Chickamauga Maps

I fear this post might be well behind the times but in case its not, I recently found out that that the University of Tennessee Press has put pdfs copies of the Betts' Chickamauga maps online. These maps were created when the battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga were preserved. Henry Boynton was the first park historian and wrote the official battle history, placed the iron markers you see on the field today and also had troop movement maps created to accompany the text. You can buy these maps in an altered state today at the park, basically one map now has info that originally appeared on 3-4 maps. But now UT Press has put the original 13 maps online here.

They did this in conjunction with the publication of "The Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga and the Organizations Engaged" by Henry Boynton, edited by Timothy B. Smith. Smith has basically combined three Boytnon books into one volume and provided some other notes on Boynton. I have not held a copy of Smith's version yet, I knew he was working on it but did not realize it was out already. I actually do have Boynton's other books but I would like a modern reprint so I don't have to worry about ruining my 100 year old versions.

Chickamauga

I've been rereading Glenn Tucker's "Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West" for research this past week. Its been awhile since I've read it and this past week has made me realize again how nice a read it is. Oh sure it has its errors and sometimes the order of things is a little odd, but Tucker was a good writer.

Next up I'll read Peter Cozzens' "This Terrible Sound" to flesh out the details and use that as my source material. I read Tucker just to refresh my mind about the flow of the battle. I'll use Cozzens for the meat. Cozzens' book is a good read too, I've read his four western theater battle books and enjoyed them all.

I also have the five Blue & Gray magazines that were recently done on this campaign handy. And then I'll use the new "Maps of Chickamauga" by David Powell to pinpoint any loose details. I noticed that Steven Woodworth has edited a volume of Chickamauga essays that is coming out at the end of April. So hopefully I'll be able to get a copy of that soon too to get another perspective. Truthfully we have a bunch of Chickamauga related literature available right now. Things are looking up.

Then I can really get working on my own Chickamauga project. Hopefully I'll be able to make it as readable as Tucker but have all the facts right too. Luckily I'm not trying to write a whole new battle history, just a smaller project, I don't have the time (or motivation) for that.

Turchin's Chickamauga

Awhile back I stumbled across a potentially really interesting find. I requested John Turchin's Chickamauga through interlibrary loan, with the intention of xeroxing the entire book. Since then google books has made this unnecessary.

The interesting find is that inside the cover was a notation that this copy once belonged to William Rosecrans, commander of the Union army at Chickamauga. But as I read the book I found four pages that had hand written notations on them. They are in pencil so they are not the clearest copies. All the notations center around the time when Wood's Division moved out of the lines on September 20, right before Longstreet assaulted that very spot and turned the tide toward Confederate victory.

This is page 112 with the simple notation, "mistake"

Page 116 with the notation, "[?] Sheridan [?] way to shore up the left of our lines"

Page 127 with the notation, "this is a weak argument to expect a [?] [?]"

Page 128 with the notation, "this is a great mistake"

Is it Rosecrans' handwriting? I have no idea. I only offer it up as an interesting quirk of research. I did find this letter by Rosecrans to allow for some handwriting comparison. My initial reaction is that it does not eliminate the possibility that the writing in the book is Rosecrans'. I'd like to think it is Rosecrans' writing, it seems like an odd hoax to make.
I also posted this pictures on the Civil War West Yahoo discussion group when I found it a few years back. The pictures there might be a bit clearer, I think I scanned them differently back then.

Maps of Chickamauga

The latest release in the amazing Savas Beatie "Maps of ... "series is the Maps of Chickamauga, by Dave Powell and cartography by David Friedrichs. I received my copy the other day and it is another amazing volume.

The basic concept for each book is that when the book is laid open the right side page has a map and the left side page has the text that explains the actions on that map. The book is in a large format (7X10) so the maps are nice and big and there is quite a bit of text accompanying each map. This is not simply a paragraph or two but a full page of text. If you just read the text and never looked at a map you would have a good understanding of the battle but the maps really seal the deal.

The other way to get the most out of these map books is to refer to those maps while reading one of the highly detailed battle histories that are out there. For instance with this book you would pair it with Peter Cozzens' This Terrible Sound. Cozzens' book does have a good number of maps for a battle history but Powell and Friedrichs probably have 10 times the maps, with more detail. Also the problem with a book like Cozzens is that often when you need a map you've already passed it so you need to flip back to the map. Now you just need to keep a second bookmark in the map book so that you keep pace in that book as you read the detailed battle history. (I don't mean to pick on Cozzens, I'm just using him as an example since the latest map book is on Chickamauga, all battle histories suffer from this problem, its not the fault of the author, its just that none of them have upwards of 100 maps in them).

