Some final Shiloh observations

As you may have guessed I have finished my series of posts on the the critical decisions of the Shiloh campaign. Some things that surprised me; there was very little done on the second day that can be termed critical. In fact there are not many critical decisions made during the battle. Most of the critical decisions are made prior to the battle. Also the Union tends to make few bad decisions while the Confederates seem to make few good decisions. Some of this is dumb luck and I really hate to make a blanket statement that the Union just had more good commanders, but at Shiloh this seems to be the case. Confederates who will eventually have pretty good careers tend to have off days at Shiloh, while the Union gets some good days out of commanders who end up with lackluster careers.

I found this exercise quite helpful in examining a battle and will probably do it again down the road. The trap of studying a battle, or the war, is that you let your 21st century ideas influence your opinions of an event. Distances, minutes and miles, seem much shorter now. When a general or unit takes awhile to do something we are often quick to criticise and blame. But often if you can look at what they did with what was available you will come to a different conclusion, not always but this is often the case. Eventually I think I would like to try this approach on Perryville, that is a battle that has recently caught my attention after two visits this past year. It is a battlefield I want to study in depth and then take a long trip there to really get the feel of the land.

Also with hindsight we can see that a decision someone agonized over wasn't as important as they feared. We now know Beauregard didn't have the vast army that Halleck was afraid of in May 1862 as he closed in on Corinth, but if we study what Halleck knew and what he had to work with we might come to a different conclusion. I can cut Halleck some slack because he was worried about the possibility of another high casualty battle like Shiloh was. I am more critical of his decision after Corinth to stop the advance and be content with what was gained, I realize he had a ton of new territory to defend, but he had so many men that some sort of advance was possible. That of course though is a discussion for another day.

This is not my final Shiloh post, just the last post in the Critical Decisions of Shiloh series. I'm sure I will post about Shiloh again in the future, maybe soon, maybe not for awhile.

Lack of Union pursuit after Shiloh

On April 8 Grant sent out a small pursuit party under Sherman to see what the Confederates were up to. Sherman was repulsed at Fallen Timbers. This ended the Union pursuit. As stated earlier the purpose of Grant’s army being at Pittsburg Landing was be in a position to capture Corinth. Both Grant and Beauregard’s armies had suffered severely at Shiloh; casualties on a scale that the country had never experienced before. On April 11 Halleck arrived to take command of the combined Union force. Pope's army would be brought over to Pittsburg Landing after its capture of Island No. 10. After April 11 Halleck had a relatively fresh army under Buell to tip the odds in his favor. An immediate advance, by a general who was willing to attack the Confederates at Corinth, probably would have resulted in a major victory. Halleck was too worried about long casualty lists to risk an attack that might bring a major victory but also a large casualty count.

Grant’s other options were to have used many more men in the pursuit, Buell’s Army of the Ohio had not been too bloodied on April 7. Also Grant could have decided after Sherman returned to make a larger pursuit on April 9. Though it is well after the battle of Shiloh it is possible that Halleck could have ordered a pursuit of the Confederates soon after his arrival on April 11.

Grant mainly didn’t pursue because he didn’t feel he could order Buell to do it and because he knew that Halleck wanted to avoid another battle. Halleck was on his way to Pittsburg Landing to take overall command. If Grant had made a large scale pursuit on April 8 or 9 he probably would have captured large numbers of Confederates and that might have softened the news of his own large casualties in the battle. There is also a possibility that if Grant had captured a large number of Confederates on April 8 it may have convinced Halleck to start the Corinth campaign sooner, move faster and attack. Halleck might have been able to score a major victory at Corinth that included the capture of a portion of Beauregard’s army as well as the strategic rail junction. Considering how cautious Halleck was it is unlikely that anything would have made him move faster and attack.

The Confederates would have been able to rest somewhat before Halleck's army arrived. There were also fortifications around Corinth that were made stronger every day. Halleck had a superiority of numbers though and probably could have taken Corinth with light to moderate losses.

