After Chickamauga Cleburne had two brigade vacancies to fill. He picked James A Smith to replace Deshler. Smith was a 1853 West Point graduate. To replace Wood Cleburne picked a man similar to himself, Mark P Lowrey who was an Irish Protestant and had been a company commander in the early days of the war before rising to regimental command. Before the war Lowrey had been a Baptist minister. Lidell's brigade was also returned to Cleburne's division.
The army also needed two new corps commanders. Cleburne seemed the logical choice to replace DH Hill but the position instead went to Breckinridge while the other corps went to Cheatham. Breckinridge and Cheatham were the two most senior officers who had not signed the anti-Bragg petition; they were not Bragg fans just astute enough not to anger him. Cleburne did not publicly complain about the slight but mentioned to Lidell, who was a friend of Bragg, that Breckinridge was "unlucky and inspired no confidence." Lidell said that there was no one else to which Cleburne responded that surely there were other candidates and that "I would rather the command were given to you." Perhaps Cleburne hoped Liddell would say something similar about Cleburne but either Liddell didn’t feel that way or did not understand the ruse (or maybe he understood it too well). Cleburne may have hoped that Liddell would repeat this conversation to Bragg. It appears that Liddell did not tell Bragg and Cleburne began to tell Liddell less and less. That situation Liddell did pick up on and resented it, later complaining about Cleburne in his memoirs. In late October Hardee returned to the army and took over from Cheatham. Cleburne's division was soon transferred into Hardee's corps.
Near midnight on November 22 Bragg ordered Cleburne to take his division to Chickamauga Station and move to Longstreet's aid. He would also take Buckner's division, now temporarily commanded by Bushrod Johnson, along. Cleburne might have noticed that this move would remove the last two division commanders from the army that had signed the petition. By midmorning all but one of Johnson's brigades had departed when Bragg sent a note that no new units should depart, that if part had already left then the rest should follow but no new units. A little later a second courier reported that all troops should return at once. Pretty soon a third courier arrived telling Cleburne to move to Bragg's HQ at once, that he would be the army's reserve.
The next morning, November 24, Bragg had Cleburne send one brigade (Cleburne selected Polk's) to guard the railroad bridge over Chickamauga Creek. That afternoon, after Lookout Mountain fell, Bragg sent Cleburne to Tunnel Hill as Sherman could be seen over there. Cleburne arrived at about 2:30 PM and sent Smith's brigade to take Billy Goat Hill. Sherman gained it before Smith but this was not the hill Sherman really wanted and he wouldn't realize his mistake until the next day. That night Cleburne had breastworks built but sent all but two cannon to the rear. He thought Bragg would retreat but as the night dragged on he became more anxious. He sent an aide to Bragg's HQ but it wasn't until midnight that he found out that Bragg was going to stay, Breckinridge had talked him into it. Cleburne now ordered the artillery back to the front.
Hardee could tell that Cleburne would be hard pressed and so in the morning he sent Joseph Lewis' Orphan Brigade to help Cleburne. At 11 AM Sherman began the attack. During the first assault Smith asked permission to counter attack, which proved quite successful but Smith was badly wounded during it. Hiram Granbury now took command of the brigade. The second attack pierced Cleburne's lines briefly but was repulsed. Instead of falling back to their jump off points the Union dug in close to Cleburne's lines. They were able to pick off many artillerists and Granbury had to press infantry into the artillery service. Cleburne moved Swett's battery to enfilade the Union and was then able to force them back.
For the next assault Sherman committed four divisions. This attack was working quite well and Cleburne called on Alfred Cumming's Georgia Brigade for help. These three regiments plus the 2nd-15th-24th Arkansas charged down the hill at 3:30 PM and drove the Union back. At 5 PM Cleburne sent another charge down the hill but the Union was gone. Soon he received an order from Hardee that he needed to send all available troops to the center. Quickly this order became useless as the center was pierced so Cleburne took command of the three divisions in his area and formed a line to prevent the Union from rolling up the line. In the dark he withdrew all his men.
During the evening of November 25 Cleburne ordered Lowrey to attack in front of Missionary Ridge to clear the Union pickets. While the rest of the army is fleeing Cleburne is attacking, though it is only as a ruse to help the withdrawal of his men. At 10 PM that night Cleburne's force reached East Chickamauga Creek. The bridge was burned but one of Bragg's staff officers ordered Cleburne to ford the river, camp on the opposite bank and march at 4 AM for Ringgold Gap. Cleburne thought that he would lose many men if they had to cross a cold river and then sleep with little protection from the elements so he ignored this order and went into camp where he was. He was risking possible capture if the Union advanced quickly but he thought the move was in the best interests of his men.
Sometime after midnight Cleburne received an order from Bragg to hold Ringgold Gap at all costs so that the wagon trains and artillery could escape. He feared that he did not have enough men to defend the gap and that his division might be destroyed so he had the orders put in writing. The Union advance would outnumber Cleburne 4 to 1; 16,000 to 4,000. Cleburne also sent Captain Irving Buck to Bragg's HQ to get further instructions. At 2:30 AM Cleburne began crossing the river. First he built large fires on the other side so his men would have a chance to dry off and warm up, one veteran said that the fires only helped them get warm but that they appreciated that.
The gap Cleburne would defend was just wide enough for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, a wagon road and a branch of the East Chickamauga Creek. The ridge south of the gap rose abruptly while on the north side it rose much more gradually. The wagon train continued southeast from the gap toward Dalton and crossed the Chickamauga Creek three times in a short distance. These three bridges could very easily lead to the destruction of Bragg's army if Cleburne could not hold the gap.
On the south side of the gap Cleburne placed the 16th Alabama to guard the left flank. In the gap itself there were four lines of infantry with skirmishers in a patch of woods. Three regiments were also kept in reserve near the gap. Two Napoleon cannons, under the command of Lieutenant Richard Goldthwaite, were put near the mouth of the gap and were concealed by branches. Cleburne's remaining force was left at the rear of the gap with orders to watch the right flank. Soon after placing his men, about 8 AM, Cleburne could see Hooker's skirmishers advancing towards the gap. Turning around Cleburne could see, "close in rear of the ridge our immense train was still in full view, struggling through the fords of the creek and the deeply cut roads leading to Dalton, and my division, silent, but cool and ready, was the only barrier between it and the flushed and eager advance of the pursuing Federal army."
The leading Union brigade was Woods's of Osterhaus' division. The Confederates held their fire until the brigade was within 50 yards and then they let loose with cannon fire and infantry volleys. When the smoke cleared the Union survivors were racing to the rear leaving many dead and wounded behind. Williamson's brigade was then ordered to take the ridge on the Confederate right. Creighton's brigade of Geary's division was also ordered to advance on Williamson's left in hopes of turning the Confederate right flank.
On the ridge the Confederates were commanded by Major W.A. Taylor who was soon re-enforced with two companies sent by Colonel Hiram Granbury. Taylor then launched a charge down the ridge that resulted in the capture of 60-100 Federals and the 29th Missouri's colors. Creighton, meanwhile, was making steady progress towards the top. When they arrived there they meet the 1st Arkansas and 7th Texas, dispatched by General Lucius Polk just in time to beat Creighton's men there. These two regiments were enough to drive Creighton's men back down the ridge. Williamson's and Creighton's brigades reformed and assaulted again several times, Creighton was mortally wounded in this action. Geary then pulled Creighton's brigade off the ridge.
While the Confederate right was being assaulted there were also attacks made on the Confederate left and center. The attack on the left was stopped by the 16th Alabama and some other skirmishers lead by James Dulin. The attack on the center first captured some houses near Cleburne's line from which sharpshooters shot at the cannoners. Then the 13th Illinois charged the cannon but were repulsed by canister. Goldthwaite then shelled the houses until they were destroyed. Sometime between noon and 1 PM Hardee notified Cleburne that the trains were a safe distance away and he could now withdraw, which Cleburne soon did. About this same time Grant rode up and told Hooker to discontinue the attack. Cleburne had saved the Army of Tennessee from destruction.
