn the tide for the Confederates. Quite simply Cleburne laid out good earthworks. The Union in his front lost 300 killed and 500 wounded. Cleburne lost just 2 killed and 9 wounded. Sherman listed his losses as 2500, then revised it to 3000 but even that was probably not correct.
Two months of campaigning had reduced his division from 5218 to 3855. Buck later claimed that morale in the army was higher when they reached the Chattahoochee than when it left Dalton. On July 17 Hood replaced Johnston as army commander. Cleburne was upset at Johnston's removal but mostly kept his feelings to himself. He also was not a fan of Hood and thought Hardee should have gotten the promotion instead. When Hood took over the army he needed a new corps commander for his old corps. He turned to Hardee for advice and Hardee selected Cheatham. Cheatham was Cleburne's senior but that had not stopped Hardee from previously advocating for Cleburne. Hardee had been Cleburne's commander for most of his service and it is possible that Hardee wanted to kept Cleburne with him or that Hardee thought Cleburne was best suited at divisional command. One thing that Symonds pointed out was that at command conferences Cleburne never spoke of his own ideas, he would freely give opinions of ideas that other brought forth but he never came up with ideas (with one notable exception).
Cleburne would be involved in two of the battles around Atlanta, at Bald Hill on July 22 and at Jonesboro at the end of August. At Jonesboro he would command a corps for the only time in his career.
The days of retreating were now at an end for the Army of Tennessee, they had run out of real estate and Hood had an aggressive nature. At Bald Hill Cleburne's division would be in its first battle under Hood. They were part of the flanking move on the east side of town. The attack was to begin at dawn but didn't get rolling until 1 PM. It was men of Smith's brigade who killed McPherson in this initial attack. Around 2 PM Govan ran into trouble and Cleburne ordered Lowrey to come up behind Govan to hit the entrenched line. The aide delivering the message noticed a gap forming between Cleburne and Walker and told Lowrey of it. Lowrey moved to fill this gap instead of following Cleburne's orders but when Cleburne was told of Lowrey's decision he approved of it, blind obedience to orders was not Cleburne's style. Govan's men though did push the Union back to Bald Hill and the next attack was coordinated. It appeared that the break through was at hand but after an hour of fighting Cleburne's division withdrew.
The battle had been hard on Cleburne's division. The division lost 1388 men, which exceeded total casualties since the beginning of the campaign in May. Thirty of forty field officers were killed or wounded, including 8 of 15 regimental commanders. James A Smith was badly wounded and turned command of his brigade over to Granbury. Lowrey lost 578 of 1000 men. Hood claimed a victory but the army could not stand many more such victories.
After three days of fury Cleburne's division was withdrawn into Atlanta. Sherman's force disappeared and Hood used the time to reorganize his army. SD Lee had arrived to take over Hood's corps on a permanent basis and Cheatham reverted to division command. Instead of replacing Walker (who had died near McPherson) Hood broke up his division and parceled out the remaining brigades. Cleburne was given Mercer's Georgia brigade, commanded by Colonel Charles Olmstead. Mercer's brigade had been in Savannah until recently and were basically green soldiers. Cleburne also did not think much of Olmstead.
By July 27 it was somewhat clear that Sherman's disappearance did not mean he was retreating, just that he was going to try to flank Atlanta from another direction. That day Cleburne moved to the west and occupied a mile and a half of trenches north of the Augusta Railroad. His 3000 men meant he had about 1 man per yard. Not much happened in this area until late August. On August 30 Hardee was summoned to Atlanta to confer with Hood and Cleburne took over control of the corps while it marched to Jonesboro. Hood told Hardee to take command of Lee's corps and use the two corps to drive the Federals back. Hardee arrived back at Jonesboro a few hours before daylight on August 31. The Federals had about 20,000 men and were well entrenched. Cleburne would get to continue to command Hardee's corps for the time being.
Hardee planned to strike the Union with two prongs, Cleburne attacking first from the south and making a right wheel, driving the Union flank north. When the moment seemed right Lee's corps would join in on Cleburne's right. Due to some confusion Lowrey, commanding Cleburne's division, thought the objective was to drive the Union across the Flint River. Granbury began the assault at 3:30 AM but instead of wheeling right he continued west and drove the Union cavalry across the river. Lowrey would claim that Granbury attacked contrary to orders but two other brigades in the division followed Granbury's example. Brown's division on Lowrey's right attacked correctly but did not fare well as they lacked support and also had an open left flank. Maney now moved to fill the gap on Brown's left but suspended the attack as he asked Cleburne about support. Hardee told Cleburne to call off the attack and while Cleburne's corps was in shambles it was not the whole reason Hardee called an end to the battle. Lee had decided not to wait for Cleburne's attack and had attacked an hour before Cleburne did. This assault was a disaster and was the primary reason Hardee called it all off. Cleburne had not improved his reputation. Some blame could be placed on the divisional commanders, especially Lowrey, but Cleburne had also not communicated a clear battle plan.
That night the Confederate fell back closer to Jonesboro. Lee's corps was sent to near Rough and Ready. The next day, September 1, they could see two Union corps bearing down on their position. For awhile it was not clear if Sherman would attack or be content to place his force between Hardee and Atlanta. At 3 PM Sherman attacked. The Union suffered severe losses, similar to Kennesaw Mountain, but they had too many men for the Confederate to deal with and eventually gained the position. Govan and nearly 600 men of his brigade (nearly the entire brigade) was captured. At dark Sherman ended the attack. If he had continued to attack he might have destroyed Hardee's corps but he had achieved his objective, Atlanta was now untenable. That night Hood abandoned Atlanta.