It is a critical decision to not pursue. There were very good reasons not to pursue but there were also good reasons to pursue. Every day the Confederates have to strengthen Corinth means it will take m ore men to capture it. Halleck wants to avoid casualties and rather than rush into a risky battle he chooses to march slowly and continuously entrench so that he cannot be attacked.

Forrest’s charge at Fallen Timbers

After the battle the Union made a pursuit with a small force under Sherman. At Fallen Timbers Forrest led an impromptu charge against this small force with roughly 400 cavalrymen. Forrest cut right through the Union lines in the charge. This small event caused Sherman to halt the pursuit and return to his camps. The Union made no other pursuit. Forrest was clearly outnumbered but he made his charge hoping to stop the Union, just like he did. The Fallen Timbers site had a lot of felled trees which would hinder movement and this seemed like the place to halt the Union.

Forrest could have tried some other way to halt the Union. In retrospect we can see that Sherman probably would have stopped at his first resistance. There are any number of ways Forrest could have halted Sherman. A few cannon may have been enough to convince Sherman to halt the pursuit. The way Forrest ended the pursuit was dramatic but it could have ended much less dramatically.

Its a significant action but one that is not critical because the Confederate rear guard would have done something to halt this small pursuit. Forrest just ended the pursuit in dramatic fashion.

Beauregard ordering withdrawal on April 7

Around 2 P.M. on April 7 Beauregard decided that his army had done all they could. He realized that continuing the fight would only risk the possibility of his army routing from the battlefield so he ordered a retreat from the field.

Beauregard could have decided to stick it out as long as possible. If the Confederates had continued to hold their ground they probably would have been destroyed. Two more brigades of Buell's army had just arrived on the battlefield and were moving towards the front. The longer Beauregard stayed the more he risked the destruction of his army without much possibility of achieving a great victory.

The risks far outweighed any possible rewards so it is wise that Beauregard decided to retreat. This qualifies as a critical decision because if he had stayed the Confederate army would have probably dissolved.

Confederate failure to prepare for a second day of fighting

As was discussed in the Forrest expedition section the Confederates made little effort to prepare for a second day of battle. Many units retreated to the Union camps to find food and use the tents. Some units slept in line of battle where they ended the first day. Polk gathered some of his corps and retreated to their camp of the previous night well south of the battlefield. Beauregard shared a tent with Bragg so they probably discussed some ideas for the next day but there was no command council held to share information and plans. This disorganization does not allow Beauregard to effectively deal with the Union advance early on April 7.

The simple solution would have been to gather his commanders that night to discuss plans for the next day. The council of war would have been able to make a few easy decisions that would have changed the start of the second day of battle. The first would have been to arrange troops logically within the battlefield, not having some up front, some in the Union camps and some miles to the rear. Forrest might have been able to present his information about the arrival of Buell's army at such a meeting. A decision about whether to retreat or do something else could have been made.

Ignoring the possibility of a second day was a critical decision and a mistake. This is very similar to Grant thinking that the Confederates would not venture out of Corinth to attack him.

Forrest’s scouting expedition of April 6-7

There was little use for cavalry during the battle. The battlefield is mostly woods with scattered fields. At the end of the first day's fighting Forrest moved forward and gained a good vantage point on some old Indian mounds to watch the landing. He saw Buell's army coming across the river to swell Grant's ranks. He knew that Beauregard needed this information right away so that he could either order a night attack or prepare for a morning retreat. He was unable to find Beauregard but did find Hardee. Hardee refused to do anything about the information.

Hardee and Forrest should have known where to find Beauregard. They both should have been in contact with Johnston/Beauregard throughout the day. There is no alternate decision here because there is no way to find Beauregard to let him make a decision. Also Hardee decides not to make the decision for Beauregard.