Friday, April 16, 2010
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Cleburne: Kentucky campaign and Stones River
To start the Kentucky campaign Bragg gave two brigades to Kirby Smith, his best two brigades, Preston Smith and Cleburne. Cleburne reported to Kirby Smith on August 7 in Knoxville and was given command of both brigades as a division, command of Cleburne's brigade went to Hill.
Kirby Smith planned to use Stevenson's division to hold the Union at Cumberland Gap and then move into their rear with his other three divisions. Cleburne's division was the first one to march, leaving at dawn on August 14. They covered the 60 miles to Barboursville, Kentucky in 50 hours and were then on the Union supply line. Kirby Smith then abandoned the earlier plan of joining with Bragg in Tennessee and decided to march on Lexington alone.
On the afternoon of August 29 Cleburne's division was at Big Hill, south of Richmond. The Confederate cavalry was in front but soon broke under a Union cavalry attack. Cleburne repulsed this attack, capturing about 30 soldiers. That night he received orders to attack the next morning. In the morning he advanced about 1-2 miles to Mount Zion Church, six miles south of Richmond. He deployed Hill to the right of the pike with Preston Smith behind Hill. At 7:30 AM Kirby Smith arrived and decided to flank the Union with Churchill's division which was coming up. Meanwhile Cleburne's sharpshooters had been skirmishing with the artillery pretty effectively. After an hour Union General Mahlon Dickerson Manson decided to attack first and launched an attack on Cleburne's right flank. Cleburne decided that to do this the Union must have weakened their center so instead of responding to the attack by reinforcing the point of contact he launched an attack of his own on the Union center. He brought Preston Smith up to hold the right while he lead Hill forward. As he passed down the line he saw his friend Lucius Polk being taken to the rear. He stopped to see if Polk was okay and Polk responded that he was only slightly wounded. Cleburne started to reply but a bullet pierced his left cheek, knocked out two teeth and exited through his open mouth, he would later joke that he spat the bullet out. The swelling and bleeding soon prevented him from speaking so he turned command over to Preston Smith, the battle was mostly over when he did this. It ended up being the most complete Confederate victory of the war; 4300 Union soldiers were captured including General Manson. Among the captured supplies were many pair of blue pants which Cleburne's division was soon wearing.
Kirby Smith's part of active campaigning in Kentucky was nearly over, which gave Cleburne some time to heal. Eating and speaking were difficult. Shaving was also difficult and he soon sported a beard, which he kept after the wound completely healed. It also happened to cover the scar quite nicely. In late September Preston Smith and Cleburne's brigades were returned to Bragg's army and Cleburne returned to brigade command. On September 23 he rejoined his brigade at Shelbyville. Bragg ordered him to hold Shelbyville and if pressed to retreat towards Frankfort. On October 1 he retreated towards Frankfort as the Union advanced to within 5 miles of his position. The next day he received orders to join Polk's move towards Harrodsburg, where he would be able to rejoin Hardee's corps (would become part of Buckner's division).
October 8 found Cleburne at Perryville. At this time his brigade numbered about 1000 men, the 13-15 Arkansas was down to 200. At noon he was ordered to support Johnson's brigade northwest of town. Buckner formed his division about 2 PM in column, Johnson in front, then Cleburne and St. John Liddell in the rear. To the right was Cheatham's division and on the left was Patton Anderson. Johnson soon advanced and Cleburne was held in reserve until 4 PM. When Cleburne advanced he found Johnson in a creek bed, Johnson expressed determination to advance again but his men were out of ammunition. Cleburne would attack alone.
Cleburne noticed that the Union line was a bit back from the crest and could not shoot at his advancing men. He put a skirmish line with the colors forward of the main line by about 10 paces. When they crested the hill that line would take the brunt of the fire and Cleburne's brigade could then rush upon the Union before they could reload. This charge succeeded and drove the Union back. After driving them from this position he crossed the Mackville road and stopped in a cornfield. A battery on his left started to enfilade this position, wounding Cleburne in the leg (foot) and killing his horse. Cleburne then advanced on this battery and drove it from the field, ending up 75 yards from the new Union line, with both flanks exposed. Rather than retreat his 800 men held on here resisting counter attacks until Liddell's brigade came up near dusk.
At one point in the fight Confederate artillery had fired on Cleburne's brigade mistaking the blue pants for a Union line. It took a little convincing but the Confederate artillery did stop the bombardment. Symonds says that Cleburne demonstrated more courage than judgment during the campaign but it seems to me that he did use very good judgment at Richmond and Perryville. Cleburne blamed Bragg for the outcome of the campaign.
The army soon retreated to Knoxville, then to Chattanooga and finally to Murfreesboro. During the army reorganization Buckner was transferred to Mobile, opening up a division command in Hardee's corps. Buckner suggested Cleburne and Hardee readily agreed. It was a slightly odd promotion in that Sterling Wood and Bushrod Johnson were both his seniors within the division. Johnson and Wood had performed well in Kentucky; Johnson was also a West Point graduate; and both were native southerners. Cleburne did get the promotion to division command and his promotion to major general became official on December 12. His division consisted of four brigades; Wood, Johnson, Liddell and his old brigade, now under Lucius Polk. It does not appear that Wood or Johnson were upset about Cleburne being promoted over them.
He received other good news that winter. Sometime in November his youngest half brother, Kit, came down from Cincinnati. It is not clear if Pat refused him a position on his staff or if Kit never asked. In any event Kit decided to join Morgan's cavalry and make a name for himself.
Stones River
The night before the attack Cleburne received his orders. His and McCown's divisions would lead the assault, supported by Polk's two divisions. That night his men crossed the cold Stones River and aligned for the attack by using the distant light from Cheatham's division's camps. Cleburne's men did not light any fires of their own so as to not reveal their location. The attack was to be made at dawn, which Cleburne estimated would be at 5 AM. At 4:30 AM he roused his command and arranged his division from left to right as Liddell, Johnson and Polk. Wood was placed in reserve behind Polk. When 5 AM came it wasn't light yet but Hardee sent Cleburne forward anyway. He was to follow McCown but McCown went too far to the left and Cleburne was unable to follow him. Eventually McCown got things back together and came up on Liddell's left.
Cleburne's men were able to knock through line after line and by 9 AM had reached the Wilkinson Turnpike. About this time they had advanced past Cheatham on their right and started to receive enfilading fire on their right. A half hour later the attack got rolling again, partly because McCown and Cleburne were now side by side. Together they presented a 10 brigade front which overlapped the Union right by a half mile. But now there were no Confederate reserves if the attack should falter.
Near the Nashville Pike Cleburne encountered the fifth Federal line. Around 3 PM they cracked this line and briefly held the turnpike, Rosecrans' line of retreat. A fresh Union line came up and drove Cleburne back from the turnpike. Cleburne wanted to attack again but wasn't sure if it was possible. He asked Johnson for advice and he replied that an attack would be "very hazardous." Then Cleburne asked Hardee if he should attack. Hardee knew that if Cleburne was having doubts then it was unwise to attack so he ordered Cleburne to hold his ground.
The next day Bragg ordered Cleburne to make a reconnaissance. Cleburne sent Liddell's brigade in but they soon needed help so he sent Wood in too. By the time Wood got there though Liddell had retreated and Wood found himself outgunned. The fighting cost 100 men from the division. The rest of the day was spent waiting for more orders. The third day, when the fighting kicked up in full force on the Confederate right, Cleburne's brigade saw no combat. On the morning of January 2nd Bragg held a conference and decided to retreat. That afternoon he held another conference asking if the army could stay 24 more hours to bring off the wounded. Cleburne said that he could hold for 24 more hours but most of the other generals said no and so the original plan of retreat remained.
Kirby Smith planned to use Stevenson's division to hold the Union at Cumberland Gap and then move into their rear with his other three divisions. Cleburne's division was the first one to march, leaving at dawn on August 14. They covered the 60 miles to Barboursville, Kentucky in 50 hours and were then on the Union supply line. Kirby Smith then abandoned the earlier plan of joining with Bragg in Tennessee and decided to march on Lexington alone.