During the initial part of the Georgia campaign Cleburne's division saw little combat. During the May 14-15 battle of Resaca Cleburne's division was in the center of the lines and saw very little action. Their next movements took them to Adairsville, Kingston and Allatoona. While at Allatoona (May 20-23) Cleburne likely learned of the death of Kit, his youngest half brother. Kit was a lieutenant in the 5th Kentucky and was killed in a skirmish at Dublin, Kentucky on May 10. Twice during the campaign Cleburne was in combat; at Pickett's Mill and Kennesaw Mountain. Both times he turned in sterling efforts.
May 27 found Cleburne at Pickett's Mill. Early in the morning he moved his men to the right, extending the army's flank, by his own initiative. He had been in reserve but now was in the front. Luckily for him this is exactly the spot the Union army would attack. If Cleburne had not moved his division the Union would have struck an open flank but now they ran into one of the better divisions of the army. The fighting centered around a sinkhole while the Union kept probing in the dense woods for the right flank, Cleburne held this line for several hours. At dusk two of Lowrey's regiments, the 33rd Alabama and 8/19th Arkansas, pulled back a few dozen yards to straighten the line. When Cleburne's staff saw this they though it was the beginning of a rout and sent two regiments to bolster the line. This confusion almost lead to a real rout but Cleburne was at the spot and soon straightened everything out.
That night Union soldiers could be heard rustling in the brush. Cleburne's men were not sure what was going on and Cleburne ordered Granbury to send out some pickets to figure it out. Granbury suggested using the whole brigade instead. At 10 PM they fixed bayonets and charged into the woods. There were some Federals there but they ran away after firing a volley and Granbury gathered about 200 prisoners. For the third time (Missionary Ridge and Ringgold Gap) Cleburne had repulsed a numerically superior enemy. Partly this was due to Howard committing his men piecemeal but Cleburne had prepared his position well with good trenches and interior lines to shift men. His brigade commanders also worked well as a team and would reinforce each other without waiting for the orders to be routed through Cleburne.
On June 14 Leonidas Polk was killed by an artillery shell. Johnston appointed Loring, Polk's senior division commander, the new corps commander, apparently Johnston never considered Cleburne. Loring was 10 months Cleburne's senior in rank and was from the same corps. A week later Stewart took permanent command of the corps. He was junior to Cleburne by four months and from Hoods' corps, but he was a West Pointer, had not been anti-Bragg and had not supported Cleburne's emancipation proposal. If Cleburne objected to these command decisions he never said anything about it. That's one of Cleburne's characteristics, he never complained openly about decisions concerning rank.
Sadness again hit Cleburne when his good friend Lucius Polk was wounded on June 15. He was severely wounded in the legs by an artillery shell, the second Polk to be hit by artillery in two days. Polk would resign from the army in July and return to his home near Columbia, Tennessee.
While Cleburne performed well at Kennesaw Mountain on June 27 it was not the sort of battle that needed the incredible to turn the tide for the Confederates. Quite simply Cleburne laid out good earthworks. The Union in his front lost 300 killed and 500 wounded. Cleburne lost just 2 killed and 9 wounded. Sherman listed his losses as 2500, then revised it to 3000 but even that was probably not correct.
Two months of campaigning had reduced his division from 5218 to 3855. Buck later claimed that morale in the army was higher when they reached the Chattahoochee than when it left Dalton. On July 17 Hood replaced Johnston as army commander. Cleburne was upset at Johnston's removal but mostly kept his feelings to himself. He also was not a fan of Hood and thought Hardee should have gotten the promotion instead. When Hood took over the army he needed a new corps commander for his old corps. He turned to Hardee for advice and Hardee selected Cheatham. Cheatham was Cleburne's senior but that had not stopped Hardee from previously advocating for Cleburne. Hardee had been Cleburne's commander for most of his service and it is possible that Hardee wanted to kept Cleburne with him or that Hardee thought Cleburne was best suited at divisional command. One thing that Symonds pointed out was that at command conferences Cleburne never spoke of his own ideas, he would freely give opinions of ideas that other brought forth but he never came up with ideas (with one notable exception).
Cleburne would be involved in two of the battles around Atlanta, at Bald Hill on July 22 and at Jonesboro at the end of August. At Jonesboro he would command a corps for the only time in his career.
The days of retreating were now at an end for the Army of Tennessee, they had run out of real estate and Hood had an aggressive nature. At Bald Hill Cleburne's division would be in its first battle under Hood. They were part of the flanking move on the east side of town. The attack was to begin at dawn but didn't get rolling until 1 PM. It was men of Smith's brigade who killed McPherson in this initial attack. Around 2 PM Govan ran into trouble and Cleburne ordered Lowrey to come up behind Govan to hit the entrenched line. The aide delivering the message noticed a gap forming between Cleburne and Walker and told Lowrey of it. Lowrey moved to fill this gap instead of following Cleburne's orders but when Cleburne was told of Lowrey's decision he approved of it, blind obedience to orders was not Cleburne's style. Govan's men though did push the Union back to Bald Hill and the next attack was coordinated. It appeared that the break through was at hand but after an hour of fighting Cleburne's division withdrew.
The battle had been hard on Cleburne's division. The division lost 1388 men, which exceeded total casualties since the beginning of the campaign in May. Thirty of forty field officers were killed or wounded, including 8 of 15 regimental commanders. James A Smith was badly wounded and turned command of his brigade over to Granbury. Lowrey lost 578 of 1000 men. Hood claimed a victory but the army could not stand many more such victories.