The fact that Forrest made a reconnaissance is not a battle altering decision, that is exactly what cavalry should be doing. His efforts to share this information are dealt with in the Confederate preparations for a second day of fighting. Hardee's decision to do nothing about the information is critical because he could have made a decision to get at least part of the army ready for a second day of battle. Hardee should have realized that Beauregard was not doing anything to prepare for a second day and that he was the only one with the important information about Buell. Forrest's decision to stop looking for Beauregard is also critical because his information is so important. Forrest never did contact Beauregard because once the attack starts the value of the information was severely diminished. On the other hand the Union advance starts so early on April 7 that there is probably very little Beauregard could have done differently if he had received the information around the time of the Union advance.

Beauregard calling off final attack on April 6

As the Confederates prepared to attack the Dill Branch line late on April 6 an order arrived from Beauregard calling off the attack. He claimed the "battle sufficiently won," though Bragg made the very good point that no battle is ever sufficiently won.

Either Beauregard could have sent an order giving more discretion to the front line commander or rode there himself to view the situation. If the Confederates had attacked the Dill Branch line until sunset or losses caused them to stop instead of an order they probably would not have achieved much beyond lengthening the casualty lists.

It is debatable what a concerted attack on the Dill Branch line might have achieved but it is doubtful that this attack would have succeeded. There were few Confederates in the assault and the sun was setting. This is not a decision effecting the course or outcome of the battle.

Hurlbut and WHL Wallace move early

Hurlbut and WHL Wallace moved towards the sound of firing without waiting for orders from Grant. They took up positions on the left and right flank respectively of what would be become the Sunken Road defenses. Both start moving around 9 AM which is about the moment Grant arrives at the Landing. Even though they had not moved before Grant arrived they were ready to move. This is a big step as Civil War regiments cannot be made ready in mere moments, it takes awhile to get a regiment ready, much less brigades or divisions.

If they had waited for orders they might have come into those positions too late and would have had to form a line closer to the landing. Forming a line closer to the landing would have changed that element of the defense. Except for Dill Branch there was very little good defensive ground between the Sunken Road and the landing. If they had been routed from the Dill Branch line it would have proved disastrous. Also if they had initially formed a line along Dill Branch that would have allowed the Confederates to strike Sherman and McClernand’s divisions on the left flank.

Forming a line along the Sunken Road allowed time for a last line of defense to be created. It also protected the left flank of Sherman and McClernand. It is a critical decision for Hurlbut and WHL Wallace to move without orders and secure a defensive line.

This post is a bit out of order. Sorry about that, I wanted to check something before posting it and in the meantime I forged on with other Shiloh posts.

Prentiss holds to the last

When Grant toured his divisions during the morning he told Prentiss to hold the Sunken Road to the last man. Prentiss followed these orders completely. He did not try to get out of there until he was flanked on both sides. Very few of his men got away as the Confederates closed in from all sides.

Prentiss could have pulled his men out earlier. The most logical time to leave was probably when Hurlbut retreated from his left flank. This happened at a time when the fighting in his front had diminished so it probably appeared that he was safe until reports of the retreat on the left became known.

If Prentiss had pulled his men out when Hurlbut did he might have been able to prevent the capture of roughly 2300 Union soldiers. This may have allowed the Confederates to make a more coordinated assault on the Dill Branch line as historically they lost some of their manpower to gathering up prisoners. Of course the Dill Branch would also have been stronger by those 2300 men.

Prentiss’ staying in position until the bitter end did cause the capture of a large number of Union soldiers but it also delayed the Confederate attack on Dill Branch by at least a half hour. It is debatable if the Dill Branch line could be breached but giving the Confederates more time to try it would not be a good thing. It is a critical decision because it cost the Confederates valuable daylight, which at this point was worth more than manpower.

Lew Wallace’s marching formation

When Lew Wallace was informed he was on the wrong road he performed a counter march so that his best brigade stayed at the front of the formation. The first courier to Wallace had said that the Union was doing well but by the time the courier arrived that informed him of the better route (or rather the only route now available) the day had turned against the Union. Wallace was now informed that he might have to rescue the rest of the army from a dire situation. If the army was really in such a dire situation it makes sense to put the best brigade at the head of the column. If he would have had to fight his way across the bridge or go into combat soon after that he would need his best men up front.