When the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table does a battle study we always have a ton of maps in a binder. When Chickamauga comes around again on our schedule we can just use this book instead of creating a massive binder of maps. Okay, I'll probably still create a massive binder of maps, but I really wouldn't need to.

Earlier Ted Savas provided me with a few low resolution images from the book. If you click on them they'll be a bit better.

Ted also informed me that Powell and Freidrichs are currently working on a book on Chattanooga/Knoxville (and attendant satellite actions). And that Bradley Gottfried is keeping the series going in the Eastern Theater with the Maryland Campaign coming out next. The map series will also include several books on the Trans-Mississippi theater campaigns.

UPDATE

Here's a page of text and the accompanying map.

Chickamauga Memorial by Tim Smith

A Chickamauga Memorial: The Establishment of America’s First Civil War National Military Park. By Timothy B. Smith

Over the past few years Timothy B. Smith has established himself as one of the leading authorities on the initial preservation of Civil War battlefields in the 1890s. He has previously written about the formation of Shiloh (This Great Battlefield of Shiloh: History, Memory, and the Establishment of a Civil War National Military Park) and the initial period of preservation (The Golden Age of Battlefield Preservation: The Decade of the 1890's and the Establishment of America's First Five Military Parks). Now he has tackled the first battlefield that became a National Military Park, Chickamauga.

Even though battlefield preservation efforts began very early in some instances it wasn’t until the 1890s that the effort began seriously. In 1888 two Union veterans of Chickamauga, Henry Van Ness Boynton and Ferdinand Van Derveer, toured the battlefield and decided that Chickamauga should be preserved. There were already efforts at Gettysburg to preserve that battlefield but what Boynton and Van Derveer’s idea different is that they wanted to preserve the entire battlefield. Gettysburg’s efforts were focused only on saving Union positions, while the newly hatched plan for Chickamauga was preserve both sides’ positions.

Boynton was in a unique position to make this happen. He was the Washington correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette, founder of the Gridiron Club and friendly with many national politicians. He also was a staunch defender of the Army of the Cumberland, and had written a rebuttal against William T. Sherman’s memoirs. When Boynton returned home from his battlefield tour he threw himself into the effort to create a national military park at Chickamauga, which also intended to include sites in Chattanooga. He started with articles in Cincinnati Gazette, which were eventually published in book form. He also lobbied politicians to spend federal money on creating the park, another new way of preserving a battlefield.

When his efforts to convince Congress to pass legislation creating the park they turned to Boynton to write the bill. With no guide to follow he created a bill that needed few changes and would also be the template for future battlefield park legislation as four other battlefields became national parks in the 1890s. Boynton was then selected as the first park historian. From this position Boynton would greatly influence how the story of the battle was told. No plaque or monument could be placed during his watch without his approval. The fight on Snodgrass Hill took on greater prominence in the Chickamauga story and it was no coincidence that Boynton’s regiment, the 35th Ohio, had fought there. There were obviously controversies over positions but Boynton almost always prevailed.

Interestingly the way Boynton preserved both battlefields was different. At Chickamauga the entire battlefield was purchased, sometimes through condemnation proceedings. At Chattanooga only land along roadways with some small side parcels was preserved. This was done primarily because Chattanooga had grown in the intervening years and huge parcels of land could not be purchased. This method was first copied at Antietam and became known as the Antietam Plan but Smith argues, quite correctly, that it should be called the Chattanooga Plan. Within both units of the park both methods of preservation were utilized. Since the 1890s preservation efforts, nationally and locally, mainly followed the Chattanooga Plan. In recent decades preservationists have gone back to Boynton’s original idea of preserving huge tracts of land.

It was not long after Chickamauga became a park that the Spanish-American War began. The US Army needed areas to train and garrison soldiers before sending them to Cuba. Chickamauga became one of these sites. Over 70,000 passed through the park on their way to the war. Their presence damaged roads and left a mess behind. A few years later the Army would build Fort Oglethorpe just north of the park. The park was still used for maneuvers but the total impact was lessened. The park was again used as a staging ground for World War One, with 60,000 troops using the park. Trenches were dug on Snodgrass Hill to simulate the trench warfare the men would see in Europe. In 1933 FDR transferred the park to the Interior Department and it would not be used by the troops for World War Two.

Smith’s book in some respects can be considered a biography of Boynton as Boynton was the prime moving force in the early days of the park. From 1888 until his death in 1905 there probably was no other man who was more active in park activities than Boynton. In fact one wonders if Smith might write a biography of Boynton sometime in the future.