After three days of fury Cleburne's division was withdrawn into Atlanta. Sherman's force disappeared and Hood used the time to reorganize his army. SD Lee had arrived to take over Hood's corps on a permanent basis and Cheatham reverted to division command. Instead of replacing Walker (who had died near McPherson) Hood broke up his division and parceled out the remaining brigades. Cleburne was given Mercer's Georgia brigade, commanded by Colonel Charles Olmstead. Mercer's brigade had been in Savannah until recently and were basically green soldiers. Cleburne also did not think much of Olmstead.
By July 27 it was somewhat clear that Sherman's disappearance did not mean he was retreating, just that he was going to try to flank Atlanta from another direction. That day Cleburne moved to the west and occupied a mile and a half of trenches north of the Augusta Railroad. His 3000 men meant he had about 1 man per yard. Not much happened in this area until late August. On August 30 Hardee was summoned to Atlanta to confer with Hood and Cleburne took over control of the corps while it marched to Jonesboro. Hood told Hardee to take command of Lee's corps and use the two corps to drive the Federals back. Hardee arrived back at Jonesboro a few hours before daylight on August 31. The Federals had about 20,000 men and were well entrenched. Cleburne would get to continue to command Hardee's corps for the time being.
Hardee planned to strike the Union with two prongs, Cleburne attacking first from the south and making a right wheel, driving the Union flank north. When the moment seemed right Lee's corps would join in on Cleburne's right. Due to some confusion Lowrey, commanding Cleburne's division, thought the objective was to drive the Union across the Flint River. Granbury began the assault at 3:30 AM but instead of wheeling right he continued west and drove the Union cavalry across the river. Lowrey would claim that Granbury attacked contrary to orders but two other brigades in the division followed Granbury's example. Brown's division on Lowrey's right attacked correctly but did not fare well as they lacked support and also had an open left flank. Maney now moved to fill the gap on Brown's left but suspended the attack as he asked Cleburne about support. Hardee told Cleburne to call off the attack and while Cleburne's corps was in shambles it was not the whole reason Hardee called an end to the battle. Lee had decided not to wait for Cleburne's attack and had attacked an hour before Cleburne did. This assault was a disaster and was the primary reason Hardee called it all off. Cleburne had not improved his reputation. Some blame could be placed on the divisional commanders, especially Lowrey, but Cleburne had also not communicated a clear battle plan.
That night the Confederate fell back closer to Jonesboro. Lee's corps was sent to near Rough and Ready. The next day, September 1, they could see two Union corps bearing down on their position. For awhile it was not clear if Sherman would attack or be content to place his force between Hardee and Atlanta. At 3 PM Sherman attacked. The Union suffered severe losses, similar to Kennesaw Mountain, but they had too many men for the Confederate to deal with and eventually gained the position. Govan and nearly 600 men of his brigade (nearly the entire brigade) was captured. At dark Sherman ended the attack. If he had continued to attack he might have destroyed Hardee's corps but he had achieved his objective, Atlanta was now untenable. That night Hood abandoned Atlanta.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Cleburne: personality and winter 1864
Cleburne was a quiet man so there is not too much known of him outside of military events. When he lived in Helena before the war Cleburne had been shy especially around women, this can be partly seen by the facts that he joined the lodge and that his best friends were men of the rough and tumble variety. During December 1862 at Murfreesboro he purposely missed the two biggest social events of the season; John Hunt Morgan's wedding and a Christmas Ball. He stayed at his headquarters west of town at Eagleville.
In the winter of 1863-64, while Walker's copy of the proposal had been enroute to Richmond, Cleburne took his first leave of the war, traveling to Mobile with Hardee. Hardee was getting married and asked Cleburne to be his best man. During the ceremony Cleburne became smitten with the maid of honor, Susan Tarleton. He spent much of his leave with her as the wedding party stayed together. The day before he left he asked her to marry him but she did not give him an answer. She did give him permission to write to her and she promised to write to him. It appears that he wrote her nearly every day, though those letters no longer exist. In early March he could not take the suspense any longer and so decided to travel back to Mobile to convince her to marry him. After three years without any leave he was now taking his second in six weeks. His staff was very amused by his behavior. After five days in Mobile he was able to convince her to marry him and then he returned to the army.
On March 22 the army awoke to 5 inches of snow. In his division Polk's brigade attacked Govan's brigade in a snowball fight. Cleburne got caught up in the excitement and lead Polk's brigade. Unfortunately Govan was able to lead a counter attack and capture Cleburne. He was paroled but was soon captured again. Govan's brigade thought some punishment should be metted out to a parole breaker. After some debate about punishment it was decided that Cleburne would get leniency because this was his first offense. That night he issued a whiskey ration to the division and they spent the rest of the night singing.
Winter Camp 64:
In late February Cleburne's division was sent to stop Sherman's Meridian Expedition but after they had only gotten half way there Sherman turned back to Vicksburg. Cleburne then received word from Johnston that the Union had advanced and captured Cleburne's old camp at Tunnel Hill. On February 25 Cleburne's men attacked and regained their camp. It appears that the Federal reconnaissance was not coordinated with Sherman's campaign, just a lucky coincidence that they attacked camps that the Confederates had evacuated to deal with Sherman.
Also in late February the army got another command shakeup. John Bell Hood arrived to replace Hindman, who was commanding Breckinridge's corps. While many of Cleburne's men thought he might get the promotion Johnston had never really considered him. Johnston had originally asked Davis for permission to create a new corps but even that command was not intended for Cleburne, instead Johnston wanted William Whiting.
That winter Cleburne also formed an officer school. He hosted discussion on the art of war with Polk, Lowrey, Govan and Granbury and encouraged them to do the same with their regimental commanders.