His other option was to about face the entire division. If Wallace had been marching straight into combat it would have been important to have the best brigade attack first. If he had performed an about face he would have arrived on the battlefield a little earlier but probably not in time to take part in the battle that day.

Since Wallace stood little chance of seeing combat after taking the wrong road the reverse march does not rate as a critical decision. The net result of Wallace taking the slower method of turning around was just the time lost. Wallace cannot be faulted for his decision to counter march because he had just been told that the fate of the army might rest on his shoulders. Having the best men up front was now more important than the time saved by about facing the entire division.

I would also like to add that even though above I refer to Wallace being on the wrong road I'm not in total agreement with that, see the most recent post about Wallace, as Wallace knew of two roads from his position to the main encampment. One road had already been selected as the route Sherman would take to help Wallace. The shoe was on the other foot so Wallace took that road. Once Sherman has had to abandon that bridge Wallace's route is the worse option. Perhaps if the first courier had said the situation was particularly bad Wallace would have taken the route that put him behind the Union army and would have allowed Grant to place him where ever he needed him. Overall I think Wallace has taken too much grief for decisions that were not bad decisions based on the info he had.

Another thing to note is that, from what we can decipher, Grant's orders were not crystal clear. Everyone was learning on the fly. In the future Grant's orders will be much clearer, this is one lesson he took from Shiloh. If Shiloh had been an 1864, or even an 1863, battle it would have been fought much differently. I don't mean entrenchments and the like, just that command and control issues would have worked much more smoothly, orders would have been better. Veterans at all levels would have behaved differently. This is one aspect of Shiloh that interests me, the rawness of the troops and commanders and how they all acted. A great book on this aspect is Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits at Shiloh by Joseph Allan Frank & George A. Reaves.

Lew Wallace taking the wrong road

The area between Savannah and Corinth can be thought of as a rough triangle with Purdy in the northwest corner forming a right angle. Purdy is roughly 22 miles north of Corinth and 20 miles west of Savannah. The camps around Pittsburg Landing are about 25 miles from Corinth along the longest leg of the triangle. Roughly halfway between Savannah and Purdy is Adamsville, one of Lew Wallace's brigades was camped here. Another brigade was two miles east at Stoney Lonesome and the third brigade was two more miles east at Crump's Landing. Savannah is about 2 more miles to the east.

The road network in this area consisted of a few good roads and many small paths utilized by local farmers. The largest road in the area was the Corinth Road which traveled the long leg of the triangle from the landing to Corinth. The Hamburg-Savannah Road went north-south along the river connecting those two points on the river by land and passed right through the Union camps and is also referred to as the River Road. Hamburg and Purdy were also connected and this road was the third major road to bisect the battlefield. Each of Wallace's brigades had a road that lead from their position to the battlefield.

The road from Crump's Landing was the River Road. The road from Adamsville angled to the southeast and joined with the River Road just north of Snake Creek. The road from Stoney Lonesome, called the Shunpike, angled to the southwest until it was clear of Snake Creek, then it turned south and intersected the Hamburg-Purdy Road.

It the weeks before the battle the Union commanders were more worried about the Confederates striking Wallace's exposed division than the major camps. Sherman and Wallace had decided to use the Hamburg-Purdy Road and the Shunpike in case of attack. They had corduroyed sections of the road to keep it dry so that it would be ready for any emergency. When Wallace was given orders to come to the aid of the army he decided to take the path Sherman had intended to take to help him. There is, and was, some debate over whether or not those initial orders stated which road to take. The only copy of the order has long since been lost so that is a mystery we'll never solve. The route Wallace choose would bring him onto Sherman's right flank, as long as he was able to hold onto the Owl Creek bridge. Sherman though was unable to hold onto the bridge and Wallace did not learn that the path was blocked until well into his march. Unless he wanted to try to cut his way through the Confederate army, an idea he later said he thought about (but probably didn't), he would have to back track and take the River Road to reach Grant's army.