I have one minor complaint about Smith’s book. It is that he ends the story with the 1933 transfer to the Interior Department. He does a brief recap of events at the park since then but I wish there was more. I do understand it however as Smith’s goal was to write about the formation of the first national military park and that story is over by 1933. I think this book is a worthwhile addition to anyone with an interest in Chickamauga, or who has visited our national battlefield parks and wondered how it all got started.

This review also appeared in the November issue of Civil War News

Confederate Struggle for Command by Alexander Mendoza

Confederate Struggle for Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West by Alexander Mendoza

I have very mixed emotions about this book. I came in very interested, in fact its a book I purchased, and I wanted to like the book. As I read the first part I was not very impressed with the book. The last chapters were better but even in those sections there were things I found annoying. If I had received this as a review book I probably would not keep it but since I spent my own money on it I probably will. Maybe later I will find more use from the book but right now I’m disappointed.

One thing I thought the book did very well was covering the disputes between Longstreet, Law, McLaws and Robertson. For some reason when the First Corps came west all the simmering conflicts among the chief commanders came to a boil. Longstreet had problems with the leadership of both divisions (Jenkins vs Law in one, and McLaws in the other) almost as soon as the battle of Chickamauga was over. After the failure at Knoxville he also had a problem with the Texas Brigade’s commander, Robertson.

Here are some things I had issues with.

When the Union hastily formed a new line on Horseshoe Ridge they allowed a gap to form between them and Kelly Field. They never had the men to close this so they left it and lucked out that the Confederates never exploited it. Mendoza points out that Longstreet had men who could have been used to exploit the gap if he had known it was there. Then he absolves Longstreet of missing the gap by writing, “Longstreet’s blunder is understandable in the context of challenges facing him on the battle’s second day. The densely wooded terrain, in which the thick gunpowder smoke became trapped, limited visibility to a few hundred yards at most. Attempting a reconnaissance under such conditions would have been a dangerous undertaking.” (p 46) At the close of the chapter he again gives Longstreet a pass on this issue with, “But his unfamiliarity with the terrain and the limited visibility on the thickly wooded battlefield explain this blunder.” (p 52) My problem with this is that limited visibility on thickly wooded battlefields is the norm in the Civil War, especially in the West. I don’t think that any general can know all details of the battlefield but if we are to give a general a pass for missing a gap the reasons should be better than it was smoky, wooded, and unfamiliar ground. How many battles took place on a piece of ground the high command was intimately knowledgeable about?

On page 47 Mendoza wrote, “Bragg should have realized, however, that Longstreet still held Preston’s Division in reserve and could have moved those troops to the Confederate right for an enveloping attack on Thomas’s position.” Mendoza does have a point about Preston being in reserve. The problem though is that Preston was about 3 miles from the Confederate right, and that’s if he marched in a straight line, which was impossible due to troop positions. Even cutting through the woods he would have likely had to march 4 or 5 miles to get there. Once we factor in the time to change formations Preston would likely have to been in motion by noon to be able to do much in the battle. Longstreet began his attack at 11 AM and it would seem odd to pull the reserve division away so early in that fight. It would have been closer to 3 PM that Bragg could have made this decision, which is when Bragg and Longstreet met and was what Mendoza had just written about in the paragraph before the above quote. That means Preston likely wouldn't have been able to get into combat that day. Its fine to say Bragg should have done this or that but you need to have an understanding of the realities of Civil War combat first, in this case (unless Bragg moves Preston very early in Longstreet's attack) Preston is stuck on the left end of the Confederate lines.

There are some things that are just worded clumsily. Mendoza says that Longstreet was aided in placing his men by Tom Brotherton, “who lived in North Georgia before enlisting.” (p 39) That’s true but it would be better to say that Tom Brotherton’s house was about 300 yards away, that Longstreet used him because Tom probably knew every hog path through the woods since that is where he grew up. What makes Tom different than the hundreds or thousands of other Confederate soldiers who grew up in North Georgia? The fact that he grew up where the fighting would take place. Mendoza should have mentioned that fact but he did not. The only connection he makes is that he says the forces were deployed east of the Brotherton Farm.

A few sentences later Mendoza says Bragg’s main objective was “elements of the Federal XIV, XX and XXI Corps.” (p 39) True but wouldn’t it be simpler to say the Army of the Cumberland. I would understand this in the Chattanooga section because then there were a few different pieces of armies operating together so referring to the various corps individually makes sense.

Another odd wording cropped up in the discussion of the infighting in Bragg’s command. Mendoza says that this squabble reduced the communication between Bragg and his lieutenants. “In mid-August Rosecrans sought to exploit the paralysis affecting the Army of Tennessee by launching the Chickamauga campaign.” (p 61) I think Rosecrans was able to benefit from this squabble but I do not think he had any knowledge of it in mid-August and I do not believe it was part of his planning.