On the afternoon of August 29 Cleburne's division was at Big Hill, south of Richmond. The Confederate cavalry was in front but soon broke under a Union cavalry attack. Cleburne repulsed this attack, capturing about 30 soldiers. That night he received orders to attack the next morning. In the morning he advanced about 1-2 miles to Mount Zion Church, six miles south of Richmond. He deployed Hill to the right of the pike with Preston Smith behind Hill. At 7:30 AM Kirby Smith arrived and decided to flank the Union with Churchill's division which was coming up. Meanwhile Cleburne's sharpshooters had been skirmishing with the artillery pretty effectively. After an hour Union General Mahlon Dickerson Manson decided to attack first and launched an attack on Cleburne's right flank. Cleburne decided that to do this the Union must have weakened their center so instead of responding to the attack by reinforcing the point of contact he launched an attack of his own on the Union center. He brought Preston Smith up to hold the right while he lead Hill forward. As he passed down the line he saw his friend Lucius Polk being taken to the rear. He stopped to see if Polk was okay and Polk responded that he was only slightly wounded. Cleburne started to reply but a bullet pierced his left cheek, knocked out two teeth and exited through his open mouth, he would later joke that he spat the bullet out. The swelling and bleeding soon prevented him from speaking so he turned command over to Preston Smith, the battle was mostly over when he did this. It ended up being the most complete Confederate victory of the war; 4300 Union soldiers were captured including General Manson. Among the captured supplies were many pair of blue pants which Cleburne's division was soon wearing.
Kirby Smith's part of active campaigning in Kentucky was nearly over, which gave Cleburne some time to heal. Eating and speaking were difficult. Shaving was also difficult and he soon sported a beard, which he kept after the wound completely healed. It also happened to cover the scar quite nicely. In late September Preston Smith and Cleburne's brigades were returned to Bragg's army and Cleburne returned to brigade command. On September 23 he rejoined his brigade at Shelbyville. Bragg ordered him to hold Shelbyville and if pressed to retreat towards Frankfort. On October 1 he retreated towards Frankfort as the Union advanced to within 5 miles of his position. The next day he received orders to join Polk's move towards Harrodsburg, where he would be able to rejoin Hardee's corps (would become part of Buckner's division).
October 8 found Cleburne at Perryville. At this time his brigade numbered about 1000 men, the 13-15 Arkansas was down to 200. At noon he was ordered to support Johnson's brigade northwest of town. Buckner formed his division about 2 PM in column, Johnson in front, then Cleburne and St. John Liddell in the rear. To the right was Cheatham's division and on the left was Patton Anderson. Johnson soon advanced and Cleburne was held in reserve until 4 PM. When Cleburne advanced he found Johnson in a creek bed, Johnson expressed determination to advance again but his men were out of ammunition. Cleburne would attack alone.
Cleburne noticed that the Union line was a bit back from the crest and could not shoot at his advancing men. He put a skirmish line with the colors forward of the main line by about 10 paces. When they crested the hill that line would take the brunt of the fire and Cleburne's brigade could then rush upon the Union before they could reload. This charge succeeded and drove the Union back. After driving them from this position he crossed the Mackville road and stopped in a cornfield. A battery on his left started to enfilade this position, wounding Cleburne in the leg (foot) and killing his horse. Cleburne then advanced on this battery and drove it from the field, ending up 75 yards from the new Union line, with both flanks exposed. Rather than retreat his 800 men held on here resisting counter attacks until Liddell's brigade came up near dusk.
At one point in the fight Confederate artillery had fired on Cleburne's brigade mistaking the blue pants for a Union line. It took a little convincing but the Confederate artillery did stop the bombardment. Symonds says that Cleburne demonstrated more courage than judgment during the campaign but it seems to me that he did use very good judgment at Richmond and Perryville. Cleburne blamed Bragg for the outcome of the campaign.
The army soon retreated to Knoxville, then to Chattanooga and finally to Murfreesboro. During the army reorganization Buckner was transferred to Mobile, opening up a division command in Hardee's corps. Buckner suggested Cleburne and Hardee readily agreed. It was a slightly odd promotion in that Sterling Wood and Bushrod Johnson were both his seniors within the division. Johnson and Wood had performed well in Kentucky; Johnson was also a West Point graduate; and both were native southerners. Cleburne did get the promotion to division command and his promotion to major general became official on December 12. His division consisted of four brigades; Wood, Johnson, Liddell and his old brigade, now under Lucius Polk. It does not appear that Wood or Johnson were upset about Cleburne being promoted over them.
He received other good news that winter. Sometime in November his youngest half brother, Kit, came down from Cincinnati. It is not clear if Pat refused him a position on his staff or if Kit never asked. In any event Kit decided to join Morgan's cavalry and make a name for himself.
Stones River
The night before the attack Cleburne received his orders. His and McCown's divisions would lead the assault, supported by Polk's two divisions. That night his men crossed the cold Stones River and aligned for the attack by using the distant light from Cheatham's division's camps. Cleburne's men did not light any fires of their own so as to not reveal their location. The attack was to be made at dawn, which Cleburne estimated would be at 5 AM. At 4:30 AM he roused his command and arranged his division from left to right as Liddell, Johnson and Polk. Wood was placed in reserve behind Polk. When 5 AM came it wasn't light yet but Hardee sent Cleburne forward anyway. He was to follow McCown but McCown went too far to the left and Cleburne was unable to follow him. Eventually McCown got things back together and came up on Liddell's left.
Cleburne's men were able to knock through line after line and by 9 AM had reached the Wilkinson Turnpike. About this time they had advanced past Cheatham on their right and started to receive enfilading fire on their right. A half hour later the attack got rolling again, partly because McCown and Cleburne were now side by side. Together they presented a 10 brigade front which overlapped the Union right by a half mile. But now there were no Confederate reserves if the attack should falter.
Near the Nashville Pike Cleburne encountered the fifth Federal line. Around 3 PM they cracked this line and briefly held the turnpike, Rosecrans' line of retreat. A fresh Union line came up and drove Cleburne back from the turnpike. Cleburne wanted to attack again but wasn't sure if it was possible. He asked Johnson for advice and he replied that an attack would be "very hazardous." Then Cleburne asked Hardee if he should attack. Hardee knew that if Cleburne was having doubts then it was unwise to attack so he ordered Cleburne to hold his ground.
The next day Bragg ordered Cleburne to make a reconnaissance. Cleburne sent Liddell's brigade in but they soon needed help so he sent Wood in too. By the time Wood got there though Liddell had retreated and Wood found himself outgunned. The fighting cost 100 men from the division. The rest of the day was spent waiting for more orders. The third day, when the fighting kicked up in full force on the Confederate right, Cleburne's brigade saw no combat. On the morning of January 2nd Bragg held a conference and decided to retreat. That afternoon he held another conference asking if the army could stay 24 more hours to bring off the wounded. Cleburne said that he could hold for 24 more hours but most of the other generals said no and so the original plan of retreat remained.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
Cleburne: enlistment thru Corinth
In 1860 Cleburne formed a militia company in Helena that was more a social organization than military. He was elected captain of this company, the Yell Rifles. After the firing on Sumter he took his company to a training camp north of Memphis. Companies were combined and he was elected colonel of the newly formed 1st Arkansas. In Little Rock the state government appointed two generals to handle Arkansas troops, one for the eastern part of state and one for the western part. Thomas Bradley proved to be a poor general and after a disastrous scouting expedition Cleburne placed Bradley under virtual arrest (there was a guard around the general's tent and Cleburne refused to accept any orders from him). Cleburne allowed Bradley to leave the camp if he resigned, which he did and then went to Little Rock to seek a court martial against Cleburne. Bradley though had second thoughts, figuring the court martial would expose his own short comings and so instead turned the whole matter over to Gideon Pillow. Pillow did not want the headache and let the whole matter end quietly.
Jefferson Davis soon put a national commander into Arkansas, William Hardee. Hardee knew of the Bradley situation and so went to the governor first. The governor agreed to have Hardee in command if he would allow the Arkansas troops to vote whether they wanted to be transferred into national service or to serve as home guard only. Hardee reluctantly agreed. Cleburne liked Hardee right from the start and campaigned hard for the men to accept the transfer. 1800 of 3000 men in the camp voted for the transfer but 8 of Cleburne's 10 companies agreed to it. In June the camp was moved to a spot near the Missouri border on the Black River.