In the winter of 1863-64, while Walker's copy of the proposal had been enroute to Richmond, Cleburne took his first leave of the war, traveling to Mobile with Hardee. Hardee was getting married and asked Cleburne to be his best man. During the ceremony Cleburne became smitten with the maid of honor, Susan Tarleton. He spent much of his leave with her as the wedding party stayed together. The day before he left he asked her to marry him but she did not give him an answer. She did give him permission to write to her and she promised to write to him. It appears that he wrote her nearly every day, though those letters no longer exist. In early March he could not take the suspense any longer and so decided to travel back to Mobile to convince her to marry him. After three years without any leave he was now taking his second in six weeks. His staff was very amused by his behavior. After five days in Mobile he was able to convince her to marry him and then he returned to the army.
On March 22 the army awoke to 5 inches of snow. In his division Polk's brigade attacked Govan's brigade in a snowball fight. Cleburne got caught up in the excitement and lead Polk's brigade. Unfortunately Govan was able to lead a counter attack and capture Cleburne. He was paroled but was soon captured again. Govan's brigade thought some punishment should be metted out to a parole breaker. After some debate about punishment it was decided that Cleburne would get leniency because this was his first offense. That night he issued a whiskey ration to the division and they spent the rest of the night singing.
Winter Camp 64:
In late February Cleburne's division was sent to stop Sherman's Meridian Expedition but after they had only gotten half way there Sherman turned back to Vicksburg. Cleburne then received word from Johnston that the Union had advanced and captured Cleburne's old camp at Tunnel Hill. On February 25 Cleburne's men attacked and regained their camp. It appears that the Federal reconnaissance was not coordinated with Sherman's campaign, just a lucky coincidence that they attacked camps that the Confederates had evacuated to deal with Sherman.
Also in late February the army got another command shakeup. John Bell Hood arrived to replace Hindman, who was commanding Breckinridge's corps. While many of Cleburne's men thought he might get the promotion Johnston had never really considered him. Johnston had originally asked Davis for permission to create a new corps but even that command was not intended for Cleburne, instead Johnston wanted William Whiting.
That winter Cleburne also formed an officer school. He hosted discussion on the art of war with Polk, Lowrey, Govan and Granbury and encouraged them to do the same with their regimental commanders.
Monday, April 19, 2010
Cleburne: slave proposal
Cleburne had made the South his home but in many ways he was still an outsider. This would be clearly seen in the winter of 1863-64. That December as the army retreated from Chattanooga Cleburne was putting the finishing touches on a proposal he had been thinking about for some time. Cleburne saw that the Confederacy was losing the numbers game. In many battles the numbers of lost on each side were pretty even but the percentages were not. At some point the Union's manpower advantage would win the war. Seeing this Cleburne proposed the radical idea of enlisting slaves into the Confederate armies.
As early as April 1863 he had asked Liddell if he'd willingly give up slavery if it meant the Confederacy would win its independence and Liddell answered "willingly." That December he sought the advice of three members of his military family. The first was Captain Buck who brought up military objections, such as would they fight, who would lead them. Cleburne thought they would fight for their freedom and the freedom of their families, it was already clear that they could fight as some black regiments had performed well for the Union. As for a leader Cleburne was willing to lead them if no one else would. Cleburne next asked his chief of staff Major Calhoun Benham. Benham was appalled at the thought of black regiments and asked Cleburne for a copy of the proposal so he could prepare a rebuttal. Cleburne wanted an open discussion of the proposal and gladly accepted Benham's request. A few days after Christmas Cleburne asked Captain Thomas Key for his opinion. Key commanded a battery in Cleburne's division and also had been a newspaper editor in Helena before the war. Key thought it was a pipe dream but was not able to persuade Cleburne against it.
Cleburne then decided to gather his regimental and brigade commanders together to discuss it. They supported it pretty enthusiastically (whether some of their support was because of hero worship is nearly impossible to tell) and a clean copy of the proposal was generated for signatures. Govan, Lowrey and John H. Kelly signed as well as many regimental commanders. Polk and Granbury were not present to sign the new copy but expressed their support of the proposal, in all 14 signed the document. Cleburne now decided to take the proposal to the upper army command. He asked Hardee to gather the division and corps commanders together at Johnston's HQ on January 2.
On the night of January 2 most of the Army of Tennessee's generals met at army headquarters in Dalton, Georgia. Most of them did not know at the time that the purpose of the meeting was to hear Cleburne's proposal for using slaves in the Confederate army. Those in attendance at this meeting, besides Cleburne, were Joseph E. Johnston, who had replaced Bragg as commander of the army one week earlier, Hardee, William H.T. Walker, Alexander Stewart, Thomas Hindman, Carter Stevenson, Patton Anderson and William Bate.
After everyone had arrived Johnston asked Hardee to explain why the meeting had been called, even Johnston didn't know. Hardee then simply said that Cleburne had prepared a paper "on an important subject." Cleburne then preceded to read his proposal, about 20 pages. When he finished Hindman was the first to speak, this had been prearranged, and he expressed support for the proposal. Benham was the next and he read his rebuttal. No notes were taken so it is impossible to know what was said but from later writings we know that Bate, Anderson and Walker were strongly against it. Bate called it "hideous and objectionable" and predicted that the army would mutiny at the mere suggestion of enlisting slaves. Anderson said it was "revolting to Southern sentiment, Southern pride and Southern honor." Walker labeled the proposal treason and said that any officer advocating it should be held fully accountable.