On that same page, 61, Mendoza has another very odd statement. He wrote, “Bragg knew that Polk was a popular figure in the Army of Tennessee and his removal would meet with disapproval. This is why he ordered both men [DH Hill being the other] to Atlanta, far away from the army.” I do not understand why sending Polk and DH Hill to Atlanta would lessen the impact of their removal on army morale. They were both suspended from command instead of being arrested which might look a little better to the common soldier but both were still removed from command. There might be a belief that the suspensions are temporary but even so they have been removed from command, that act, not where they serve their suspensions, is likely to matter most to the common soldier.

After describing how every general that had spoken out against Bragg had been transferred away or been demoted Mendoza says, “Longstreet’s mistakes convinced Bragg to order the First Corps into East Tennessee to operate against Union forces in that region.” (p 75) And that is the reason Bragg used in a telegram to Davis but I have a hard time believing that is the main reason. Bragg was already outnumbered, the Union now had an open supply line to bring their army back to fighting strength and Bragg decides this is the time to send Longstreet away. There is no debate that Longstreet had not been at the top of his game at Chattanooga but sending him away as the enemy gets stronger seems a very odd decision. If Bragg truly doubts Longstreet’s skill he should take a more hands on approach to his sector, or relieve him of command. But Bragg has decided he doesn’t want to see Longstreet at all and that leads me to believe that their earlier squabble is more at the root of this decision than any qualms about Longstreet’s ability. Also if Longstreet is performing so badly isn’t giving him a less supervised role away from the army an odder choice than closer supervision in Chattanooga?

“Starving men resorted to eating animal feed while the draft animals resorted to eating the bark off trees. The situation in the Army of the Cumberland became so precarious that officers had to post guards over the horses and mules while they ate to prevent the soldiers from stealing the few ears of corn available to them. Despite their hunger and being surrounded by the enemy, the Federal troops in Chattanooga had regained their optimism and anticipated reinforcements.” (p 83) The question I have from that section is why were they optimistic? Mendoza has just explained how bleak things were. The plans to open an effective supply line were in their infancy. There does not seem to be any reason for optimism. In hindsight we know that these lean days were not going to last too terribly long but when you’re living it I’m sure a short period of time feels like forever.

When Mendoza lists the hazards Hazen’s men will face as they drift down the Tennessee River on pontoon boats he lists artillery and picket fire, and drowning (p 95). Yes drowning was a hazard but unless the men did something to fall into the river the risk of drowning had to be pretty low on the list. I thought it odd to include it as a hazard. This may seem like a nitpicky kind of complaint but it was so odd that it stuck out like a sore thumb. It would be like saying that Burnside used the bridge at Antietam because his men might drown if they tried to ford the river and completely ignore the fact that there were not any good fords near the bridge. Anytime people are around water there is the risk of drowning but generally that risk is pretty low.

I thought Mendoza missed a good opportunity to be critical of Bragg in the chapter on the Knoxville campaign. On page 124 he says that Longstreet sends multiple messages to Bragg about the sorry condition of his army and that Bragg grew resentful of the constant complaints and questions. Then on page 129 he says that Bragg tells Davis that Longstreet hasn’t keep him informed of the situation despite repeated inquires to do so. This is a perfect place for Mendoza to expose Bragg’s lie and explore out why he might be lying. Instead Mendoza ignores the two differing passages and forges on with the story of the campaign.

“A year prior to arriving at Ringgold Station, Longstreet fell out of favor with President Davis and the War Department when he reportedly criticized the president’s close friend, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston …” (p 201) If it truly was one year earlier then it would have been September 1862 and Johnston had been dead five months. Again it is a case of Mendoza not picking his words carefully. Also there is no note of what Longstreet reportedly said about Johnston. Was Longstreet the sort of man to talk ill of the dead? I don't know for sure, my gut is to doubt it as usually people did not talk bad about the dead. If he complained about Johnston while he was still alive, which does make sense as many people blasted Johnston after the fall of Fort Donelson, then it would be a year and a half before the arrival at Ringgold. Mendoza should have been clearer about this because if Longstreet was complaining about dead men's campaigns then it does reveal another part of his character. If he complained while Johnston was alive then Mendoza's sentence is incorrect. Timing is everything in war.

A few times in the text there is reference made that the men of the First Corps suffered during the winter because they left their overcoats and baggage behind in Virginia, that they thought they’d be returning quickly. This I do not understand at all. Where did they leave the extras? Surely not in a camp as there could be no guarantee that Lee would hold that camp until their return. Was it in a warehouse in Richmond? If so then why wasn’t the stuff just sent out west. Surely it would have been separated by regiment so that when they returned they could find their stuff again, so sending it to the regiment would not have been impossible. I was always under the impression that the men carried all their stuff with them, that if they had too many supplies they sent it to loved ones or left it along the road. I have not ever read of storing the supplies in a warehouse. Not that it couldn’t happen but in 15 years of reading I’ve never read that. Since Mendoza repeats that soldier’s lament a few times I think he should have gone the extra step to inform the reader that those supplies were likely gone or could have been sent west if red-tape and/or transportation could have been cleared.