While a hard commander Cleburne also cared for his men's well being and came to be liked and respected. He was not just a commander but a leader.
After Polk broke Kentucky's neutrality Albert Sidney Johnston ordered Hardee's force to reinforce Bowling Green. They arrived there in October and Johnston soon made Hardee a division commander, Buckner was the other division commander. Hardee nominated Cleburne, Hindman and RG Shaver to command his three brigades. Cleburne's brigade consisted of the 1st Arkansas, 5th Arkansas, 6th Mississippi and 5th Tennessee.
On February 7, Johnston and Beauregard decided to abandon Bowling Green. March 4, Cleburne received official notification of promotion to brigadier general.
Shiloh
At Shiloh Cleburne commanded a brigade of six regiments and a battery. Three of his regiments had served with him previously; the 1st Arkansas had been redesignated the 15th Arkansas and the 5th Tennessee had also been redesignated the 35th Tennessee, while the 6th Mississippi remained. Cleburne also gained Bate's 2nd Tennessee, 23rd Tennessee, 24th Tennessee and Trigg's Battery. His brigade was one of three brigades in Hardee's "corps". The other two brigades, RG Shaver and Sterling Wood, were under the command of Cleburne's old friend Hindman.
On the march to Shiloh Cleburne's was the first brigade to leave Corinth, starting out about noon on April 3. That evening he took a side road to be near a spring but left no one in his rear to inform anyone else. When he returned to the main road in the morning he found it blocked by Polk's corps. Polk moved aside so Cleburne could pass but much time was lost in this enterprise. Luckily the entire army was behind schedule so Cleburne's problems were not too glaring. By dawn of April 5 Cleburne (and Hardee) were in position but Bragg and Polk were not. Cleburne formed Hardee's left flank and Bate's 2nd Tennessee was the extreme left of the army. On April 5 they had a small skirmish with a Union cavalry patrol, even fired off some artillery, but the Union high command ignored all signs of the Confederate advance.
In the early morning of April 6 Cleburne's attack took him into the swamp along Shiloh branch. The swamp formed a wedge in his lines sending the 6th Mississippi and 23rd Tennessee to the right and the rest of the brigade to the left. Initially he stayed with his right regiments but when their assault sputtered he detoured around the swamp to find the rest of the brigade. In the meantime they had been torn to tatters. Seeing he could do little there he went back around the swamp to his right regiments. While they were vastly depleted he did order another attack which finally pushed the Ohio troops out of the way. This contingent was so depleted that he ordered them to the rear for rest. On his way back to the left he received orders from Hardee (or perhaps saw Hardee directly) to go to the rear and round up stragglers from the captured camps. After a few hours of this proved useless he went off to find his other regiments. The 24th and 35th Tennessee were in the best condition and so he attacked with them and was able to drive the Union back, though this retreat was mostly due to other Union retreats along the line. It appears that at dusk Cleburne was near Cloud Field on the left of the Confederate advance.
For the second day only 800 of 2700 men answered roll call. It is not clear where he fought but appears that he was near the Davis Wheatfield. Late in the day Bragg ordered him to attack, an attack he thought was foolhardy but did anyway. The results were disastrous and he blamed Bragg for the loss, not the last time he would blame Bragg for the army's woes. As he left the field that day only 58 men of his brigade were with him. Nearly every officer in the brigade over the rank of captain was dead or wounded. In hindsight he should have given temporary command of his two right regiments to Hindman on the first day. Hindman would then have been able to coordinate their attacks and perhaps broken that Union line earlier. He could then have devoted all his focus to his other four regiments and perhaps done better with them. His attacks, three frontal charges, lacked creativity but he was hampered by terrain.
When the losses were counted later, after stragglers had reappeared, his losses in killed, wounded and captured amounted to 1043 of 2750, 38%. The 6th Mississippi lost 300 of 425 men, the fourth highest percentage loss by any unit in the entire war. The 15th Arkansas was so depleted that they were consolidated with the 13th Arkansas. Lucius Polk was elected the lieutenant colonel of the 13-15 Arkansas. Polk was a former member of the Yell Rifles, a friend of Cleburne's and also nephew of corps commander Leonidas Polk, the bishop. The commanders of the 2nd Tennessee, William Bate, and 35th Tennessee, Benjamin Hill, were wounded and would return to command. Other vacancies were filled by elections.
Corinth
During April Cleburne decided to have shooting contests and pick the 5 best shots in each company to create sharp shooter companies. In his unique command style he went to each regiment to explain his idea to the men before implementing it. He wasn't shying away from charges he just wanted to better the odds before a charge, especially when it came to dealing with artillery.
While in Corinth he had only one occasion when he met the enemy, May 28 at Farmington. They were out on a patrol when the 35th Tennessee (with Cleburne) ran into a Union division. He rode off to get support and found the 24th Tennessee blocked by a small creek. He chewed out Colonel RD Allison and got the regiment in position but as soon as he left them they ran. He then found the 2nd Tennessee and 48th Tennessee and got them into position but orders then arrived from Hardee reminding him that since he was not to bring on an engagement that he should now withdraw. Afterwards he relieved Allison of command and placed Major Hugh Bratton in command. That night Beauregard decided to evacuate Corinth (the decision had nothing to do with Cleburne's engagement). During the night of May 29-30 the Confederates left Corinth. First they went to Baldwin for a week and then to Tupelo. On June 14 Beauregard took a leave of absence and Bragg took command, but Davis soon made the command change permanent.
Jefferson Davis soon put a national commander into Arkansas, William Hardee. Hardee knew of the Bradley situation and so went to the governor first. The governor agreed to have Hardee in command if he would allow the Arkansas troops to vote whether they wanted to be transferred into national service or to serve as home guard only. Hardee reluctantly agreed. Cleburne liked Hardee right from the start and campaigned hard for the men to accept the transfer. 1800 of 3000 men in the camp voted for the transfer but 8 of Cleburne's 10 companies agreed to it. In June the camp was moved to a spot near the Missouri border on the Black River.
While a hard commander Cleburne also cared for his men's well being and came to be liked and respected. He was not just a commander but a leader.
After Polk broke Kentucky's neutrality Albert Sidney Johnston ordered Hardee's force to reinforce Bowling Green. They arrived there in October and Johnston soon made Hardee a division commander, Buckner was the other division commander. Hardee nominated Cleburne, Hindman and RG Shaver to command his three brigades. Cleburne's brigade consisted of the 1st Arkansas, 5th Arkansas, 6th Mississippi and 5th Tennessee.
On February 7, Johnston and Beauregard decided to abandon Bowling Green. March 4, Cleburne received official notification of promotion to brigadier general.
Shiloh
At Shiloh Cleburne commanded a brigade of six regiments and a battery. Three of his regiments had served with him previously; the 1st Arkansas had been redesignated the 15th Arkansas and the 5th Tennessee had also been redesignated the 35th Tennessee, while the 6th Mississippi remained. Cleburne also gained Bate's 2nd Tennessee, 23rd Tennessee, 24th Tennessee and Trigg's Battery. His brigade was one of three brigades in Hardee's "corps". The other two brigades, RG Shaver and Sterling Wood, were under the command of Cleburne's old friend Hindman.
On the march to Shiloh Cleburne's was the first brigade to leave Corinth, starting out about noon on April 3. That evening he took a side road to be near a spring but left no one in his rear to inform anyone else. When he returned to the main road in the morning he found it blocked by Polk's corps. Polk moved aside so Cleburne could pass but much time was lost in this enterprise. Luckily the entire army was behind schedule so Cleburne's problems were not too glaring. By dawn of April 5 Cleburne (and Hardee) were in position but Bragg and Polk were not. Cleburne formed Hardee's left flank and Bate's 2nd Tennessee was the extreme left of the army. On April 5 they had a small skirmish with a Union cavalry patrol, even fired off some artillery, but the Union high command ignored all signs of the Confederate advance.