Wallace could have taken the river road and arrived closer to the landing. If Wallace had taken the river road he would arrived somewhere around 2-3 P.M. He would have then been able to re-enforce any of the troubled areas. These fresh units might have been enough to prevent the capture of Prentiss’s Sunken Road defenders.

If Wallace had arrived earlier he could have turned the tide of combat on day one. This delay was critical, however, knowing what Wallace knew it was not a bad decision to take the route he best knew.

Union forms a final line on April 6

As the battle progressed it became clear to Grant that a fall back line was needed. He gave this task to his chief of artillery, Colonel Webster. This final line utilized whatever available artillery was nearby, including some siege guns that were intended to be used at Corinth. As units retreated from other portions of the battlefield they further filled in the last line. By the time the Confederates attacked it late in the day it was very strong and they were unable to breach the line.

Grant could have decided that a fall back line was not necessary. He could have decided to send every available unit back to the front. He could have just relied on his commanders to rally their men when they fell back to the landing.

If the line had not been made it would have probably had severe repercussions when the Confederates made their attack on the Dill Branch line. By giving retreating units a safe place to halt, it was easier to rally those men. It is possible that they could have continued north until they felt safe before stopping. A reserve line studded with cannon helped them feel safe where Grant needed them most.


This was an important decision but not a critical one because it seems obvious to create a fall back line. Any competent commander should have built a last line, especially in a situation where there were no more fallback points. North of Pittsburg Landing there are not any other obvious fallback positions, if needed the Union would have found something but probably nothing as good as the line along Dill Branch. Grant made a good decision but because of his situation, terrain and otherwise, it was not critical because it was so obvious. If he had made the opposite decision that would have been a critical decision, and a mistake.

Confederate commitment to Hornet’s Nest

In one particular portion of the Union's Sunken Road defenses it came to be known as the Hornets' Nest. This was an area that the Confederates assaulted about 7 times. Some sources have listed as many as 12 charges in this area but 7 is probably closer to the truth. None of these assaults drove the Union from this area. It was not until the Union flank near the Peach Orchard was turned that this sector had to retreat. In retrospect it seems clear that the Confederates devoted too much attention to this area.

It seems clear that at some point Johnston, or some other high ranking general, should have stopped these attacks and put these men to better use in another area of the battlefield. Some men would have had to stay opposite the Hornet's Nest so that the Union did not advance from there or shift troops elsewhere. There would have been some Confederates freed up to make attacks on either of the flanks of the Sunken Road. This may have allowed the Confederates to turn those flanks earlier and given them more time to attack elsewhere.

This was a critical decision because it should have been clear after the second or third assault that this position was not going to be taken by frontal assault. The Confederates would have been put to better use elsewhere on the battlefield.

Union counterattack at noon on April 6

Around noon on April 6 the combined forces of Sherman and McClernand’s divisions made a counter attack near Woolf Field. They were successful in driving off the enemy and capturing a battery. The Confederates soon recaptured the battery but the guns would not be used at Shiloh again. The attack slowed the Confederate advance on this front and bought Sherman/McClernand’s force some time.

Although Sherman and McClernand’s divisions fought together, quite well, Sherman seems to get most of the credit for the fighting on this front. This probably had a lot to do with their overall reputations at the end of the war. Sherman and McClernand did not have to attack. They could have used the lull before this counter attack to form a new defensive line or strengthen the line they were on.

When Sherman and McClernand attacked the Confederates were weakened enough that the Union attack was able to push them back. If the Confederates were in a condition to be pushed away they probably could not have made a successful attack if Sherman and McClernand had stayed put.

This is a critical decision, in some respects it looks like a foolhardy decision. How did Sherman and McClernand know that an attack would be successful at that moment? Although they were relatively new to command (this was not the first battle for either commander but was their first battle on this scale) they did a fine job all day. Picking the right moment for a counter attack was just another sign of how good, or lucky, they were. Luckily for the Union right the attack succeeded in pushing the Confederates back and buying them some time.