Johnston decided that forwarding the proposal to Richmond would cause more trouble than good so he swore everyone to secrecy. Walker though decided that he needed to be the protector of Southern values and was determined that Richmond hear about this. Days later he asked Cleburne for a copy and told him his intent. Cleburne by now knew that the proposal might cause severe trouble for him as there might be others in the government who would deem this treason. A fresh copy was made for Walker, but Cleburne removed the 14 signatures and instead was the only one to sign it. Cleburne was willing to stand by his position no matter the consequences but he decided to protect his subordinates. Walker also tried to get written statements from the proposal's supporters but no one was willing to go on the record with Cleburne. They were however upset that Walker had made himself the defender of Southern values and Hindman wrote him, "I do not choose to admit any inquisitorial rights in you."
Walker at first tried to send the copy to Davis through Johnston but Johnston refused to forward it. Walker was then able to give it to a congressman who would deliver it personally to Davis. When Davis finally got the proposal he wrote to Walker and Johnston that the matter was over and that everyone was sworn to secrecy. Only Benham's copy of the proposal survived the war and it wasn't until 1888 that it saw the light of day again when it was published in a magazine.
For most part secrecy was maintained but there were rumors. Colonel James Nisbet was particularly curious and after pledging to BG Clement H Stevens that he wouldn't tell anyone else Stevens told Nisbet of the proposal. Nisbet thought it was a good idea (it seems that supporters of the proposal tended to be lower in rank, coincidence?). Stevens exploded, calling slavery the reason for the war and said, "If slavery is to be abolished then I take no more interest in our fight." To many Southerners independence without slavery was not worth the fight. That is the point Cleburne missed as an outsider as he thought that independence was worth giving up other things.
Bragg soon became Davis' official military advisor. He was still upset over the various command squabbles he had been involved in. He loved Cleburne's proposal because he thought it discredited Cleburne and his allies, many of whom had been anti-Bragg men. Bragg wrote of them, "they are agitators and should be watched." He also said "we must mark the men."
As early as April 1863 he had asked Liddell if he'd willingly give up slavery if it meant the Confederacy would win its independence and Liddell answered "willingly." That December he sought the advice of three members of his military family. The first was Captain Buck who brought up military objections, such as would they fight, who would lead them. Cleburne thought they would fight for their freedom and the freedom of their families, it was already clear that they could fight as some black regiments had performed well for the Union. As for a leader Cleburne was willing to lead them if no one else would. Cleburne next asked his chief of staff Major Calhoun Benham. Benham was appalled at the thought of black regiments and asked Cleburne for a copy of the proposal so he could prepare a rebuttal. Cleburne wanted an open discussion of the proposal and gladly accepted Benham's request. A few days after Christmas Cleburne asked Captain Thomas Key for his opinion. Key commanded a battery in Cleburne's division and also had been a newspaper editor in Helena before the war. Key thought it was a pipe dream but was not able to persuade Cleburne against it.
Cleburne then decided to gather his regimental and brigade commanders together to discuss it. They supported it pretty enthusiastically (whether some of their support was because of hero worship is nearly impossible to tell) and a clean copy of the proposal was generated for signatures. Govan, Lowrey and John H. Kelly signed as well as many regimental commanders. Polk and Granbury were not present to sign the new copy but expressed their support of the proposal, in all 14 signed the document. Cleburne now decided to take the proposal to the upper army command. He asked Hardee to gather the division and corps commanders together at Johnston's HQ on January 2.
On the night of January 2 most of the Army of Tennessee's generals met at army headquarters in Dalton, Georgia. Most of them did not know at the time that the purpose of the meeting was to hear Cleburne's proposal for using slaves in the Confederate army. Those in attendance at this meeting, besides Cleburne, were Joseph E. Johnston, who had replaced Bragg as commander of the army one week earlier, Hardee, William H.T. Walker, Alexander Stewart, Thomas Hindman, Carter Stevenson, Patton Anderson and William Bate.
After everyone had arrived Johnston asked Hardee to explain why the meeting had been called, even Johnston didn't know. Hardee then simply said that Cleburne had prepared a paper "on an important subject." Cleburne then preceded to read his proposal, about 20 pages. When he finished Hindman was the first to speak, this had been prearranged, and he expressed support for the proposal. Benham was the next and he read his rebuttal. No notes were taken so it is impossible to know what was said but from later writings we know that Bate, Anderson and Walker were strongly against it. Bate called it "hideous and objectionable" and predicted that the army would mutiny at the mere suggestion of enlisting slaves. Anderson said it was "revolting to Southern sentiment, Southern pride and Southern honor." Walker labeled the proposal treason and said that any officer advocating it should be held fully accountable.
Johnston decided that forwarding the proposal to Richmond would cause more trouble than good so he swore everyone to secrecy. Walker though decided that he needed to be the protector of Southern values and was determined that Richmond hear about this. Days later he asked Cleburne for a copy and told him his intent. Cleburne by now knew that the proposal might cause severe trouble for him as there might be others in the government who would deem this treason. A fresh copy was made for Walker, but Cleburne removed the 14 signatures and instead was the only one to sign it. Cleburne was willing to stand by his position no matter the consequences but he decided to protect his subordinates. Walker also tried to get written statements from the proposal's supporters but no one was willing to go on the record with Cleburne. They were however upset that Walker had made himself the defender of Southern values and Hindman wrote him, "I do not choose to admit any inquisitorial rights in you."
Walker at first tried to send the copy to Davis through Johnston but Johnston refused to forward it. Walker was then able to give it to a congressman who would deliver it personally to Davis. When Davis finally got the proposal he wrote to Walker and Johnston that the matter was over and that everyone was sworn to secrecy. Only Benham's copy of the proposal survived the war and it wasn't until 1888 that it saw the light of day again when it was published in a magazine.