In the early morning of April 6 Cleburne's attack took him into the swamp along Shiloh branch. The swamp formed a wedge in his lines sending the 6th Mississippi and 23rd Tennessee to the right and the rest of the brigade to the left. Initially he stayed with his right regiments but when their assault sputtered he detoured around the swamp to find the rest of the brigade. In the meantime they had been torn to tatters. Seeing he could do little there he went back around the swamp to his right regiments. While they were vastly depleted he did order another attack which finally pushed the Ohio troops out of the way. This contingent was so depleted that he ordered them to the rear for rest. On his way back to the left he received orders from Hardee (or perhaps saw Hardee directly) to go to the rear and round up stragglers from the captured camps. After a few hours of this proved useless he went off to find his other regiments. The 24th and 35th Tennessee were in the best condition and so he attacked with them and was able to drive the Union back, though this retreat was mostly due to other Union retreats along the line. It appears that at dusk Cleburne was near Cloud Field on the left of the Confederate advance.
For the second day only 800 of 2700 men answered roll call. It is not clear where he fought but appears that he was near the Davis Wheatfield. Late in the day Bragg ordered him to attack, an attack he thought was foolhardy but did anyway. The results were disastrous and he blamed Bragg for the loss, not the last time he would blame Bragg for the army's woes. As he left the field that day only 58 men of his brigade were with him. Nearly every officer in the brigade over the rank of captain was dead or wounded. In hindsight he should have given temporary command of his two right regiments to Hindman on the first day. Hindman would then have been able to coordinate their attacks and perhaps broken that Union line earlier. He could then have devoted all his focus to his other four regiments and perhaps done better with them. His attacks, three frontal charges, lacked creativity but he was hampered by terrain.
When the losses were counted later, after stragglers had reappeared, his losses in killed, wounded and captured amounted to 1043 of 2750, 38%. The 6th Mississippi lost 300 of 425 men, the fourth highest percentage loss by any unit in the entire war. The 15th Arkansas was so depleted that they were consolidated with the 13th Arkansas. Lucius Polk was elected the lieutenant colonel of the 13-15 Arkansas. Polk was a former member of the Yell Rifles, a friend of Cleburne's and also nephew of corps commander Leonidas Polk, the bishop. The commanders of the 2nd Tennessee, William Bate, and 35th Tennessee, Benjamin Hill, were wounded and would return to command. Other vacancies were filled by elections.
Corinth
During April Cleburne decided to have shooting contests and pick the 5 best shots in each company to create sharp shooter companies. In his unique command style he went to each regiment to explain his idea to the men before implementing it. He wasn't shying away from charges he just wanted to better the odds before a charge, especially when it came to dealing with artillery.
While in Corinth he had only one occasion when he met the enemy, May 28 at Farmington. They were out on a patrol when the 35th Tennessee (with Cleburne) ran into a Union division. He rode off to get support and found the 24th Tennessee blocked by a small creek. He chewed out Colonel RD Allison and got the regiment in position but as soon as he left them they ran. He then found the 2nd Tennessee and 48th Tennessee and got them into position but orders then arrived from Hardee reminding him that since he was not to bring on an engagement that he should now withdraw. Afterwards he relieved Allison of command and placed Major Hugh Bratton in command. That night Beauregard decided to evacuate Corinth (the decision had nothing to do with Cleburne's engagement). During the night of May 29-30 the Confederates left Corinth. First they went to Baldwin for a week and then to Tupelo. On June 14 Beauregard took a leave of absence and Bragg took command, but Davis soon made the command change permanent.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Cleburne: before the war
I ended up catching strep last week so I was unable to make the presentation at the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table meeting on last Thursday. I've been moved to May but I'm not 100% positive I can attend that night either, and I think that even if I do I'll do a brand new presentation. The Cleburne presentation was chosen because I could do it last minute but given a month lead time I have another topic I'd like to do and it'd be fresh. So I've decided to post my old Cleburne presentation here over the next few days (so its not one giant post).
When one thinks of Pat Cleburne they probably think of his battle accomplishments. They might know of his slave enlistment proposal and how this damaged his chances at promotion. He was not perfect in battle, as few men could ever claim to be. He made his mistakes and usually learned from them. As far as his slave enlistment proposal is concerned it did damage his reputation but there were other things that kept him from promotions. I regret that this presentation will be mostly a recap of Cleburne's battles because he was a private person and not much about his person life is known.
Before the Civil War:
Pat Cleburne was born March 16, 1828 (have seen some sources claiming 17 March). His father was a doctor and Pat grew up as part of the upper middle class in Ireland. His mother died in the fall of 1829 leaving four children; William age 4, Anne age 3, Patrick 19 months and infant Joseph. His father soon hired a live in housekeeper and nanny who in December 1830 became his new wife. They would have one daughter and three sons over the next 11 years. Isabel was the only mother Pat ever knew. In the summer of 1842 his father died and Pat dropped out of the local boarding school (that also did some military drills) and became an apprentice to a colleague of his father so that he would not be a financial encumbrance to his family.
Over the next two years Pat twice applied for admission to Apothecaries Hall and was rejected. As money became tight due to the potato famine of 1845 Pat was let go as an apprentice. In Feb 1846 he traveled to Apothecaries Hall in hope that a personal visit would work better than a letter. He was rejected again and so joined the army. He joined the 41st Foot which was to be soon sent back to India but the regiment stayed in Ireland as a police force as the famine worsened. Two years later he was appointed to corporal but soon lost his stripes when he failed an inspection. In 1849 the family decided to go to America and Pat volunteered to go first as a scout. He had recently inherited 20 pounds as his birth mother's dowry and was now able to buy a discharge. In July 1849 he was again promoted to corporal but in September 1849 he purchased his discharge.
William, Anne, Joseph and Pat took passage to America in private cabins. Their first stop was in New Orleans (on Christmas Day), then to Cincinnati after which the family separated. Joseph moved to Indiana, William to Milwaukee, Anne was married in Cincinnati and Pat also stayed in Cincinnati.
Pat became a drug store clerk but the next spring he got a job prospect in Helena, Arkansas. The job wasn't his when he left Cincinnati but at his interview he was offered the job. He would manage a drug store for two doctors, Nash and Grant. He was allowed to live above the drugstore with Nash as a roommate and was also paid $50 a month. After a year Nash got married and Cleburne moved in with him as a boarder. In December 1851 Grant decided to sell his share of the store and Cleburne was able to buy him out. In 1852 Cleburne joined the Masons, sponsored by Nash, and quickly became a leader of the lodge. Nash and Cleburne became good friends, Nash helped Cleburne with high society and Cleburne helped Nash in fights. Cleburne had little contact with alcohol in Ireland but once in America found out that he was an angry and mean drunk and so became a teetotaler.
In the winter of 1853 Cleburne decided to move up in Helena society. The standard way to do that was to buy a cotton plantation and slaves but he instead decided to become a lawyer. It does not appear that he reached this decision because of a distaste for slavery but that he just thought he could advance faster and farther as a lawyer. As a frontier state there were many legal fights over land ownership so this was a good choice. In April 1854 he sold off his share of the store and used the money to live off of while he studied for the bar. He made $3000 from the sale and he figured he could live off that for two years which was how long he thought it would take to join the bar.
In the summer of 1854 Cleburne meet Thomas Hindman who he'd have a connection with the rest of his life. Hindman was Cleburne's opposite in nearly every way but they became fast friends. During 1854 the Whig party split over the Kansas-Nebraska act. Cleburne was a Whig but mostly because his friends were Whigs and the best people in Helena tended to be Whigs. In Arkansas former Whigs joined the Know Nothing Party (anti-immigrant party) which pushed Cleburne into the Democratic Party. Hindman happened to be the leader of the Democrats in Helena. In September 1855 Cleburne's social reputation increased when he and Hindman volunteered to stay behind to help doctors when a Yellow Fever epidemic swept Helena. In January 1856 he was accepted to the bar. That spring he and Hindman bought a local newspaper, the Democratic Star and renamed it the States Right Democrat.