Cleburne’s handing of brigade

Confederate General Patrick R. Cleburne’s initial assault at the swamp near Shiloh Branch split his brigade. Until this obstacle was cleared he would stay with one half of his brigade for awhile, then ride around the swamp to the other half and help them for awhile before going back. He did this several times and was not able to do much with either half.

His other option was to temporarily attach one half to another nearby commander to command until the brigade could be reunited. Coordinating half of his brigade with another command may have been enough to more quickly carry that position. As it was neither half was able to accomplish much beyond extending casualty lists.

This was a critical decision because choosing the other option may have enabled the Confederates to capture the Shiloh Church sector much sooner. This was a difficult decision for me to make because I like Cleburne, I find him a fascinating character, but this is one of those cases where he did not do a very good job. He lost too much time riding between the two halves of his brigade. When he was away from one portion they did little, mostly because they were recuperating from the recent brutal attack.

Cleburne's brigade ended up getting mauled during the battle. Some of it was early but he was in action on both days of the battle. When the losses were counted later, after stragglers had reappeared, his losses in killed, wounded and captured amounted to 1043 of 2750, 38%. The 6th Mississippi lost 300 of 425 men, the fourth highest percentage loss by any unit in the entire war.

This map is from Craig Symonds biography of Cleburne. I scanned it, its not that great of quality but gives you idea of where the split happened. The map also shows positions later in the day, so ignore the northern part of the map for this discussion.

Confederate attack formation

The Confederate attack was made with each corps being a battle line. This was to create waves of men which may have been a manageable attack formation in open fields but in the woods this quickly collapsed. The length of the line also prevented the corps commander from exercising control over his entire command. Eventually an ad hoc command structure was created when each corps commander took control of a section of the front. This was not the best solution but was the only real solution to be made during the battle.

The other main option would be to attack with each corps forming a column. If each corps had attacked as a column the corps commanders would have had more control over the attack. This probably would have allowed them to fight more effectively.

A critical decision because the line formation caused much confusion which resulted in delays and piecemeal attacks. A better controlled formation might have accomplished more.

Peabody’s scouting expedition

Those early April encounters between the armies did nothing to convince Grant and Sherman that an attack was eminent. Some Union commanders, usually at the regimental level, did think that something was going to happen. Colonel Peabody was one such leader and as a brigade commander was probably the highest ranking officer to believe that something was wrong. On the night of April 5 he was having a hard time sleeping because he kept thinking about the unknown danger so he decided late that night to send out a reconnaissance party. The party originally was about 3 companies strong but he later sent more men out there. The orders were simply to keep going until they found out what was out there. Around 5 A.M. on April 6 they fired the first shots of the battle.

Peabody did not have to send out the expedition, in fact he was violating orders when he did so. Prentiss had told him during the day not to send out an expedition or to even get his brigade ready for a morning attack.

Peabody's men held the Confederate advance back about an hour which allowed Prentiss' other brigade to be alerted. If there had been no warning the initial Confederate attack on Prentiss' division may have been more catastrophic. Also the Confederates might have been able to get troops everywhere along the front before the warning was raised. This might have meant a quicker fall to Stuart’s camp and allowed the Confederates to gain the Peach Orchard before Hurlbut’s division came up.

Verdict: Peabody provided the first warning of battle. Eventually someone else would have raised the warning but the Confederacy might have been in a better position at that time. A more unified opening attack would have been a great advantage for the Confederates so this qualifies as a critical decision.

Confederate April 6 morning council

Just south of the Union lines before dawn on April 6 the Confederate commanders (Beauregard, A. S. Johnston, Bragg, Polk, Hardee and Breckinridge) held a council to determine if there should even be a battle. Beauregard was in favor of retreating back to Corinth as he was sure that the Union knew they were there (there had been many encounters between scouts of both armies) plus the inexperienced soldiers made too much noise during the march (men sang, shot at animals along the way, fired off their guns to make sure the powder was dry and bands played). Beauregard was sure that the Union was now completely entrenched. It was logical to assume the Union knew of their advance and was ready. As they debated gunshots were heard and Johnston proclaimed the battle already started.