For most part secrecy was maintained but there were rumors. Colonel James Nisbet was particularly curious and after pledging to BG Clement H Stevens that he wouldn't tell anyone else Stevens told Nisbet of the proposal. Nisbet thought it was a good idea (it seems that supporters of the proposal tended to be lower in rank, coincidence?). Stevens exploded, calling slavery the reason for the war and said, "If slavery is to be abolished then I take no more interest in our fight." To many Southerners independence without slavery was not worth the fight. That is the point Cleburne missed as an outsider as he thought that independence was worth giving up other things.
Bragg soon became Davis' official military advisor. He was still upset over the various command squabbles he had been involved in. He loved Cleburne's proposal because he thought it discredited Cleburne and his allies, many of whom had been anti-Bragg men. Bragg wrote of them, "they are agitators and should be watched." He also said "we must mark the men."
Friday, April 16, 2010
Cleburne: Chattanooga
After Chickamauga Cleburne had two brigade vacancies to fill. He picked James A Smith to replace Deshler. Smith was a 1853 West Point graduate. To replace Wood Cleburne picked a man similar to himself, Mark P Lowrey who was an Irish Protestant and had been a company commander in the early days of the war before rising to regimental command. Before the war Lowrey had been a Baptist minister. Lidell's brigade was also returned to Cleburne's division.
The army also needed two new corps commanders. Cleburne seemed the logical choice to replace DH Hill but the position instead went to Breckinridge while the other corps went to Cheatham. Breckinridge and Cheatham were the two most senior officers who had not signed the anti-Bragg petition; they were not Bragg fans just astute enough not to anger him. Cleburne did not publicly complain about the slight but mentioned to Lidell, who was a friend of Bragg, that Breckinridge was "unlucky and inspired no confidence." Lidell said that there was no one else to which Cleburne responded that surely there were other candidates and that "I would rather the command were given to you." Perhaps Cleburne hoped Liddell would say something similar about Cleburne but either Liddell didn’t feel that way or did not understand the ruse (or maybe he understood it too well). Cleburne may have hoped that Liddell would repeat this conversation to Bragg. It appears that Liddell did not tell Bragg and Cleburne began to tell Liddell less and less. That situation Liddell did pick up on and resented it, later complaining about Cleburne in his memoirs. In late October Hardee returned to the army and took over from Cheatham. Cleburne's division was soon transferred into Hardee's corps.
Near midnight on November 22 Bragg ordered Cleburne to take his division to Chickamauga Station and move to Longstreet's aid. He would also take Buckner's division, now temporarily commanded by Bushrod Johnson, along. Cleburne might have noticed that this move would remove the last two division commanders from the army that had signed the petition. By midmorning all but one of Johnson's brigades had departed when Bragg sent a note that no new units should depart, that if part had already left then the rest should follow but no new units. A little later a second courier reported that all troops should return at once. Pretty soon a third courier arrived telling Cleburne to move to Bragg's HQ at once, that he would be the army's reserve.
The next morning, November 24, Bragg had Cleburne send one brigade (Cleburne selected Polk's) to guard the railroad bridge over Chickamauga Creek. That afternoon, after Lookout Mountain fell, Bragg sent Cleburne to Tunnel Hill as Sherman could be seen over there. Cleburne arrived at about 2:30 PM and sent Smith's brigade to take Billy Goat Hill. Sherman gained it before Smith but this was not the hill Sherman really wanted and he wouldn't realize his mistake until the next day. That night Cleburne had breastworks built but sent all but two cannon to the rear. He thought Bragg would retreat but as the night dragged on he became more anxious. He sent an aide to Bragg's HQ but it wasn't until midnight that he found out that Bragg was going to stay, Breckinridge had talked him into it. Cleburne now ordered the artillery back to the front.
Hardee could tell that Cleburne would be hard pressed and so in the morning he sent Joseph Lewis' Orphan Brigade to help Cleburne. At 11 AM Sherman began the attack. During the first assault Smith asked permission to counter attack, which proved quite successful but Smith was badly wounded during it. Hiram Granbury now took command of the brigade. The second attack pierced Cleburne's lines briefly but was repulsed. Instead of falling back to their jump off points the Union dug in close to Cleburne's lines. They were able to pick off many artillerists and Granbury had to press infantry into the artillery service. Cleburne moved Swett's battery to enfilade the Union and was then able to force them back.
For the next assault Sherman committed four divisions. This attack was working quite well and Cleburne called on Alfred Cumming's Georgia Brigade for help. These three regiments plus the 2nd-15th-24th Arkansas charged down the hill at 3:30 PM and drove the Union back. At 5 PM Cleburne sent another charge down the hill but the Union was gone. Soon he received an order from Hardee that he needed to send all available troops to the center. Quickly this order became useless as the center was pierced so Cleburne took command of the three divisions in his area and formed a line to prevent the Union from rolling up the line. In the dark he withdrew all his men.
During the evening of November 25 Cleburne ordered Lowrey to attack in front of Missionary Ridge to clear the Union pickets. While the rest of the army is fleeing Cleburne is attacking, though it is only as a ruse to help the withdrawal of his men. At 10 PM that night Cleburne's force reached East Chickamauga Creek. The bridge was burned but one of Bragg's staff officers ordered Cleburne to ford the river, camp on the opposite bank and march at 4 AM for Ringgold Gap. Cleburne thought that he would lose many men if they had to cross a cold river and then sleep with little protection from the elements so he ignored this order and went into camp where he was. He was risking possible capture if the Union advanced quickly but he thought the move was in the best interests of his men.