Like Nash, Hindman seemed to attract violence. On May 24, 1856 Hindman convinced Cleburne to be his backup when Hindman confronted a rival politician. On the way to a hotel that this man was believed to be staying at the two groups met on the street. A shoot out began, Hindman was wounded and Cleburne was severely wounded, though he did kill one of the assailants. A grand jury later cleared Hindman and Cleburne and their social standing increased.
After the 1856 elections went favorably Cleburne and Hindman ceased publication of their newspaper. Hindman campaigned for Breckinridge in the 1860 election (Bell was the other candidate in Arkansas). Breckinridge won the state. During 1856 the rest of Cleburne's family came over from Ireland and settled in Kentucky. In 1860 the scattered elements of the Cleburne family mirrored the opinions of their states. In January 1861 Pat wrote half brother Robert in Kentucky, "I am with Arkansas in weal or woe."
When one thinks of Pat Cleburne they probably think of his battle accomplishments. They might know of his slave enlistment proposal and how this damaged his chances at promotion. He was not perfect in battle, as few men could ever claim to be. He made his mistakes and usually learned from them. As far as his slave enlistment proposal is concerned it did damage his reputation but there were other things that kept him from promotions. I regret that this presentation will be mostly a recap of Cleburne's battles because he was a private person and not much about his person life is known.
Before the Civil War:
Pat Cleburne was born March 16, 1828 (have seen some sources claiming 17 March). His father was a doctor and Pat grew up as part of the upper middle class in Ireland. His mother died in the fall of 1829 leaving four children; William age 4, Anne age 3, Patrick 19 months and infant Joseph. His father soon hired a live in housekeeper and nanny who in December 1830 became his new wife. They would have one daughter and three sons over the next 11 years. Isabel was the only mother Pat ever knew. In the summer of 1842 his father died and Pat dropped out of the local boarding school (that also did some military drills) and became an apprentice to a colleague of his father so that he would not be a financial encumbrance to his family.
Over the next two years Pat twice applied for admission to Apothecaries Hall and was rejected. As money became tight due to the potato famine of 1845 Pat was let go as an apprentice. In Feb 1846 he traveled to Apothecaries Hall in hope that a personal visit would work better than a letter. He was rejected again and so joined the army. He joined the 41st Foot which was to be soon sent back to India but the regiment stayed in Ireland as a police force as the famine worsened. Two years later he was appointed to corporal but soon lost his stripes when he failed an inspection. In 1849 the family decided to go to America and Pat volunteered to go first as a scout. He had recently inherited 20 pounds as his birth mother's dowry and was now able to buy a discharge. In July 1849 he was again promoted to corporal but in September 1849 he purchased his discharge.
William, Anne, Joseph and Pat took passage to America in private cabins. Their first stop was in New Orleans (on Christmas Day), then to Cincinnati after which the family separated. Joseph moved to Indiana, William to Milwaukee, Anne was married in Cincinnati and Pat also stayed in Cincinnati.
Pat became a drug store clerk but the next spring he got a job prospect in Helena, Arkansas. The job wasn't his when he left Cincinnati but at his interview he was offered the job. He would manage a drug store for two doctors, Nash and Grant. He was allowed to live above the drugstore with Nash as a roommate and was also paid $50 a month. After a year Nash got married and Cleburne moved in with him as a boarder. In December 1851 Grant decided to sell his share of the store and Cleburne was able to buy him out. In 1852 Cleburne joined the Masons, sponsored by Nash, and quickly became a leader of the lodge. Nash and Cleburne became good friends, Nash helped Cleburne with high society and Cleburne helped Nash in fights. Cleburne had little contact with alcohol in Ireland but once in America found out that he was an angry and mean drunk and so became a teetotaler.
In the winter of 1853 Cleburne decided to move up in Helena society. The standard way to do that was to buy a cotton plantation and slaves but he instead decided to become a lawyer. It does not appear that he reached this decision because of a distaste for slavery but that he just thought he could advance faster and farther as a lawyer. As a frontier state there were many legal fights over land ownership so this was a good choice. In April 1854 he sold off his share of the store and used the money to live off of while he studied for the bar. He made $3000 from the sale and he figured he could live off that for two years which was how long he thought it would take to join the bar.
In the summer of 1854 Cleburne meet Thomas Hindman who he'd have a connection with the rest of his life. Hindman was Cleburne's opposite in nearly every way but they became fast friends. During 1854 the Whig party split over the Kansas-Nebraska act. Cleburne was a Whig but mostly because his friends were Whigs and the best people in Helena tended to be Whigs. In Arkansas former Whigs joined the Know Nothing Party (anti-immigrant party) which pushed Cleburne into the Democratic Party. Hindman happened to be the leader of the Democrats in Helena. In September 1855 Cleburne's social reputation increased when he and Hindman volunteered to stay behind to help doctors when a Yellow Fever epidemic swept Helena. In January 1856 he was accepted to the bar. That spring he and Hindman bought a local newspaper, the Democratic Star and renamed it the States Right Democrat.
Like Nash, Hindman seemed to attract violence. On May 24, 1856 Hindman convinced Cleburne to be his backup when Hindman confronted a rival politician. On the way to a hotel that this man was believed to be staying at the two groups met on the street. A shoot out began, Hindman was wounded and Cleburne was severely wounded, though he did kill one of the assailants. A grand jury later cleared Hindman and Cleburne and their social standing increased.
After the 1856 elections went favorably Cleburne and Hindman ceased publication of their newspaper. Hindman campaigned for Breckinridge in the 1860 election (Bell was the other candidate in Arkansas). Breckinridge won the state. During 1856 the rest of Cleburne's family came over from Ireland and settled in Kentucky. In 1860 the scattered elements of the Cleburne family mirrored the opinions of their states. In January 1861 Pat wrote half brother Robert in Kentucky, "I am with Arkansas in weal or woe."
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
Cleburne
This Thursday I'll be giving a presentation on Patrick Cleburne at the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table. I'm filling in last minute for another presenter who cannot make it. I gave this presentation about five years ago so hopefully people won't be upset that its a repeat. But I'll change a few things, alter the focus a bit from the first time. I think Cleburne is a fascinating character. So if you're in the area come on by and catch my presentation.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
A great day
Yesterday was a great day, I'd say one of the best days of my life. I'm not sure if I've talked about it much here but my son is not my biological son. But yesterday the court revoked his biological father's rights and allowed me to adopt him. In 6-8 weeks the government will even issue a new birth certificate most likely to make all the necessary name changes easier to make. A six year old doesn't have his name on a lot but there are a variety of things that need to be changed. But its official now, we have court documents to that fact and made the change at school already.
So while there is a new Kurtz man (officially now, he's been using Kurtz for over a year) the most important part here was not the name change. Now if, heaven forbid, something were to happen to my wife I wouldn't also have to worry about losing my son. I'm the only father he's ever known and tearing apart the family would be devastating to both of us. Now we do not have that worry. We are forever joined. Plus now we do not have to deal with the harassment from afar. If we wanted to we would never have to listen to another word out of his mouth. Truthfully we will probably send a picture once a year with a little update but we are legally obligated to do nothing at all.
The best day of my life was the day I got married but yesterday is a very close second. Of course another big day will be coming up near the end of June when we welcome a second baby into the family. I truly have a blessed life.
And FYI, all comments for all posts on this blog are moderated (due to Chinese spammers) so if you feel that no biological father should ever lose his rights, not matter if he asks for it himself or makes no effort to even call his son, don't bother leaving a comment. I'm willing to post comments that question my Civil War research but in this case follow your mother's advice, "if you don't anything nice to say don't say anything at all."
So while there is a new Kurtz man (officially now, he's been using Kurtz for over a year) the most important part here was not the name change. Now if, heaven forbid, something were to happen to my wife I wouldn't also have to worry about losing my son. I'm the only father he's ever known and tearing apart the family would be devastating to both of us. Now we do not have that worry. We are forever joined. Plus now we do not have to deal with the harassment from afar. If we wanted to we would never have to listen to another word out of his mouth. Truthfully we will probably send a picture once a year with a little update but we are legally obligated to do nothing at all.