Johnston could have easily sent orders withdrawing those engaged units and returning to Corinth. There are other examples in the war of battles barely starting before the attacker realizes the odds against them and withdraws, the Mine Creek Expedition in Virginia probably being the best known. A retreat to Corinth means that April 6 would have been known for just another small encounter between pickets of both armies and not the start of the battle of Shiloh.

Also it should be pointed out that while Johnston could have ordered his men to withdraw this would have actually been difficult to do. An interesting what-if to think about is if there had been a withdrawal what might Sherman and Grant have done. Would they have realized the opportunity in front of them? Would they have decided to wait an attack and made preparations for an assault once Buell's army arrived? I don't like to delve to deeply into what-ifs but sometimes they can be used to illuminate the options various commanders had. I don't know what Grant would have done. In 1863-4 he probably would have attacked but was his army the fine tool in 1862 that it was a year later? And did he realize this?

This is a very critical decision because a retreat means that there never would have been a battle of Shiloh.

Confederate re-enforcements prior to Shiloh

This is one of those decisions that I've changed my opinion on many times and probably will again. The chief Confederate re-enforcement I'm concerned with here is Van Dorn's army in Arkansas.

In early March Beauregard began lobbying Van Dorn to come to Corinth as part of the concentration there. Beauregard did not have the authority to command him to do it. Van Dorn hemmed about the decision until about mid March when A.S. Johnston finally ordered Van Dorn to Corinth. In the meantime Van Dorn had attacked the Union army near Pea Ridge and had lost that battle.

Van Dorn arrived after the battle but had Johnston ordered him a couple of weeks earlier Van Dorn may have made it in time. If Johnston had ordered Van Dorn's army to Corinth earlier he would have had another 15,000 men and that may have been enough to swing the battle. Of course the Union might have also been able to transfer men in time to Grant to offset Van Dorn.

While it is difficult to determine what the alternative situation would have been had Van Dorn arrived, it is clear that his arrival would have effected the battle in some respect. The overall result may have been the same but the battle would have been fought differently. The war in Arkansas in 1862 would have been much different with Van Dorn’s army out of the state.

I am reluctant though to call this a critical decision because this exercise could continue with every battle before Shiloh. For every unit that was not at Shiloh but could have been it could be asked what if they had been there. The other big group of men who missed Shiloh but might have been there were the men Floyd-Pillow-Buckner surrendered at Fort Donelson. Then we could examine the decisions they made that prevented them from escaping before Grant encircled Fort Donelson. Like I said this exercise could continue ad naseum.

If Van Dorn's troops had been engaged on the first day it seems difficult to think that they would not have made a difference, perhaps they would have been enough to win the battle before Buell's army arrived.

Lack of Union scouting prior to Shiloh

In early April various Union units received information of nearby Confederates. This information was usually dismissed by the high command (Grant and Sherman) as simple scouting parties, home guard or pure imagination. Some of these encounters ended in bloodshed and capture. Sherman may have been overcompensating for when he was perceived as insane while in Kentucky because of the warnings he raised as commander there.

It would have been easy for Grant to have ordered a reconnaissance with enough strength in infantry and cavalry to find out what was in front of them. A point made at the presentation was that this area is not good for cavalry operations, the forests are just too thick. On the battlefield this is correct but for scouting operations it might have made the cavalry's job easier. The Union cavalry would have been mainly confined to the roads, but so was the Confederate army. The Confederates would not have been hiding off in the woods and by the afternoon of April 4 there were too many Confederates to hide.

Depending on the day this reconnaissance was made they may have learned very little or a lot about what was in front of them. Maybe the battle would have started earlier, but for the most part it seems safe to assume the Grant's army would have been better prepared for a battle.

The lack of a proper reconnaissance prior to the battle has disastrous consequences at the beginning of the battle. Good information would have probably meant a more prepared Union army. Some of the information Sherman received was good, it was just ignored. This was a critical decision and mistake.