Sometime after midnight Cleburne received an order from Bragg to hold Ringgold Gap at all costs so that the wagon trains and artillery could escape. He feared that he did not have enough men to defend the gap and that his division might be destroyed so he had the orders put in writing. The Union advance would outnumber Cleburne 4 to 1; 16,000 to 4,000. Cleburne also sent Captain Irving Buck to Bragg's HQ to get further instructions. At 2:30 AM Cleburne began crossing the river. First he built large fires on the other side so his men would have a chance to dry off and warm up, one veteran said that the fires only helped them get warm but that they appreciated that.
The gap Cleburne would defend was just wide enough for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, a wagon road and a branch of the East Chickamauga Creek. The ridge south of the gap rose abruptly while on the north side it rose much more gradually. The wagon train continued southeast from the gap toward Dalton and crossed the Chickamauga Creek three times in a short distance. These three bridges could very easily lead to the destruction of Bragg's army if Cleburne could not hold the gap.
On the south side of the gap Cleburne placed the 16th Alabama to guard the left flank. In the gap itself there were four lines of infantry with skirmishers in a patch of woods. Three regiments were also kept in reserve near the gap. Two Napoleon cannons, under the command of Lieutenant Richard Goldthwaite, were put near the mouth of the gap and were concealed by branches. Cleburne's remaining force was left at the rear of the gap with orders to watch the right flank. Soon after placing his men, about 8 AM, Cleburne could see Hooker's skirmishers advancing towards the gap. Turning around Cleburne could see, "close in rear of the ridge our immense train was still in full view, struggling through the fords of the creek and the deeply cut roads leading to Dalton, and my division, silent, but cool and ready, was the only barrier between it and the flushed and eager advance of the pursuing Federal army."
The leading Union brigade was Woods's of Osterhaus' division. The Confederates held their fire until the brigade was within 50 yards and then they let loose with cannon fire and infantry volleys. When the smoke cleared the Union survivors were racing to the rear leaving many dead and wounded behind. Williamson's brigade was then ordered to take the ridge on the Confederate right. Creighton's brigade of Geary's division was also ordered to advance on Williamson's left in hopes of turning the Confederate right flank.
On the ridge the Confederates were commanded by Major W.A. Taylor who was soon re-enforced with two companies sent by Colonel Hiram Granbury. Taylor then launched a charge down the ridge that resulted in the capture of 60-100 Federals and the 29th Missouri's colors. Creighton, meanwhile, was making steady progress towards the top. When they arrived there they meet the 1st Arkansas and 7th Texas, dispatched by General Lucius Polk just in time to beat Creighton's men there. These two regiments were enough to drive Creighton's men back down the ridge. Williamson's and Creighton's brigades reformed and assaulted again several times, Creighton was mortally wounded in this action. Geary then pulled Creighton's brigade off the ridge.
While the Confederate right was being assaulted there were also attacks made on the Confederate left and center. The attack on the left was stopped by the 16th Alabama and some other skirmishers lead by James Dulin. The attack on the center first captured some houses near Cleburne's line from which sharpshooters shot at the cannoners. Then the 13th Illinois charged the cannon but were repulsed by canister. Goldthwaite then shelled the houses until they were destroyed. Sometime between noon and 1 PM Hardee notified Cleburne that the trains were a safe distance away and he could now withdraw, which Cleburne soon did. About this same time Grant rode up and told Hooker to discontinue the attack. Cleburne had saved the Army of Tennessee from destruction.
The army also needed two new corps commanders. Cleburne seemed the logical choice to replace DH Hill but the position instead went to Breckinridge while the other corps went to Cheatham. Breckinridge and Cheatham were the two most senior officers who had not signed the anti-Bragg petition; they were not Bragg fans just astute enough not to anger him. Cleburne did not publicly complain about the slight but mentioned to Lidell, who was a friend of Bragg, that Breckinridge was "unlucky and inspired no confidence." Lidell said that there was no one else to which Cleburne responded that surely there were other candidates and that "I would rather the command were given to you." Perhaps Cleburne hoped Liddell would say something similar about Cleburne but either Liddell didn’t feel that way or did not understand the ruse (or maybe he understood it too well). Cleburne may have hoped that Liddell would repeat this conversation to Bragg. It appears that Liddell did not tell Bragg and Cleburne began to tell Liddell less and less. That situation Liddell did pick up on and resented it, later complaining about Cleburne in his memoirs. In late October Hardee returned to the army and took over from Cheatham. Cleburne's division was soon transferred into Hardee's corps.
Near midnight on November 22 Bragg ordered Cleburne to take his division to Chickamauga Station and move to Longstreet's aid. He would also take Buckner's division, now temporarily commanded by Bushrod Johnson, along. Cleburne might have noticed that this move would remove the last two division commanders from the army that had signed the petition. By midmorning all but one of Johnson's brigades had departed when Bragg sent a note that no new units should depart, that if part had already left then the rest should follow but no new units. A little later a second courier reported that all troops should return at once. Pretty soon a third courier arrived telling Cleburne to move to Bragg's HQ at once, that he would be the army's reserve.
The next morning, November 24, Bragg had Cleburne send one brigade (Cleburne selected Polk's) to guard the railroad bridge over Chickamauga Creek. That afternoon, after Lookout Mountain fell, Bragg sent Cleburne to Tunnel Hill as Sherman could be seen over there. Cleburne arrived at about 2:30 PM and sent Smith's brigade to take Billy Goat Hill. Sherman gained it before Smith but this was not the hill Sherman really wanted and he wouldn't realize his mistake until the next day. That night Cleburne had breastworks built but sent all but two cannon to the rear. He thought Bragg would retreat but as the night dragged on he became more anxious. He sent an aide to Bragg's HQ but it wasn't until midnight that he found out that Bragg was going to stay, Breckinridge had talked him into it. Cleburne now ordered the artillery back to the front.