In a discussion of war strategy Mendoza has three sentences that bother me. “Longstreet grasped the fact that if the Confederacy were to win, it needed to concentrate forces and strike against the North itself” And, “His grasp of strategy continued into the spring of 1864 when he proposed an invasion of Kentucky to draw the Federals from Johnston’s front in northern Georgia. Even though Longstreet failed to take into account his plan’s logistical problems, it does not detract from the fact that he recognized the situation facing the Confederacy during the last eighteen months of the war.” These sentences bother me because there is considerable debate on what was the proper course for the Confederacy, Mendoza has clearly picked an aggressive route but he offers no support for why that was the proper method instead of a prolonged defensive that traded space for time. It seems to me that the defensive school of thought has been the more popular one lately. I think if Mendoza says Longstreet knew the correct way he should at least offer some support for why this was the correct method. Also I think failing to grasp the logistical problems facing the Confederacy means you do not recognize the “situation facing the Confederacy during the last eighteen months of the war.” Logistics are an important part of the Civil War from before the first shots are fired and yet in the spring of 1864 Longstreet is apparently to be congratulated for coming up with a plan to invade Kentucky that ignores the very serious logistical problems of the Confederacy (and Civil War armies as a whole).

There are some other things I thought seemed odd so I have requested his sources through inter-library loan to double check those. When I get those sources I'll report back because if its true its an interesting story to share. And if its false its one more thing to dislike about this book.

I was a little reluctant to post this negative review since the two other reviews I know of have been pretty favorable. But I felt that there were enough things I did not like to warrant it. Like I said in the first paragraph I will keep the book and might find in a few years that I like it better, but today I am not a fan.

Hans Christian Heg

Hans Christian Heg commanded a brigade at Chickamauga after previously leading the 15th Wisconsin. Heg and the 15th Wisconsin were unique in that he was Norwegian and the regiment was primarily Norwegians, with a few Swedes and Danes. Foreign born officers and regiments primarily made up of one nationality were not too rare but the number of Norwegians was a bit more rare. We think mainly of the Irish and German regiments, not of the Norwegians. In fact I've seen sources that claim the 15th Wisconsin was the only Scandinavian regiment in the war.

At Chickamauga Heg was mortally wounded on the first day. From what I've read it seems that Heg was considered a pretty good officer and had a bright future in the army. Who knows how high he might have risen but division command by the end of the war doesn't seem that much of a stretch. In any respect we'll never know how good Heg might have been as Chickamauga was his first and last battle as brigade commander.

I had read that there was a statue of Heg on the grounds of the capitol in Madison. So one day while doing research at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum (located across the street from the capitol) I decided to go for a stroll. And I found the story to be true.

And here is Heg's mortuary monument at Chickamauga.

Chickamauga Tour

Every year Dave Powell helps organize a spring weekend of Chickamauga tours. Usually he is a main tour guide with NPS Historian Jim Ogden. I got an email over the weekend announcing the next spring tour, March 13 & 14, 2009. Since Dave has helped me out in the past with research questions on Chickamauga I thought I'd help advertise the tours here.

I've always wanted to attend but every year something gets in the way. This year is no different. Maybe some day I'll hit the lotto and can retire, then I'll have plenty of time to run down to Chickamauga for the weekend.

CCNMP Study Group 2009 Seminar in the Woods
Mission Statement: The purpose of the CCNMP Study Group is to create a forum to bring students of the American Civil War together to study and explore those events in the fall of 1863 that led ultimately to the creation of the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park. The intent is to use the indispensable resource of the park itself as an outdoor classroom to promote learning and study of the battles for Chattanooga, and to build interest for an annual gathering that will in time examine all aspects of the Campaigns for Chattanooga. Additionally, we hope to bring students and serious scholars, both professional and amateur, to the field to share insights and knowledge about the battles.

Tour Leaders: Jim Ogden, Park Historian, and Dave Powell

Date: Friday, March 13, and Saturday, March 14, 2009.

Note: Friday’s tours will involve a tour bus. We will be charging a small fee for use of the bus. See below.