The best day of my life was the day I got married but yesterday is a very close second. Of course another big day will be coming up near the end of June when we welcome a second baby into the family. I truly have a blessed life.
And FYI, all comments for all posts on this blog are moderated (due to Chinese spammers) so if you feel that no biological father should ever lose his rights, not matter if he asks for it himself or makes no effort to even call his son, don't bother leaving a comment. I'm willing to post comments that question my Civil War research but in this case follow your mother's advice, "if you don't anything nice to say don't say anything at all."
Friday, March 26, 2010
4th Infantry Division
Yesterday I had to get plates for my new car. Instead of getting the plain old standard plates I got plates for the 4th Infantry Division, based at Fort Carson in Colorado Springs. I thought the plates were more interesting plus it supports our troops. Additionally there is a Civil War connection.
The 4th has four brigades and in each brigade is an infantry battalion, the fourth brigade has two battalions. These infantry battalions trace their history to the Civil War. There are two battalions of the 8 and 12th Infantry Regiments. Both units served with the Army of the Potomac. There is one battalion of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, which actually started its history as the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment. The 13th Regiment's motto is "First at Vicksburg" although it appears that the 2nd battalion spent more of its time in Missouri than in the army under Sherman and Grant.
There are also three squadrons of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers, in the division but that's a post war regiment.
The 4th has four brigades and in each brigade is an infantry battalion, the fourth brigade has two battalions. These infantry battalions trace their history to the Civil War. There are two battalions of the 8 and 12th Infantry Regiments. Both units served with the Army of the Potomac. There is one battalion of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, which actually started its history as the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment. The 13th Regiment's motto is "First at Vicksburg" although it appears that the 2nd battalion spent more of its time in Missouri than in the army under Sherman and Grant.
There are also three squadrons of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers, in the division but that's a post war regiment.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Chickamauga
I've been rereading Glenn Tucker's "Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West" for research this past week. Its been awhile since I've read it and this past week has made me realize again how nice a read it is. Oh sure it has its errors and sometimes the order of things is a little odd, but Tucker was a good writer.
Next up I'll read Peter Cozzens' "This Terrible Sound" to flesh out the details and use that as my source material. I read Tucker just to refresh my mind about the flow of the battle. I'll use Cozzens for the meat. Cozzens' book is a good read too, I've read his four western theater battle books and enjoyed them all.
I also have the five Blue & Gray magazines that were recently done on this campaign handy. And then I'll use the new "Maps of Chickamauga" by David Powell to pinpoint any loose details. I noticed that Steven Woodworth has edited a volume of Chickamauga essays that is coming out at the end of April. So hopefully I'll be able to get a copy of that soon too to get another perspective. Truthfully we have a bunch of Chickamauga related literature available right now. Things are looking up.
Then I can really get working on my own Chickamauga project. Hopefully I'll be able to make it as readable as Tucker but have all the facts right too. Luckily I'm not trying to write a whole new battle history, just a smaller project, I don't have the time (or motivation) for that.
Next up I'll read Peter Cozzens' "This Terrible Sound" to flesh out the details and use that as my source material. I read Tucker just to refresh my mind about the flow of the battle. I'll use Cozzens for the meat. Cozzens' book is a good read too, I've read his four western theater battle books and enjoyed them all.
I also have the five Blue & Gray magazines that were recently done on this campaign handy. And then I'll use the new "Maps of Chickamauga" by David Powell to pinpoint any loose details. I noticed that Steven Woodworth has edited a volume of Chickamauga essays that is coming out at the end of April. So hopefully I'll be able to get a copy of that soon too to get another perspective. Truthfully we have a bunch of Chickamauga related literature available right now. Things are looking up.
Then I can really get working on my own Chickamauga project. Hopefully I'll be able to make it as readable as Tucker but have all the facts right too. Luckily I'm not trying to write a whole new battle history, just a smaller project, I don't have the time (or motivation) for that.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Artillery range finder
I recently started rereading Glenn Tucker's "Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West" and was struck by a passage I've obviously read before but did not remember. In telling the story of the Union entrance into Chattanooga in early September 1863 Tucker has a passage about an artillery range finder.
Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry, of Wilder's Brigade, is near the Tennessee River with two rifled 10 pounders of the 5th Wisconsin Battery. There is a small Confederate fort across the river with a brass gun in the center and two steel guns on its flanks. Atkins asks the battery's lieutenant to fire at the fort and the lieutenant pulls out a "flat piece of brass full of holes of different sizes." He finds the hole that corresponds to a man standing up across the river and thus has the range. The first shot dismantled the brass gun and killed four men. (page 17 in the 1992 Morningside reprint)
The source is a speech Atkins gave in 1907 so his memory could be flawed. I did a google image search and found nothing. Has anyone seen this in a museum anywhere? Can anyone verify if the thing even existed?
I would think that if it existed there would be a ton of these made during the war. Word would quickly spread that the 5th Wisconsin Battery always fired its shots at the proper range. The other batteries would want to know how they did so well. Other commanders would want one for the batteries under their command. Sure men could become proficient at judging ranges with their eyes alone but once the first range finder was made it would be pretty simple to make copies. Then every battery in the service could have a bunch so that if the sharp-eyed officers were wounded or killed the other men could still find the correct range quickly. Of course the range finder would be of little use once smoke obscured the enemy but there would be plenty of times it would come in handy. Plus once you got the first range right then adjustments would be very easy as the enemy advanced or retreated.
Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry, of Wilder's Brigade, is near the Tennessee River with two rifled 10 pounders of the 5th Wisconsin Battery. There is a small Confederate fort across the river with a brass gun in the center and two steel guns on its flanks. Atkins asks the battery's lieutenant to fire at the fort and the lieutenant pulls out a "flat piece of brass full of holes of different sizes." He finds the hole that corresponds to a man standing up across the river and thus has the range. The first shot dismantled the brass gun and killed four men. (page 17 in the 1992 Morningside reprint)
The source is a speech Atkins gave in 1907 so his memory could be flawed. I did a google image search and found nothing. Has anyone seen this in a museum anywhere? Can anyone verify if the thing even existed?
I would think that if it existed there would be a ton of these made during the war. Word would quickly spread that the 5th Wisconsin Battery always fired its shots at the proper range. The other batteries would want to know how they did so well. Other commanders would want one for the batteries under their command. Sure men could become proficient at judging ranges with their eyes alone but once the first range finder was made it would be pretty simple to make copies. Then every battery in the service could have a bunch so that if the sharp-eyed officers were wounded or killed the other men could still find the correct range quickly. Of course the range finder would be of little use once smoke obscured the enemy but there would be plenty of times it would come in handy. Plus once you got the first range right then adjustments would be very easy as the enemy advanced or retreated.
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
Spring Hill
Truthfully I should have made this post before I started the Franklin series, but somehow I forgot that I had some Spring Hill pictures. Or maybe I was just too focused on Franklin. In any respect Spring Hill is one of those big what-if moments of the war. Hood had outmaneuvered the Union at Columbia and had a chance to put them in a huge bind. If his men could block the Columbia Pike they would put the Union in a tight spot. The Union army would be separated with the Confederate army between them. Of course you could also look at it that the Confederates would now be surrounded, but generally history has looked at this as a lost opportunity for the Confederates.
Instead the Confederates stopped just short of the Columbia Pike, and slept while the Union army slipped by on the pike. The next morning a furious Hood would berate his top commanders. Some believe that these men responded by being too exposed, too aggressive at the battle of Franklin, which lead to six generals being killed. I think Hood deciding he would make a frontal assault on Franklin instead of finding a way around the town and beating the retreating Union army to Nashville was the reason for the high casualties at Franklin. For whatever reason (and there have been tons of explanations offered for why Hood attacked the way he did) for that style of attack that is why the losses were so severe.
Back to Spring Hill, there is some land preserved and much of the area still is rural. That has changed in recent years, in the few years since I started visiting Spring Hill I've seen new buildings go up in the area and can see that it will only get worse. I have little fear of Savannah growing into the view sheds of Shiloh but I am certain that Franklin's growth will mean growth for Spring Hill and we will lose hallowed ground and view sheds.