Hardee could tell that Cleburne would be hard pressed and so in the morning he sent Joseph Lewis' Orphan Brigade to help Cleburne. At 11 AM Sherman began the attack. During the first assault Smith asked permission to counter attack, which proved quite successful but Smith was badly wounded during it. Hiram Granbury now took command of the brigade. The second attack pierced Cleburne's lines briefly but was repulsed. Instead of falling back to their jump off points the Union dug in close to Cleburne's lines. They were able to pick off many artillerists and Granbury had to press infantry into the artillery service. Cleburne moved Swett's battery to enfilade the Union and was then able to force them back.
For the next assault Sherman committed four divisions. This attack was working quite well and Cleburne called on Alfred Cumming's Georgia Brigade for help. These three regiments plus the 2nd-15th-24th Arkansas charged down the hill at 3:30 PM and drove the Union back. At 5 PM Cleburne sent another charge down the hill but the Union was gone. Soon he received an order from Hardee that he needed to send all available troops to the center. Quickly this order became useless as the center was pierced so Cleburne took command of the three divisions in his area and formed a line to prevent the Union from rolling up the line. In the dark he withdrew all his men.
During the evening of November 25 Cleburne ordered Lowrey to attack in front of Missionary Ridge to clear the Union pickets. While the rest of the army is fleeing Cleburne is attacking, though it is only as a ruse to help the withdrawal of his men. At 10 PM that night Cleburne's force reached East Chickamauga Creek. The bridge was burned but one of Bragg's staff officers ordered Cleburne to ford the river, camp on the opposite bank and march at 4 AM for Ringgold Gap. Cleburne thought that he would lose many men if they had to cross a cold river and then sleep with little protection from the elements so he ignored this order and went into camp where he was. He was risking possible capture if the Union advanced quickly but he thought the move was in the best interests of his men.
Sometime after midnight Cleburne received an order from Bragg to hold Ringgold Gap at all costs so that the wagon trains and artillery could escape. He feared that he did not have enough men to defend the gap and that his division might be destroyed so he had the orders put in writing. The Union advance would outnumber Cleburne 4 to 1; 16,000 to 4,000. Cleburne also sent Captain Irving Buck to Bragg's HQ to get further instructions. At 2:30 AM Cleburne began crossing the river. First he built large fires on the other side so his men would have a chance to dry off and warm up, one veteran said that the fires only helped them get warm but that they appreciated that.
The gap Cleburne would defend was just wide enough for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, a wagon road and a branch of the East Chickamauga Creek. The ridge south of the gap rose abruptly while on the north side it rose much more gradually. The wagon train continued southeast from the gap toward Dalton and crossed the Chickamauga Creek three times in a short distance. These three bridges could very easily lead to the destruction of Bragg's army if Cleburne could not hold the gap.
On the south side of the gap Cleburne placed the 16th Alabama to guard the left flank. In the gap itself there were four lines of infantry with skirmishers in a patch of woods. Three regiments were also kept in reserve near the gap. Two Napoleon cannons, under the command of Lieutenant Richard Goldthwaite, were put near the mouth of the gap and were concealed by branches. Cleburne's remaining force was left at the rear of the gap with orders to watch the right flank. Soon after placing his men, about 8 AM, Cleburne could see Hooker's skirmishers advancing towards the gap. Turning around Cleburne could see, "close in rear of the ridge our immense train was still in full view, struggling through the fords of the creek and the deeply cut roads leading to Dalton, and my division, silent, but cool and ready, was the only barrier between it and the flushed and eager advance of the pursuing Federal army."
The leading Union brigade was Woods's of Osterhaus' division. The Confederates held their fire until the brigade was within 50 yards and then they let loose with cannon fire and infantry volleys. When the smoke cleared the Union survivors were racing to the rear leaving many dead and wounded behind. Williamson's brigade was then ordered to take the ridge on the Confederate right. Creighton's brigade of Geary's division was also ordered to advance on Williamson's left in hopes of turning the Confederate right flank.
On the ridge the Confederates were commanded by Major W.A. Taylor who was soon re-enforced with two companies sent by Colonel Hiram Granbury. Taylor then launched a charge down the ridge that resulted in the capture of 60-100 Federals and the 29th Missouri's colors. Creighton, meanwhile, was making steady progress towards the top. When they arrived there they meet the 1st Arkansas and 7th Texas, dispatched by General Lucius Polk just in time to beat Creighton's men there. These two regiments were enough to drive Creighton's men back down the ridge. Williamson's and Creighton's brigades reformed and assaulted again several times, Creighton was mortally wounded in this action. Geary then pulled Creighton's brigade off the ridge.
While the Confederate right was being assaulted there were also attacks made on the Confederate left and center. The attack on the left was stopped by the 16th Alabama and some other skirmishers lead by James Dulin. The attack on the center first captured some houses near Cleburne's line from which sharpshooters shot at the cannoners. Then the 13th Illinois charged the cannon but were repulsed by canister. Goldthwaite then shelled the houses until they were destroyed. Sometime between noon and 1 PM Hardee notified Cleburne that the trains were a safe distance away and he could now withdraw, which Cleburne soon did. About this same time Grant rode up and told Hooker to discontinue the attack. Cleburne had saved the Army of Tennessee from destruction.
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