Friday Morning: 8:30 a.m. to Noon. Minty vs. Johnson, September 18th, 1863.
By Bus, we will examine the opening engagement of the battle, as Bushrod Johnson and Nathan Bedford Forrest collided with Minty’s Cavalry Brigade. Stops will include Ringgold, Peeler’s Mill site, Peavine Ridge, Reed’s Bridge, and conclude at Jay’s Mill. This land is in private hands, but we will have ample opportunities to dismount and walk some of the terrain in question.

Park at the Visitor‘s Center. The bus will depart and return from there.

Friday Afternoon: 1:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Rosecrans in Command, September 17th to 20th, 1863.
By Bus, we will trace Union Commander William Starke Rosecrans’ movements on the field between September 17th and 20th, discussing his command decisions and the information he had at the time. Stops will include Crawfish Springs, Wilder Tower/Widow Glenn’s, the Visitor’s Center, and the Dyer Orchard HQ site.

Park at the Visitor’s Center. The Bus will depart and return from there.

Saturday Morning: 8:30 a.m. to Noon. Hindman vs. Sheridan, morning of September 20th.
On foot: We will examine the attack of Hindman’s Division on Sheridan’s Federals, after Davis’ division is overwhelmed. We will discuss the fighting in South Dyer Field, the storming of Lytle Hill, defeat of Lytle and Walworth’s Brigades, and end with Wilder’s repulse of Manigault’s Rebel Brigade.

Park in the gravel lot by Recreational Field.

Saturday Afternoon: 1:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Hindman assails the end of the line: Horseshoe Ridge, September 20th
On Foot: Horseshoe Ridge provides a dramatic conclusion to the battle of Chickamauga. We will discuss the movements of Anderson’s, Manigault’s and Deas’ Brigades as they make their final attack on Horseshoe Ridge.

Park at Snodgrass Hill.

Cost: Beyond the fee for Friday’s Bus, there is no cost for tour participation. Meals lodging, transportation, and incidentals, however, are the individual’s responsibility.

Tour Departures: All tours will meet at the Chickamauga Visitor’s Center at the designated start time, and will depart from there after some brief overview discussion. We will board the bus or car caravan to the designated parking area, and from there, we will be on foot. We will be on foot for up to three hours, so dress and prepare accordingly. Tours will depart rain or shine. Participants are responsible for their own transportation, and should plan accordingly. All tours are designed to be self-contained, so participants who cannot attend the full schedule are still welcome to join us for any portion of the weekend.

Lodging and Meals: Everyone is responsible for their own lodging and meals. There are many hotels in the greater Chattanooga area, for any price range. The closest are in Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, with the least expensive in Ringgold. Each tour is designed to leave at least 90 minutes for lunch, and there are several family and fast food restaurants within minutes of the battlefield. There are designated picnic areas near the Visitor’s Center, for those who wish to bring a lunch and eat on the field.

What to bring: Each tour will involve extensive walking. Proper clothing and especially footgear is essential. Dress in layers, wear sturdy, broken-in walking shoes or boots, and be prepared for some rain, as spring can be quite wet in North Georgia. We will be walking on dirt and gravel trails, uncut fields, and through stretches of woods. The ground will be wet and muddy in places. Bring your own water and snacks.

Reading up on the subject: Many people like to prepare in advance for these kinds of events. I suggest the following works might be of help.

Cozzens, Peter. This Terrible Sound. University of Illinois, 1992. The best modern study of the battle.

Gracie, Archibald. The Truth About Chickamauga. Morningside, Reprinted 1987. For the veteran Chickamauga student only. Gracie’s narrative is incoherent, disorganized, and mistaken in many places. However, his focus is central to Saturday Afternoon’s tour, and his work contains a wealth of primary source accounts that are not found anywhere else. We will be discussing many of the same topics Gracie examines.

Woodworth, Stephen E. Six Armies In Tennessee: The Chickamauga And Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1998; an excellent overview campaign study.

Woodworth, Stephen E. A Deep Steady Thunder: The Battle Of Chickamauga. Abilene, Texas. McWhiney Foundation Press, 1998. Concise but very useful account of the battle, designed as an introduction to the action. 100 pages, very readable.

Note: Friday’s Tours will be by Bus, as we move from site to site. While the tour itself is free, we do have to pay for the bus.

Pre-registration Fee: $35 Due by February 1st, 2009

After November 5th, 2008, send to:
FRANK CRAWFORD
34664 ORANGE DRIVE
PINELLAS PARK, FLORIDA 33781

Frank will hold your payments. If you pay by check, note that Frank will not cash those checks until we have sufficient entries, so that if we have to refund, Frank will simply send your checks back to you.

Please also note that this fee is NON-REFUNDABLE after February 1st, 2009. Once we are committed to the bus, we will be charged the booking fee.