The main land preserved at Spring Hill is where Forrest's men attacked, followed later in the day by Cleburne.
The view from the above sign. The ridge line is very obvious but this walk is much steeper than it looks. Not extreme steep but it proves the point that you do not really appreciate maps and books until you walk the ground.
And the view back down the hill. There is a walking trail up here with a few stops that help explain the fight up here.
Back in the parking lot is this state historical marker that has one of the best quotes of the war. Forrest speaking to Chalmers after he was repulsed, "They was in there sure enough, wasn't they, Chalmers?" Cleburne's men then arrived and pushed the attack, succeeding until dark ended the fighting.
On the Columbia Pike, and nearly due west of the preserved land seen earlier, is this sign. It helps show how close the Confederates were to cutting the pike. How this would have affected the course of the war can be debated but the earlier fighting is only a half mile away so once Cleburne drove the Union back there was little to stop them from cutting the pike.
This is very similar to a picture at the beginning of this post. I included it here because it shows some of the preservation issues at Spring Hill. At the base of the hill is a new building (I haven't been back since to see what business happens at the building, it might be a grocery store or a warehouse, I don't know) which was not there on my first visit a few years earlier. In the distance is a highway that handles a lot of traffic heading towards the Saturn plant, as well as the general increase in population in the area. Sad to say but I do not think that this view will remain like this for much longer. If this is the view we have in 2039 for the 175th anniversary I would be very surprised, I think there will be more homes and stores cluttering this view by then. I hope I'm wrong.
Instead the Confederates stopped just short of the Columbia Pike, and slept while the Union army slipped by on the pike. The next morning a furious Hood would berate his top commanders. Some believe that these men responded by being too exposed, too aggressive at the battle of Franklin, which lead to six generals being killed. I think Hood deciding he would make a frontal assault on Franklin instead of finding a way around the town and beating the retreating Union army to Nashville was the reason for the high casualties at Franklin. For whatever reason (and there have been tons of explanations offered for why Hood attacked the way he did) for that style of attack that is why the losses were so severe.
Back to Spring Hill, there is some land preserved and much of the area still is rural. That has changed in recent years, in the few years since I started visiting Spring Hill I've seen new buildings go up in the area and can see that it will only get worse. I have little fear of Savannah growing into the view sheds of Shiloh but I am certain that Franklin's growth will mean growth for Spring Hill and we will lose hallowed ground and view sheds.
The main land preserved at Spring Hill is where Forrest's men attacked, followed later in the day by Cleburne.
The view from the above sign. The ridge line is very obvious but this walk is much steeper than it looks. Not extreme steep but it proves the point that you do not really appreciate maps and books until you walk the ground.
And the view back down the hill. There is a walking trail up here with a few stops that help explain the fight up here.
Back in the parking lot is this state historical marker that has one of the best quotes of the war. Forrest speaking to Chalmers after he was repulsed, "They was in there sure enough, wasn't they, Chalmers?" Cleburne's men then arrived and pushed the attack, succeeding until dark ended the fighting.
On the Columbia Pike, and nearly due west of the preserved land seen earlier, is this sign. It helps show how close the Confederates were to cutting the pike. How this would have affected the course of the war can be debated but the earlier fighting is only a half mile away so once Cleburne drove the Union back there was little to stop them from cutting the pike.
This is very similar to a picture at the beginning of this post. I included it here because it shows some of the preservation issues at Spring Hill. At the base of the hill is a new building (I haven't been back since to see what business happens at the building, it might be a grocery store or a warehouse, I don't know) which was not there on my first visit a few years earlier. In the distance is a highway that handles a lot of traffic heading towards the Saturn plant, as well as the general increase in population in the area. Sad to say but I do not think that this view will remain like this for much longer. If this is the view we have in 2039 for the 175th anniversary I would be very surprised, I think there will be more homes and stores cluttering this view by then. I hope I'm wrong.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Kennesaw Mountain
Once again this is a pre-digital picture post.
Kennesaw Mountain is a tough battle to tour. The preserved land tends to only be the Confederate trenches so you cannot follow the Union attacks much, although in some places there is enough preserved to give you the feel of the final bit of the assault (and at Kennesaw that's almost all you need). Sure I would love if more was preserved but we have to deal with what's left.
On the big Kennesaw Mountain are some Confederate entrenchments that still appear very strong.
Kennesaw Mountain is a tough battle to tour. The preserved land tends to only be the Confederate trenches so you cannot follow the Union attacks much, although in some places there is enough preserved to give you the feel of the final bit of the assault (and at Kennesaw that's almost all you need). Sure I would love if more was preserved but we have to deal with what's left.
On the big Kennesaw Mountain are some Confederate entrenchments that still appear very strong.
But the point here is not how strong the position was but what it protects, and you can get a nice view of hazy Atlanta from here. Clearly the Confederates are running out of ground. There are still places they can make stands and strike at the Union army but it is obvious that there is not much ground to give. If they are to strike back they need to pick their spots in a hurry.
But at Kennesaw Sherman has decided to stop moving around the flank and give battle. He realizes how close he is getting to Atlanta and hopes for a big victory to shorten this campaign. But it will fail.
Most of what is preserved, fighting wise, is the area at Cheatham's Hill. Here some very savage fighting will center along an area known as the Dead Angle. Cheatham and Cleburne had very strong entrenchments and will severely handle the Union assault. 8000 Union soldiers will make the assault and in 90 minutes will lose over 1000 while Confederate casualties were roughly a third of that.
A view from one of the Confederate forts, this one looking right at modern traffic.
This is the view from Cheatham's Hill. This is actually a pretty long open area, and somewhat steep. This would have been very brutal to attack across.
The battlefield park started initially as this Illinois monument placed at the top of the hill, with a small parcel of land around it. Later more land was added and eventually it became the national park we know today.
Some Union soldiers were trapped near the top of the hill, unwilling to retreat across the open ground and unable to go forward. So they dug a mine in hopes of blowing up the trenches, this didn't work but it kept them busy.
Along Cheatham Hill are a few monuments like this to fallen Union soldiers.
The best picture I managed of the entrenchments. Trees and kudzu have made it a bit difficult to see but you can get some feel for it.
To the south of Cheatham Hill is Kolb's Farm, which was fought for about a week earlier. There is very little preserved here, I only included it as an example of what much of the Atlanta area battlefields look like. One small piece of ground is preserved, and traffic buzzes by a short distance away.
Monday, March 8, 2010
Confederate Cemetery at Franklin
In the spring of 1866 the Confederate dead were reinterred on the McGavock family estate. Their house, Carnton, had been a field hospital during the battle and as discussed in a previous post is now open for paid tours. The cemetery is also open to the public. The dead have been grouped by state and there are individual headstones with as much information as possible for each man.
Each state also has a marker with the number of dead from that state. The state historical society marker lists the internments at 1496 but if you tally the totals from each state marker the total is 1481.
Here are some shots of the cemetery. Its a rather simple design, one big central walkway with burials in lines on either side.
Once I was there and flags for each state were out. I like the look of that too.
On the south side of the Confederate cemetery is the McGavock family cemetery.
And now the state markers.
Each state also has a marker with the number of dead from that state. The state historical society marker lists the internments at 1496 but if you tally the totals from each state marker the total is 1481.
Here are some shots of the cemetery. Its a rather simple design, one big central walkway with burials in lines on either side.
Once I was there and flags for each state were out. I like the look of that too.
On the south side of the Confederate cemetery is the McGavock family cemetery.
Additionally General Johnson Kelly Duncan is buried here. Duncan was born in 1827 in Pennsylvania and graduated 5th in the West Point class of 1849. He resigned in 1855 and did some engineering work in Louisiana. When the war began he became colonel of the 1st Louisiana Regular Artillery but in January 1862 was promoted to brigadier general and put in charge of the lower Mississippi River defenses (Forts Jackson and St. Philip). He was captured when the forts fell and after his exchange became Bragg's chief of staff. He died of malaria in Knoxville on December 18, 1862 and was later buried here.
And now the state markers.
Alabama
Arkansas
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
The Unknowns
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
The Unknowns
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