On-site Sign up Fee: $40

We MUST have 20 attendees registered and Paid by Feb 1st, or we cannot reserve the bus. Once we confirm the minimum, you will be able to join the tour the day we depart, for late add-ons. If we do not meet the minimum, we will car-caravan for Friday’s tours.

For more information, email David Powell at: Dpowell334@aol.com

Historic Photos of Chickamauga - Chattanooga

Historic Photos of Chickamauga - Chattanooga by James A. Hoobler.

Of the three historic photos books done by Turner Publishing this is my favorite. I think as far as quality goes it ranks even with the Gettysburg volume but since it is of one of my favorite battlefields this volume ranks higher in my mind overall.

The pictures are broken down into four chapters; Tullahoma Campaign, Chickamauga Campaign, Siege of Chattanooga and Remembrance, Reunion and Preservation. The book follows the path set forth in the other Historic Photos books from Turner Publishing. There is a page or two of introductory text for each chapter followed by one big photo per page with a sentence or two for a caption.

The Tullahoma chapter is very short, only a few pages, Chickamauga's is not much bigger. The Chattanooga chapter is fairly decent in length. The bulk of the book is in the final chapter, Remembrance, Reunion and Preservation.

This chapter shows a fair amount of photos for monument dedications and dignitaries visiting the field. It also has quite a few chapters showing park workers doing projects for the park, like making roads or building bases for monuments. There is also quite a bit of photos for when Chickamauga served as a training camp for the military, first for the Spanish-American War and then again for World War 1. Some of these pictures show camp life which isn't all that exciting but some show men posing with monuments or the fact that barracks were built in fields with monuments so a monument ends up being right next to the building.

My initial worry with this book was that there would be quite a bit of overlap between this book and Hoobler's "Cities Under the Gun" which had a ton of pictures of Nashville and Chattanooga during the war. That is not the case though as that earlier work shows much more of the town of Chattanooga while this book focuses much more on the battlefields around Chattanooga. I think both books are worthy additions to any Western Theater Civil War library.

96th Illinois

(front)
I L L I N O I S
96TH INFANTRY
1ST BRIGADE - WHITAKER
1ST DIVISION - STEEDMAN
RESERVE CORPS - GRANGER
(rear)
Commanded by
COL. THOMAS E. CHAMPION
SEPT. 20, 1863
2.30 TO 6.30 P.M.
LOSS 225
Monument #713

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Dave Powell suggested in a comment that I should post a picture of the 96th Illinois monument, so here it is. Unfortunately it really doesn't show much of the surrounding terrain. One thing it does show is how think the woods is now. Makes me wish there was an active Friends Of organization like Gettysburg or Antietam that would work to thin the woods. It would probably be a full time job to keep the woods thinned but I've seen the results at Antietam and Gettysburg and it is truly spectacular.

2nd South Carolina

2nd Regiment South Carolina Infantry
Commander
Lt. Col. Franklin Gaillard
Monument #1349

South Carolina markers are pretty simple, just regiment and commander. I did a little searching online to flesh out some more details on Franklin Gaillard. He served with the 2nd South Carolina his whole career. He enlisted as 2nd lieutenant in Company A, was a major by Antietam, and commanded the regiment thereafter as lieutenant colonel, excepting periods that the colonel returned for duty after his own woundings. Gaillard was killed at the Wilderness and his cousin, William DuBose, the chaplain for the 2nd South Carolina, wrote of this, "What his loss is to us of the brigade as an officer and as a man it is impossible to overestimate. It would gratify his friends to see how deep and universal the feeling has been and how irreparable his loss is regarded. . . . I do not think that any death outside of my immediate family has ever affected me more deeply."
Lt. Col. Franklin Gaillard with his daughter, Maria Porcher Gaillard, and son, David Lellair Gaillard.
His grave in Fredericksburg. The family photo and the grave photo I found at findagrave.com

Granger Knoll

As you can see I have added pictures of the five Union monuments on Granger knoll, which was the subject of two previous posts (visit them here and here). I have also turned these into pdf files that can be viewed by clicking the link on the right side of the page under "Chickamauga Monuments"

I'd also like to point out that this past week I added pdf files of the last 16 Rocky Mountain Civil War Roundtable newsletters and that is available on the right side of the page too, under "RMCWRT Newsletters." Each issue is 6 pages but when you view them you will notice that some do not run a complete 6 pages. That is because I edited out some info that was really only applicable to roundtable members and no longer needs to appear in this online version.

And this morning I also added a link to a copy of the symposium ad that will run in the next issue of North & South magazine. This ad was done in conjunction with the University of Tennessee Press and I am impressed with how well it turned out and how much of the ad space UT Press shared with the roundtable. It is in the section marked "Files" on the right side of the page.

22nd Michigan

MICHIGAN
TO HER
TWENTY-SECOND REGIMENT OF INFANTRY
COMMANDED BY
COLONEL HEBER LeFAVOUR
LIEUT. COLONEL WILLIAM SANBORN
CAPT. ALONZO M. KEELER
WHITAKER'S BRIGADE, STEEDMAN'S DIVISION, GRANGER'S CORPS
This monument marks the position where the regiment performed its most important service, Sept. 20th, 1863.
Casualties:
Engaged 455
Killed 32
Wounded 96
Missing 261
Total loss 389
On the 19th the regiment marched from Rossville joining the brigade near McAfee's Church. From thence it moved about noon of the 20th toward this position. After three hours desperate combat having exhausted their ammunition, they charged overwhelming numbers until overcome.
In the Chattanooga campaigns it performed important engineer service, Major Henry S. Dean, Commanding.
Monument #898

89th Ohio

89TH OHIO INFANTRY
TURCHIN'S BRIGADE, REYNOLD'S DIVISION
14TH ARMY CORPS
This regiment, Col. Caleb H. Carlton and Capt. Isaac Nelson, commanding, being temporarily detached from its brigade, was on Sept. 19th, 1863, assigned to Whitaker's Brigade, Steadman's Division, Reserve Corps. About 2:00 p.m. Sept. 20th, 1863, it participated with that brigade in the assault on this position which it occupied and held until night. The withdrawal of the troops on its right after dark and without notice, resulted in the capture of a large part of the regiment.
Loss: Killed 19, Wounded 63, Captured or missing 171, Total 253.
The regiment was organized Aug. 26th, 1862 for three years.
Monument #1016

84th Indiana

INDIANA'S TRIBUTE
TO HER
EIGHTY FOURTH REGIMENT INFANTRY
COLONEL NELSON TRUSLER, COMMANDING
FIRST BRIGADE (WHITAKER)
FIRST DIVISION (STEADMAN)
RESERVE CORPS (GRANGER)
September 18th this regiment was engaged on the extreme left of the army near Ringgold Bridge, and on the morning of the 19th was stationed on the hills near McAfee's Church.
Skirmished with the enemy until 1 p.m., when he attacked in large force and severe fighting was kept up until 5 p.m., when the enemy drew off. September 20th still in position near McAfee Church until 12 m. when the regiment marched to the sound of the firing at Snodgrass Hill, arriving at this point about 2:30 p.m. and engaged in the charge and desperate combat which took place here, assisting in driving back the enemy and saving the right.
Loss:
Killed 23
Wounded 97
Missing 13
Total 133
Monument #842

115th Illinois

(Front)
I L L I N O I S
115TH INFANTRY
1ST BRIGADE - WHITAKER
1ST DIVISION - STEEDMAN
RESERVE CORPS - GRANGER
(Rear)
COMMANDED BY
COL. JESSE H. MOORE
SEPT. 20, 1863
2 P.M. TO 6 P.M.
LOSS 183
Monument #723

98th Ohio

98TH OHIO INFANTRY
2ND BRIGADE
1ST DIVISION
RESERVE CORPS
This regiment arrived of the field Sept. 20th, 1863, about 1:30 p.m. It went into action about 2:00 p.m. being on the left of the first line of the brigade. It gained this position by assault and occupied and held it until 6:00 p.m.
Loss: Killed 9, wounded 41, captured or missing 13.
Monument #1026

An old map

I scanned this old map to share because it shows farmer's fields which some other maps do not. I dug this out because my post referring to Recreation Field got two comments about what the name of the field was historically. I did remember it being called Glenn Field but was not sure where the dividing line was. Someone else commented that the area that the North Carolina monument is at is Brock Field (a second Brock Field). This I did not remember but the map proves this to be correct too. This area is on the first map section, above the word Park in the title, Chickamauga Park Base Historical Map.

This map is one of those treasures I found at TIC that I've talked about previously. The first three pictures are sections of the map and the final picture is the entire map stitched together.

McDonald Field

The first two pictures show Confederate artillery positions taken on the afternoon of September 20th. The battery on the left (first picture) was Warren's Mississippi Light Artillery (also known as Swett's Battery) and the one on the right (second picture) is Fowler's Alabama Battery. They took position here on the afternoon to fire towards Snodgrass Hill. Later they were forced to retreat when Reynolds' Division approached its left on its way off the battlefield.

A second view of Warren's Battery showing more of the open ground in front of the position. Snodgrass Hill would be beyond the far tree line.

Final Panorama

This is the last stitched panoramic to offer. It is of Snodgrass Hill and forms a 360 degree view. The cannon on either end of the picture is the same cannon. To view the original post click here.